- Legend
- Added
- Deleted
Last updated March 2012
1. Introduction
1. 1. Overview
1. 2. Document Name and Identification
1. 3. PKI Participants
1. 3. 1. Certification Authorities
1. 3. 2. Registration Authorities
1. 3. 3. Subscribers
1. 3. 4. Relying parties
1. 3. 5. Other participants
1. 4. Certificate Usage
1. 4. 1. Appropriate certificate uses
1. 4. 2. Prohibited certificate uses
1. 5. CPS Administration
1. 5. 1. Organisation administering the document
1. 5. 2. Contact person
1. 5. 3. Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
1. 5. 4. CPS approval procedures
1. 6. Definitions and Acronyms
2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
2. 1. Repositories
2. 2. Publication of Certification Information
2. 3. Time or Frequency of Publication
2. 4. Access Controls on Repositories
3. Identification And Authentication
3. 1. Naming
3. 1. 1. Types of names
3. 1. 2. Need for names to be meaningful
3. 1. 3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
3. 1. 4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
3. 1. 5. Uniqueness of names
3. 1. 6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
3. 2. Initial Identity Validation
3. 2. 1. Method to prove possession of private key
3. 2. 2. Authentication of organisation identity
3. 2. 3. Authentication of individual identity
3. 2. 4. Non-verified subscriber information
3. 2. 5. Validation of authority
3. 2. 6. Criteria for interoperation
3. 3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests
3. 3. 1. Identification and authentication for routine re-key
3. 3. 2. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
3. 4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4. 1. Certificate Application
4. 1. 1. Who can submit a certificate application
4. 1. 2. Enrolment process and responsibilities
4. 2. Certificate Application Processing
4. 2. 1. Performing identification and authentication functions
4. 2. 2. Approval of certificate applications
4. 2. 3. Time to process certificate applications
4. 3. Certificate Issuance
4. 3. 1. CA actions during certificate issuance
4. 3. 2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
4. 3. 3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
4. 4. Certificate Acceptance
4. 4. 1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
4. 4. 2. Publication of the certificate by the CA
4. 5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage
4. 5. 1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
4. 5. 2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
4. 6. Certificate Renewal
4. 6. 1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
4. 6. 2. Who may request renewal
4. 6. 3. Processing certificate renewal requests
4. 6. 4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
4. 6. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
4. 6. 6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
4. 6. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
4. 7. Certificate Re-Key
4. 7. 1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
4. 7. 2. Who may request certification of a new public key
4. 7. 3. Processing certificate re-keying requests
4. 7. 4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
4. 7. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
4. 7. 6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
4. 7. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
4. 8. Certificate Modification
4. 8. 1. Circumstance for certificate modification
4. 9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension
4. 9. 1. Circumstances for revocation
4. 9. 2. Who can request revocation
4. 9. 3. Procedure for revocation request
4. 9. 4. Revocation request grace period
4. 9. 5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
4. 9. 6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
4. 9. 7. CRL issuance frequency
4. 9. 8. Maximum latency for CRLs
4. 9. 9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4. 9. 10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4. 9. 11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4. 9. 12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4. 9. 13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4. 9. 14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4. 9. 15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4. 9. 16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4. 10. Certificate Status Services
4. 10. 1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
4. 10. 2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4. 10. 3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4. 11. End of Subscription [OMITTED]
4. 12. Key Escrow and Recovery [OMITTED]
4. 12. 1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4. 12. 2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
5. Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5. 1. Physical Controls
5. 1. 1. Site location and construction
5. 1. 2. Physical access
5. 1. 3. Power and air conditioning
5. 1. 4. Water exposures
5. 1. 5. Fire prevention and protection
5. 1. 6. Media storage
5. 1. 7. Waste disposal
5. 1. 8. Off-site backup
5. 2. Procedural Controls
5. 2. 1. Trusted roles
5. 2. 2. Number of persons required per task
5. 2. 3. Identification and authentication for each role
5. 2. 4. Roles requiring separation of duties
5. 3. Personnel Controls
5. 3. 1. Qualifications, experience and clearance requirements
5. 3. 2. Background check procedures
5. 3. 3. Training requirements
5. 3. 4. Retraining frequency and requirements
5. 3. 5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
5. 3. 6. Sanctions for unauthorised actions
5. 3. 7. Independent contractor requirements
5. 3. 8. Documentation supplied to personnel
5. 4. Audit Logging Procedures
5. 4. 1. Types of events recorded
