Re: [anti-spam-wg@localhost] Contacts

["Dr. Jeffrey Race" <]

Thank you Paul for your excellent comments which help me to understand
what I need do to spiff up my proposal and explain it more clearly.
Some of your points I will be able to incorporate to good advantage.
On others you err because you seem unaware of certain current best
practices.  On still others a closer reading of the text of my
proposal would have revealed that the point is covered already.

I will respond point by point.   Please come back to us, if you have
time, with a critique of my reasoning or suggestions for improvement
as the case may be.

I should start by saying that this proposal is intended to move from
the "victims pay" model on which the Internet now operates, to a
"polluters {and enablers} pay" model, which means a lot of basic
assumptions about behavior have to change.   I think that is why
you and others balk at some of my ideas, because you are still living
in the "victims pay" world.


On Mon, 3 Feb 2003 19:48:00 +0100 (MET), Paul Wouters wrote:

>On Mon, 3 Feb 2003, Dr. Jeffrey Race wrote:
>> Please read the (early) draft proposal at
>> <www.camblab.com/misc/univ_std.txt> [snip]
>1) There are effective legal means (suing enduser, suing accomplice ISPs)

There are no effective legal means now for the reasons detailed in
my proposal.  Please reread the explanation there.  If there were
effective legal means, the reception of spam would be decreasing. It
is increasing.

>2) There are efective technical means (blacklists, firewalls,
de-peering,etc)

Blacklists are very effective within limits, and I build upon this.
Firewalls and de-peering do not stop the transmission of spam, nor
do blacklists.   All these technical measures leave intact the
burden on the network, and they are part of the discredited "victims
pay" model.

>3) There is a regulatory base which can be used (AUP's contractual
obligations)

Many service providers do not enforces their AUPs.

>
>The reason these are not as bright and shiny as you wish, is because:
>
>1) It is profitable to send spam
>2) It is profitable to host spammers

Thank you for repeating the thrust of the preamble to my proposal.

>In other words. This is not YOUR internet. It doesn't work as you want
>because other people actually want it to be so. Yes, it frustrates me to
>no end when I talk to a spammer, and and he shows me graphs like:
>
>http://www.xtdnet.nl/paul/spam/pornspam.png
>
>But you have to face reality. A large part of the internet users claim to
>hate spam, but they will visit and even buy the crap.
>And similarly, since not many ISP's host spammers, the few that do can 
ask
>exorbitant prices (God of free market rulez), and tend to be the biggr 
ones
>that can afford to ignore the complains (and need the money in post .com)
>
>> At present there are few or no disincentives for abuse,
>> so abuse may be expected to increase without limit until the Internet
is
>> destroyed as a viable communication mechanism.
>
>Wild speculation on your side.

It's hardly speculation; it is a fact that many of my friends wake
in the morning to find hundreds of spams in their inboxes.   Many firms
have abandoned e-mail for customer contact.   I myself cannot put
up a mailto tag on my websites because of the spam problem.


 The end of the world hasn't happend yet.
>It didn't happen with Usenet, didn't happen with uuencoded binaries,
>didn't happen with 10MB size emails. And it won't happen even if the
>spammers send us DVD quality MPEG's as previews to their porn DVD's.

In my view there is no more point in discussing how much spam is bad
than in discussing how many times my offspring may drive drunkenly.
It is unacceptable, and there is no reason to tolerate it.

>
>> Since both legal and technical measures have failed and will continue
to
>> fail, only the behavior modification method of stopping abuse remains,
>
>Abuse of any systme will always happen.

Yes, I said in my proposal there will be residual polluted areas.
Thank you for confirming my exegesis.

 You have to make sure that
>1) only a small fraction can abuse the system
>2) if possible, make the abuse unaffordable
>
>1) can be done, but we all know the price. Every single bit
authenticated,

I don't know where you get "every single bit authenticated"; I never
advocated such a thing because it is doomed to fail as I state in
my proposal.   No technical measure will every succeed because the
spammers are as smart as the anti-spammers and a lot more motivated.


>and the end of anonimity. It's not worth the price.

Again I have no idea where you get this from.   My proposal preserves
just as much anonymity as there is now.

>2) is up to the endusers to not buy spamvertised products.

This is the discredited "victim pays" model.


 It hardly matters
>what netadmin's do.
>
>> and the only proven effective method of behavior modification is
>> withdrawal of IR of identity and connectivity to continue abuse.
>
>It seems you are saying that the solution to save the internet already 
has
>a proof? I think you mean to say "if we disconnect users, we have fixed
>their misbhaviour".