5. 4. 2. Frequency of processing log
5. 4. 3. Retention period for audit log
5. 4. 4. Protection of audit log
5. 4. 5. Audit log backup procedures
5. 4. 6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5. 4. 7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5. 4. 8. Vulnerability assessments
5. 5. Key Changeover
5. 6. CA or RA Termination
6. Technical Security Controls
6. 1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
6. 1. 1. Key pair generation
6. 1. 2. Private key delivery to subscriber
6. 1. 3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
6. 1. 4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
6. 1. 5. Key sizes
6. 1. 6. Public key parameters generation and quality checking
6. 1. 7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
6. 2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6. 2. 1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
6. 2. 2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
6. 2. 3. Private key escrow
6. 2. 4. Private key backup
6. 2. 5. Private key archival
6. 2. 6. Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
6. 2. 7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
6. 2. 8. Method of activating private key
6. 2. 9. Method of deactivating private key
6. 2. 10. Method of destroying private key
6. 2. 11. Cryptographic Module Rating
6. 3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6. 3. 1. Public key archival
6. 3. 2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
6. 4. Activation Data
6. 4. 1. Activation data generation and installation
6. 4. 2. Activation data protection
6. 4. 3. Other aspects of activation data
6. 5. Computer Security Controls
6. 5. 1. Specific computer security technical requirement
6. 5. 2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6. 6. Life Cycle Technical Controls
6. 6. 1. System development controls
6. 6. 2. Security management controls
6. 6. 3. Life cycle security controls
6. 7. Network Security Controls
6. 8. Time-Stamping
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles [OMITTED]
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
8. 1. Frequency or Circumstances of Assessment
8. 2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessor
8. 3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity
8. 4. Topics Covered by Assessment
8. 5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency
8. 6. Communication of Results
9. References
1. Introduction
As per Certification Policy (CP)
[RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ]:This document is the Certification Practice Statement of the RIPE NCC. It describes the practices employed by the RIPE NCC Certification Authority (CA) in the Resource [RFC6484] Link: #RFC6484 :
(RPKI). These practices are defined in accordance with the requirements of the Certificate Policy (CP) [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ] for RPKI.RPKI
The structure of the Resource PKI (RPKI) is congruent with the number resource allocation framework of the Internet and parallels the existing INR distribution hierarchy. These INRs are distributed by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to the Internet. The IANA allocates Internet number resources to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), among others, as well as for special purposes [ RFC 8190 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8190 ]. The RIRs RFC5736 Link: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5736 ]. The RIRs, in turn, manage the allocation of number resources to End Users, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), and others.
In some regions, National Internet Registries (NIRs) are an additional tier in the INR distribution hierarchy, beneath the RIRs. Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and network subscribers then form further tiers below these registries.
This PKI encompasses several types of certificates (see IETF document draft-ietf-sidr-arch-xx Link: http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/draft-ietf-sidr-arch/ for more details):
CA certificates for each organisation distributing INRs and for the INR holderEnd-entity (EE) certificates for organisations to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed objects
In addition to the CP [RFC 6484] Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 , [RFC6484 Link: #RFC6484 ], relevant information about general PKI concepts may be found in [RFC 5280 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 ], RFC5280, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".
Conventions used in this document:
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC 2119 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2119 ].
1.1.This CPS describes:
- Participants
- Publication
Distributionof the certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) - How certificates are issued, managed, re-keyed, renewed,
managedand revoked - Facility management (physical security, personnel, audit, etc.)
- Key management
- Audit procedures
The
Certification Practice Statement (CPS) is for convenience and informational purposes only. The RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/legal/ripe-ncc-certification-service-terms-and-conditions/ and the RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/legal/ripe-ncc-certification-repository-terms-and-conditions/ prevail over the CPS. The CPS does not affect the interpretation of these Terms and Conditions.This
PKI encompasses several types of certificates:- CA certificates for each organisation distributing INRs and
- for each subscriber INR holder;End-entity
INR holdersEnd entity(EE) certificates for organisations to validate digital signatures on RPKI-signed
objects.