Now you get it!   Either my daughter drives responsibly, in which
case she does not injure others, or she drives (briefly) irresponsibly
and no longer has the car keys.   Either way there is no long-term
injury to others.   It works, believe me.  It is 100% effective.


>
>> (1) It makes explicit that every custodian of IR is responsible for
>>      preventing abuse from emerging out of his IR onto the Internet
>>      and is responsible for the consequences of such abuse on others 


>
>You cannot make this a reality without killing 95% of the ISP's,

This is the discredited argument of the Environmental Polluters: "No
one will be able to afford our products if we have to add to the
cost of our product the damage we inflict on society".    GE is
still in business, making more money than ever.

There is no evidence whatever that the ISP industry would fail if
it had to internalize the cost of the damage it inflicts on society.
Many ISPs are run responsibly and they do just fine.   The worst
offenders are the bankrupt ones or the ones circling the drain
(UU, Worldcom, Sprint, Level3).

>leaving only the international carriers being able to afford the legal
>and financial risk of hosting any customers.

No evidence for your strong declaration.  Plenty of disconfirming
evidence.

 This is one heck of a way
>to stiffle free speech.

Has nothing to do with free speech.  It is about theft of resources.
This has been litigated endlessly with always the same result.

After all, me attacking McDonalds on a website
>www.mcdonaldsruinsthworld.org is clearly IR abuse (at least, it is clear
>to McDonalds lawyers, which is all that matters)

No, it is not all that matters.   My proposal does not define abuse
in this way.

That being said, I'd welcome from Paul or anyone some other takes on
the definition I proposed.


>
>>  (2) Adopting a universal standard of withdrawal of IR, by common
>>      procedures, means that no SP will suffer competitive disadvantage
>>      from cooperating in the community effort to halt network abuse
>>      because all will adopt simultaneously (or lose Internet
>>      connectivity).
>
>Right. Microsoft Benelux spams me every 6 months. Is that reason for all
>ISP's in the world to ban microsoft.com?

My proposal does not advance such a step.  It would result in an
admonishment to MS-Benelux and if they didn't get the message (in fact
they would) then withdrawal of some limited IR resources, gradually
escalating  (in the unlikely case the perp were refractory) until
someone high up in the perp's firm decided to play by the rules.

There are numerous documented cases of this and they always shape
up when the keys are about to be taken away.  I can provide cites to
cases of refractory service providers reforming under the gun if you
want.

Let's say we all agree on that,
>does it mean that a few repeated spams from Microsoft Benelux should
>take out windowsupdates.microsoft.com?

No, see above.

How can I clarify my proposal, please, so that this type of
misunderstanding does not arise?

 And even if we ISP's agree on that,
>and do terminate them, who is going to defend that when a hospitable
Microsoft
>machine didn't fetch an update and kills a patient?
>We are ISP's. We canont determine what's best for society.

Paul, if your management cannot figure out that spam (and attendant
ills) is a grave economic burden on society, then they ought to go
into another business.  Of course you were being rhetorical, because
no one could make such a silly statement with a straight face:)




 Just like car
>manufacturors don't get to set the maximum speed on highways.
>
>>(3) This standard places the burden of abuse on the abuse enabler rather
>>      than on the victim, so conforming to practice elsewhere in
society.
>
>So I dail up through AT&T, and have my browser send out fake REFERER
strings,
>and spam into everyone's access_log. You kill my account,

No, the proposal states that there has to be an investigation.  How
can I reword it so that people do not make mistakenly simplistic
objections as you just did?


I take a new one,
>and I play this game until AT&T gets their address space yanked or they
>start filtering all their customers browsers (which is probably illegal).


It's not illegal and LOTS of providers (the well-run ones) already
check for subject lines, number of destination addresses, hostile
attachment payloads.

My proposal is intended to raise the entire industry to the level
of the best current players.

>One way or the other AT&T loses. Add to that I can actually fake lots of
>abuse, and the web becomes just too intricate for AT&T to unravel.

None of this is so.  See above.

>
>> (4) This standard legitimates withdrawal of IR as the only method
proven
>>       effective in halting abuse.
>
>You claim at the beginning this document is a "Best Practice". This item
>makes it a "Only mandatory practise".

Yes I am unfamiliar with the workings of the relevant bodies.  Please
help me to improve the precision of the terminology.