1.2. Document Name and Identification
The name of this document is "RIPE NCCThe RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions prevail over the CPS and the CPS does not affect the interpretation of these Terms and Conditions.
1. 2. Document Name and Identification
Public Key Infrastructure".1.3. PKI".1. 3. PKI Participants
As per
the CP [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ]:Note that in CP [RFC6484] Link: #RFC6484 :
1.3.1. Certification Authorities (CAs)
1. 3. 1. Certification Authorities
This CPS covers five three types of CAs for the RPKI: one Offline CA for the RIPE NCC, one All Resources CA (ACA) Online CA for the RIPE NCC, one Production CA, and a number of Hosted CAs, and a number of Delegated hosted member CAs, which are all equivalent and may be described as a single CA for the purpose of this document.
The Offline CA is the top-level CA for the RIPE NCC portion of RPKI, top level CA allowing the RIPE NCC to act as a Trust Anchor in the RPKI.
The ACA Online CA allows the RIPE NCC to act as parent of the Production CA, which in turn acts as a parent CA to RIPE NCC Members and the Delegated CA. This three-layer CA to RIPE NCC Members. This two layer approach provides a secure revocation and recovery capability in case the ACA Online CA is compromised or becomes unavailable. Thus, the The Offline CA issues certificates only to instances of the ACA, and the CRLs it issues Online CA. The CRLs issued by the Offline CA are used to revoke only certificates a certificate issued to the
ACA.The ACA issues certificates only to instances of the Production CA and the CRLs it issues are used to revoke only certificates issued to the Production CA. The Production
Although we can describe the production CA logically as a single unit, it may use additional intermediate CA certificate layers to improve performance by reducing the number of CA children, issued certificates and manifest and CRL entries.In addition,
See section 1.6 also section 1. 6 Link: #DefinitionsaandAcronyms for definitions and acronyms used in this document.
1.3.2. 1. 3. 2. Registration Authorities
There is no distinct Registration Authority (RA) for either the Offline CA, ACA, and the Production CA or the Online CA operating under this CPS. The former needs no distinct RA capability because it issues certificates only to the Online CA. The Online CA depends on the single sign-on (SSO) sign-on mechanism used by the LIR Portal to identify individuals authorised to make requests. One of the possible sign-on mechanisms is by using an X.509 client certificate issued by the RIPE NCC Business PKI (see section 3. 2. 6 for more details). The RIPE NCC already establishes a contractual relationship with each subscriber (RIPE NCC member) Member) and assumes responsibility for distributing and tracking the current allocation of address space and AS Numbers. Since the RIPE NCC operates the LIR Portal sign-on service and BPKI CA, no distinct RA is used.
1.3.3. Subscribers
Organisations receiving Provider Aggregatable (PA) INR allocations from this CA, as well as organisations receiving Provider Independent (PI) INR resources, are subscribers to the RPKI service.1. 3. 3. Subscribers
All RIPE NCC members and End Users 1.3.4. Relying parties
1. 3. 4. Relying parties
As per CP [RFC6484] Link: #RFC6484 :
Entities or individuals that act in reliance on certificates or RPKI-signed objects issued under this PKI are relying parties. Relying parties may or may not be subscribers within this PKI. (See section 1.6 See section 1. 6 Link: #DefinitionsaandAcronyms for the definition of an RPKI-signed
object).1.3.5. object.1. 3. 5. Other participants
The RIPE NCC operates a repository that holds certificates, CRLs and other RPKI-signed objects, such as Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) objects.
RIPE NCC Repository is regulated by the RIPE NCC Certification Repository Terms and Conditions Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/legal/ripe-ncc-certification-repository-terms-and-conditions/ .1.4. Certificate Usage
1.4.1. 1. 4. Certificate Usage
1. 4. 1. Appropriate certificate uses
The certificates issued under this hierarchy are for authorisation in support of validation of claims of current holdings of INRs. Additional uses, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ].