 By doing that, you actually pretend
>to be speaking on behalve of "the community at large",

I speak on behalf of no one but myself and am putting forth in good
faith a proposal for others to consider and improve.  However it is
a very different approach from those currently bruited about which
have all failed and will continue to fail.

[Parenthetical note:  I was involved years ago in a situation of
overarching importance for my country and wrote a very famous book
War Comes to Long An, which is now the classic analysis of that
problem, what went wrong, and what was the fix.   It is still sold
30 years later and used around the world.   I am confident I am not
wrong on this issue either.]

while you're just
>policing the whole internet, instead of adopting its core philosophy of
>"Be liberal in what you receive, strict in what you sent"

It has failed.

 which is part
>of the "Best Practises". Best Practises are recommendations,and not
>internet laws.
>
>> As a voluntary community, the Internet may do so at will
>
>I think you mean "MUST",


OK this needs fixing, thank you.  I am still learning.  (I am not
even in this industry, just a drive-by-shooting victim.)

since "may do so" is already possible for
>everyone who manages IR currently.
>
>> This document is intended to legitimate such withdrawals
>
>Legitimate under which law? which juristiction? Which enforcers?
>Which court? What Appeals?

None of this has anything to do with laws because we are talking
about private voluntary agreements, just like members of a church
or private social club who can discipline their memberships without
recourse to the legal system.

This is a good point you make though, and I welcome ideas how to
improve my text.


>
>> The withdrawal of IR (use of blocklists, cancellation of routing,
>> withdrawal of IP addresses and domain names) may at first split the
>> Internet into zones of purity and islands of pollution.  As blockage 
>> expands, abusers will be pushed into ever smaller and less connected 
>> domains, which grow ever more blocked.  This cumulative process will 
>> end quickly, with residual polluted areas populated by those lacking 
>> a need to communicate with zones of purity.
>
>Keep on dreaming. You think you can disconnect the pollution island of
>UUnet? AOL? This is unrealistic. Too much money is involved.

You have hit on the key point.    I will explain in more detail why
I am not so pessimistic as you.  I had lots of runins with UU who
proved almost totally insincere in their behavior.  I finally figured
out  (long before the financial frauds emerged) that their management
were just scum polluters.

The problem is that no few courageous souls can take on the Goliaths.
But if we "all jump at once"  then it is possible.   My proposal
aims to bring us to the stage where everyone says simultaneously to
UU scum and their like, OK this is it, shape up or you are cut off
now.   This happened to Telstra in Australia and it was a complete
success.  That is just how it happened.


>
>> This standard is intended to apply at every level of allocation,
>> registration and usage of IR including but not limited to RIRs, LIRs,
>> ISPs, backbone providers, domain name registrars, and end-users.
>
>So if RIPE doesn't enforce valid email addresses, you are
>going to disconnect Europe and Africa?

No you just disconnect a few abusers.

However the point is (as the parent of every teenager knows) that if
it is  VERY CLEAR that explicit rules of behavior will be ruthlessly
enforced, in fact you never have to impose punishments because the
perps reform.

Do you deny this?

 You're going to revoke
>all domains hosted by NetworkSolutions cause they keep spamming us?

No but I would start by cutting off their corporate mail servers which
has proven repeatedly to get the attention of scum managements without
affecting their customers.  Join Spam-L and read all about it.



>(committing fraud actually with their way of invoicing for moved domains)
>Kill all of UUnet's customers who have done nothing wrong but selected a
>what turned out to be bad ISP?

Would never happen for reasons stated above.


>
>> and to prevent their abuse to create injury to other users or
custodians
>> of IR, including but not limited to transmission of UBE, viruses,
worms,
>> conduct of denial-of-service attacks, and propagation of Trojan
>> programs.
>
>Ahh, everyone is now also forced to run proprietary comercial anti-virus
>software?

The universal rule in civil society is you are not allowed to cause
injury to others through intention or negligence and if your
property does, then you must pay the damages.   So well run
organizations take preventive steps with e-mail, just as they
make sure the brakes are checked on their vehicles.   The point of
my proposal is to bring current best practices of many providers
to widespread industry adoption.   I am not proposing anything
unusual here.  It is the way the rest of the world works, and
some parts of the Internet.   Why should troublemakers be exempted?
If you believe they should, please explain why.

Isn't it more fair to actually just remove Microsoft from the
>intertnet, since they are responsible for the polution to begin with, by
>writing bad software?

Well this is really two issues, but I'll take the second one:
their clever lawyers included clauses in the EULA exempting them
from all legal consequences for the injuries their products cause
the victims.

[snip irrelevant rhetorical verbiage]

>> - using any e-mail or domain address on its network for receiving
>>    replies to UBE
>
>So if I spam with paulwouters@localhost you get your domain pulled?

No the user account is pulled, as ATT does already.  I'd like every
provider to be as good as ATT (or better).

>Or do I need to spam with 10? 100?

Please read the definition.

of attglobal accounts? What if I
>fake your domain? Fake someone else's domain/product by spamming through
>you?
>

This is the joe job issue which is clearly covered in my proposal.
I don't know why you keep harping on it.

From following threads on Spam-L, it is apparent that joe jobs are
unmasked within days or even hours through various technical
investigative measures.    Go there and read the traffic.   This
is not an issue in practice.

>> - open relays, open proxies, or accessible scripting programs
>>     abusable for any forbidden purpose
>
>Who defines "forbidden purpose".

It is defined in the proposal as abuse.

 This document becomes circular now.
>
>> - use of the SP's IR to promote tools or services to commit abuse
>
>What is abuse?

It is defined in the proposal.  Please reread it.

 What is free speech, what is parody? in which juristiction?

This has nothing to do with free speech.  We are talking about
theft of service.

>
>> SPs shall ensure, by prior notice to all users and intending users, and
>> by periodic testing
>
>Where are tests available?

Paul, lots of providers do this already.   See Spam-L.  It is
discussed extensively there.   We need to make sure everyone does it.
(Just as you are responsible for keeping your car road-worthy.)

 How do I test whether my customer is using a Korean
>spammer? How do I test my customer is engaged in "forbidden purpose"?

You enable an <abuse> address per RFC 2142 and read your mail.


What
>if customers block my tester IP's?

They may do this if they do their own testing.   Lots of networks
operate this way.

 What if the testing itself is a
>violation of local law? national law?

Can you cite such a law?

 breach of contract?


Rewrite the contract.

>
>> This AUP shall bind all contracting parties and require them to bind 
>> their sub-contracting parties likewise with these minimum standards. 
>
>The AUP can never sign away constituational rights or obligations.
>

I advocate no such thing.    My proposals, as I intend them (though
I welcome suggestions for improvement) merely establish a structure
by which everyone becomes responsible for the consequencs of his
actions.


>> the standard shall be financial penalties for infringement
>
>Right so the moron who thinks to pay his alimoney using faked
>viagra pills advertised through spam is going to pay me
>damages?

I don't understand.


 Or the professional spammer is not going to setup a few fake
>holding companies to bankrupt without a loss?

This is not the way they usually work.   However fraud pierces
the corporate veil universally.

You will only be able
>top cash in from the ignorant stupid ones, and they are not the
>resource problem. It's the repeated powerspammers with some money yo
>hide themselves that are the real problem.

The identities of these people are known.  See ROKSO.

>
>
>
>> In the event a connectivity provider elects not to provide for
>> financial penalties in its AUP, it must have a clearly documented
>> procedure in place to prevent re-application for resources by
>> disconnected abusers.
>
>This seems to suggest that by having customers pay a penalty, they
>will stop spamming. I doubt that, spamming is making money, so they
>can pay the fine as well.

That's the point: if you spam, you don't get reconnected.

 Also, whether or not having a fine won't
>have any effect on someone re-applying under another (false) name.

This is an indictable offense.
>
>> The reasoning for this election not to use financial penalties
>> shall be open to public inspection.
>
>What public inspection? Whose public inspection?

On the firm's website.
>
>> Notional 'financial penalties' shall not be utilized as a cover for a
>> continuing revenue stream from an abuser.
>
>How can the ISP determine the spammer takes it as such, when using
>differnt false identities?

That problem goes away when they have to sign under penalties of
perjury.

>
>
>> At a minimum the application process shall require the applicant to
>> specify whether he (if a natural person) or it or any of its principals
>> (if a juristic person) has been disconnected from service previously by
>> any SP.
>
>So the thief has to lie one more time. Big deal. Useless information.

It's not useless because there are criminal sanctions for this.
>
>> Applicants accepted for service who reabuse shall be turned
>> over to local criminal authorities for prosecution for fraud.
>
>Breach of contract is not fraud, and cannot be prosecuted penally.
>
Breach of a valid contract is a civil matter but inducing another
to sign a contract without yourself ever intending ab initio to
abide by it is fraud in the inducement, a criminal offense in many
or most jurisdictions.  (In this case no contract was ever created
because there was never the "meeting of minds" which is the essence
of a contract.)