Some of the certificates that may be issued under this PKI could be used to support operation of this infrastructure (e.g. access control for the repository system as described in Section 2.4.) Such uses are also permitted under the RPKI certificate policy.
With regard to routing security, an initial goal of this PKI is to enable allow the holder of a set of address blocks to be able to declare, in a secure fashion, the AS Number of each entity that is authorised to originate a route to these addresses, including the context of ISP proxy aggregation. Additional uses of the PKI, consistent with the basic goal cited above, are also permitted under this policy.
1.4.2. 1. 4. 2. Prohibited certificate uses
Any uses other than those described in
Section 1.4.1 are prohibited.1.5. Policy Administration
1.5.1. section 1. 4. 1 Link: #Appropriatecertificate are prohibited.1. 5. CPS Administration
1. 5. 1. Organisation administering the document
This CPS is administered by
RIPE NCC
Stationsplein 11
1012 AB Amsterdam
The Netherlands
Since this CPS describes the implementation of the Offline CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs maintained by the RIPE NCC, this CPS is also administered by the RIPE NCC. However, it should be noted that approval procedures described in section 1. 5. 3-4 Link: #CPSAdministration apply.
Whenever the implementation is changed, this CPS will be modified and republished as a RIPE Document. This When this happens this will be announced through the appropriate channels, such communication channels (such as the RIPE NCC's
Membership Announce mailing list (ncc-announce@ripe.net).1.5.2. ncc-announce mailing list).1. 5. 2. Contact person
The
contact information is:
Email: ncc@ripe.net
Phone: +31 20 535 4444
This document is reviewed
by qualified RIPE NCC staff, as well as by an external party during the review process.1.5.4. on behalf of the RIPE community by the Certification Authority Task Force (CA-TF). It is expected that the role of the CA-TF will be transferred to an appropriate RIPE Working Group when the RPKI becomes established as a RIPE NCC service.1. 5. 4. CPS approval procedures
A RIPE certification policy dealing with issues such as validity times, revocation, re-issuance and access to the services involved is currently being developed by the RIPE community. The implementation of the various CAs (Offline, Online and hosted member CAs) will reflect this policy.
This CPS is not subject to the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP). Process. It provides a detailed outline of the implementation of the RPKI by the RIPE NCC. The CPS is publicly available. When available and when necessary, additional reporting mechanisms, such as mailing lists or presentations at RIPE Meetings, will be are used to communicate its contents. In the event that RPKI implementation becomes the contents. When the RIPE NCC RPKI implementation is found to be inconsistent with applicable policies, the RIPE NCC will policies the RIPE NCC is committed to update the implementation
of this CPS.1.6. and this CPS.1. 6. Definitions and Acronyms
| Business PKI. BPKI | ||||||||||||||||||
CP Certificate Policy. A CP is a named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of applications with common security requirements. The CP for the RPKI is [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ]. CPS Certification Practice Statement. A CPS is a document that specifies the practices that a Certification Authority employs in issuing certificates. Distribution of INRs Internet number resources (INRs) are distributed hierarchically. IANA distributes blocks of IP addresses and Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs) to the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). The RIRs distribute smaller address blocks and Autonomous System Numbers to organisations within their service regions, who in turn distribute IP addresses to their customers. IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority. IANA is responsible for global coordination of the Internet Protocol addressing systems and ASNs used for routing Internet traffic. IANA distributes INRs to RIRs. INRs Internet Number Resources. INRs are number values for three protocol parameter sets, namely:
ISP Internet Service Provider. An ISP is an organisation managing and selling Internet services to other organisations. NIR National Internet Registry. NIRs manage the distribution of INRs for a portion of the geopolitical area covered by a Regional Internet Registry. NIRs form an optional second tier in the to INR distribution hierarchy. RIR Regional Internet Registry. An RIR is an organisation that manages the distribution of INRs for a geopolitical area. RPKI-signed object A digitally signed data object (other than a certificate or CRL) declared to be such an object by the Standards Track RFCs. An RPKI-signed object can be validated using certificates issued under this PKI. The content and format of these data constructs depend on the context in which validation of claims of current holdings of INRs take place. Examples of these objects are repository manifests [RFC 6486 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6486 ] and Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs) [RFC 6482 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6482 ]. | Certification CA A CA may issue CA certificates to subordinate CAs. Thus, | ||||||||||||||||||