>> A pattern of failing to turn serial abusers over to local criminal
>> authorities shall be deemed ground for enforcement action against
>> the SP under this standard.
>
>Breach of RFC is not fraud, and cannot be prosecuted penally.

No, but the RIR can be penalized by the Internet community.  This
part of the proposal needs fleshing out.  I welcome comment.

(there is
>no contract between RIR's and endusers)

I lack knowledge of the intimate details so welcome comment from
anyone if this point needs attention.


>> Using public resources entails waiving so much of one's privacy as is
>> required to maintain the usability of the resources, and being
>> contactable is an essential element of system maintenance.
>
>Who are you to forbid anonimity because thers have abused it.

Where do you get this from?   I affirm not forbid anonymity.
[snip irrelevancies]

>> A valid postal address is essential for legal service.
>
>A postal address for a $20/month website is ridicilious and opens up
>the small website for an even worse kind of physical abuse. (In some
>countries, natural persons cannot get a PObox)
>
>> Telephone and fascimile numbers and e-mail address are necessary for 
>> redundancy and rapid technical coordination.
>
>And enables harassment and violates many privacy laws (esp in Europe)
>
Well it may be so but those are the regulations already in force.
I merely restate them.

>> Technical measures such as challenge/response to preclude harvesting 
>> are permitted and encouraged.
>
>Hah! You see your own catch-22. You are creating a breeding ground for
>spammers by forcing people to register their address and phone numbers.
>
It is the rule already.  I am just repeating the rule.

>> An exception may be made for registrants having a genuinely documented
>> requirement for anonymity, in which case the registrar assumes the
>> responsibility for timely contacting the registrant on behalf of the 
>> public.
>
>That won't work, because if the registrant abused that freedo, you
>punish the registrar. Therefor, the registrar, from a commercial point of
>view will never allow this exception to happen.


Well we can see.  I foresee no one having an objection to disconnecting
service to any abuser whether named or anonymous.
>
>> Registrars shall ensure that contact data are active and that contact
>> addresses (e.g. Postmaster and RFC-recommended role accounts) are
>> properly operated by registrants.
>
>How can registrars do that (against malicious users) How can anyone
>ensure delivery to any known and harvestable email address?

You test it.  There are testing programs.   Responsible organizations
already do this.

Also you respond to complaints.

>
>> All IR custodians shall, with the exception noted below, know the true
>> identity of its IR users, so that accountability for behavior may be 
>> ensured and financial or criminal penalties imposed as necessary.
>
>Unenforcable. First of all, all these 'test memberships' won't work
>with that, and you can't seriously want to ban those. Second, why should
>I be forced to keep a register of real usres. Again, who are you (or the
>registrar) to disallow anonimity?

Please see above.  I explicitly allow it.

 Also, it opens up the ISP to lawsuits to
>obtain the identity that could otherwise be better protected (such as
>taking domicile at a lawfirm.
>
>> For technical or economic reasons (such as prepaid or free services),
or
>> for other valid reasons such as safety of users
>
>Define these reasons objectively.

Please make suggestions.

I left it this way because such matters are mostly judgment calls
and I trust most people's judgment.   We have only the problem with
the dishonest operations like UU which have an AUP but don't enforce
it.

>
>> In such cases the provider must adopt technical measures such as rate-
>> limiting, port-blocking, or caller ID, to preclude the abuse of the
>> anonymously-used IR.
>
>That's offering crippleware to anonymous users. They deserve the same
>rights as other non-anonymous users.

Responsible and well-run service providers use these measures already.


>
>> First, ALL observers of abuse shall report each incident of abuse to 
the
>> responsible party,
>
>So all receivers of spam now mandatorily have to read all their spam
>manually to report back through email to an already overloaded and abused
>mailserver? I am not going to read hundreds of spams/day. I am not
>going to put a fulltime employee on reading my mailserver logs.
>And what about people preventing the reception of spam. Are they
violating
>the report clause?

This is a weak part and I welcome suggestions.  I might drop this
section.

>
>[ Environmental Polluter business story ]
>
>Explained in previous email
>
>> Faster response is permitted and encouraged provided it is
>> not susceptible to errors from mistaken reports or malicious
>> identify thefts (colloquially "job jobs").
>
>You can never prevent that anyone. I register spamproduct.com, and
>hire John Doe to spam for me from Korea, then proof I have no
>business relationship with this person, and claim he''s trying to ruin
>my good name by spamming as me. Meanwhile I harvest and get rich.
>Add a few pseudo fights a few months before the spams so Google turns
>up our fight. Who is then going to take any responsibility for the
>(in)action?

See above..  These are figured out quickly.   It is not a practical
problem.

You put the ISP between two fires. Punishment by LIR or
>lawsuit from customer.

Well this is a common problem in real life so we are not exempt
from it.  We have to make a best effort based on the evidence.

>
>> - For defective database information, the registrar shall notify
>>   the registrant of the defect within 24 hours and require compliance
>>   within 15 calendar days.
>
>And on day 16, the customer deletes that email address. Nothing gained.

No, you misunderstand here.  How can I explain it better?  I mean
the domain is deregistered.   I have done this successfully many
times already.

But some registrars are refractory.   That would stop under this
proposal.
>
>> COST IS NEVER PERMITTED TO JUSTIFY FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT ANTI-ABUSE
MEASURES.
>
>No one will agree to this policy. Absolutely no one is going to take the
>risk and make this world a bettr place. "Free market" ideals.

This is an essential point because otherwise it allows the
Environmental Polluter model.

>
>> publicly in any appropriate medium making this a public archival
record.
>
>We stopped doing this centuries ago (apart from EasyCar, which puts all
>the customers who, for whatever reason, possibly valid, return the car 
>late, on their website)

No, you are mistaken here.  Responsible providers document abuses
by (ex-) customers.  Instead of 404 it says "This site removed
for violation of AUP by spamming".

I am just trying to universalize current best practice.

>
>>  - Limiting or withdrawal of peering or hierarchical connectivity
>
>That would constitute a Breach of contract.

Rewrite the contract.  These things are done every day.  This is
not any kind of valid objection to my proposal.

>
>> - Limiting or withdrawal of resources (e.g. including but not limited
>>    to IP address space or domain names, routing announcements, SWIP
>>    assignments, forward and reverse DNS)
>
>Either breach of contract, or the establishment of contact (and
liability)
>where there was none before.
>
>>  - Limiting or withdrawal of authority over IR (e.g. to register)
>
>Breach of contract.


No and in fact ICANN has started action against Network Solutions for
exactly this matter.  See
 <http://www.icann.org/announcements/announcement-03sep02.htm>

Again, I am just codifying current best practice.

> And huge effects to customers of that register.

I am a customer of Network Solutions and am moving to another
registrar because of their unethical behavior.

>Let's say we now withdraw the authority of NetworkSolutions for spamming.

No but for colluding in fraudulent registrations, yes!

>What happens to the domasins registerd through them? They expire? You
>notify all 4 million domain holders to move?

Well obviously there would be a graceful transition procedure.  It
is a level of detail that is not yet timely to discuss.  It is not
an objection to the proposal.
>
>> No legal cause of action shall exist against any party for obedience to
>> this standard.
>
>Return to lawyer immediately. Do not pass Go.
>
>You can't sign away constitutional rights or duties.

I do not.

We can't sign this
>document and then you tell me to go bankrupt a company by taking their
>address space, and then say they can't sue us.

In fact the courts pay careful attention to RFCs, which have been
introduced into lots of litigation.   If it is stated that there is
X consequence for Y infraction (injuring others) and the tortfeasor
knows of this consequence and takes no action to remedy the injury
(or cease committing it) then no court is likely to allow him
damages if X happens to him and it destroys his business.   The
court will reason that the management destroyed its own business.
Happens every day.


>
>
>In short. In the idealological universe where these rules could possibly
>be adopted, there wouldn't be a single entity dreaming of violating it in
>the first place.

Well here I have to agree with you.   However every great idea
begins in the mind of one man (or woman, in the case of my wife).
If the ideas are good they will catch on.   That is what happened
with my book.   Took years.  That's why I have to get moving!

>
>Paul

Best regards to all.  Please comment.

Kind regards,

Jeffrey Race
Cambridge Electronics Laboratories
Today in Bangkok Thailand
Fax +66 2 688-4540 (backup +66 2 271-4956)
Tel +66 1 239-8197 (mobile 24 hours)
Tel +66 2 291-2235 (res)
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Tel +66 2 279-6162 (ofc)
 jrace@localhost

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