Offline CA | The RIPE NCC Offline CA. This CA is kept offline when not in use for security reasons, and acts as the top level in the hierarchy. For the moment, [RFC 8630 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8630 ]. Hosted CA A hosted CA that is technically hosted by the RIPE NCC as a RIPE NCC service in the LIR portal. Delegated CA Delegated CA is technically hosted by the company behind the CA. The issuing, revocation of its certificate follows the RPKI certificate provisioning protocol, see [RFC 6492]. Link: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc6492 All Resources CA (ACA) An Online CA that contains all resources (e.g. 0/0) and is signed by the Trust Anchor. For more information, please see the NRO website Link: https://www.nro.net/regional-internet-registries-are-preparing-to-deploy-all-resources-rpki-service/ . | This CA is used on a daily basis to Production CA subordinate Hosted CAs. It contains, in contrast to the ACA, only resources in the RIPE NCC region. Although we can describe the production CA logically as a single unit, it may use additional intermediate CA certificate layers to improve performance by reducing the number of CA children, issued certificates and manifest and CRL entries. | An Local Internet Registry (LIR)
| ||||||||||||||||
LIR Portal | The public portal the RIPE NCC provides for its members to access | ||||||||||||||||||
RIPE NCC Member | A natural or a legal person | ||||||||||||||||||
End User | A natural or a legal person who is assigned provider independent (PI) resources from the RIPE NCC through a sponsoring agreement with a RIPE NCC member. | ||||||||||||||||||
RP | Relying Party as defined in section 1.3.4. above. | ||||||||||||||||||
TA | Trust Anchor. The top CA certificate in the chain used for validation. Relying Parties choose which CA certificate they trust as being the top of the validation tree. Relying Parties may choose to trust more than one TA. |
RPKI Objects and Certificate An X.509 PKIX Resource Certificate as described in There are two types of certificates: CRL Certificate Revocation List is a time-stamped list identifying revoked certificates that are signed by a CA or CRL issuer and made freely available in a public repository. See [RFC 7318 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318 ]. Manifest A signed object under the RPKI listing all subordinate signed objects and certificates for a CA certificate. See Certificates
Term Description Certificates: [res-certificate-profile] Link: #rescertificateprofile .Certificates come in two flavors: Certificate Authority (CA) Certificates are used by Certification Certificate Authorities to issue subordinate certificates and EE certificates.(EE) Certificates are embedded in RPKI-signed objects such as Manifests and ROAs and are used to sign these objects (see [RFC 6488 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6488 ]). [RFC6488] Link: #RFC6488 ). Note the CAs described in this CPS do not currently issue any multi-use End Entity Certificates as described in [res-certificate-profile] Link: #rescertificateprofile .ROA Route Origin Authorisation. This is a digitally signed object that provides a means of verifying that an IP address block holder has authorised an Autonomous System (AS) identifies a network operator, identified by an AS Number, that is authorised to originate routes to one or more prefixes within the address block. See [RFC 6482 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6482 ]. a specified set of address blocks. See [RFC6482] Link: #RFC6482 . as described in [res-certificate-profile] Link: #rescertificateprofile . [RFC 6486 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ].
2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities
2.1. [RFC6486] Link: #RFC6486 .
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2. Publication And Repository Responsibilities
As per the CP [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ], [RFC6484] Link: #RFC6484 , certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects MUST be made available for downloading by all relying parties, are made available to all network operators to download, to enable them to validate this data.
The RIPE NCC will publish this via a repository that is accessible via rsync and RRDP. This repository conforms to the structure described in [RFC 6481 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6481 ].2.2. 2. 2. Publication of Certification Information
The RIPE NCC publishes RIPE NCC uploads the certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects that are issued to a repository it issues to a local repository system that operates as part of a world-wide distributed system of RPKI repositories.
Offline CA
The CA certificate for the RIPE NCC Offline CA is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties. The Trust Anchor Locator, as per [RFC 6490 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6490 ], follows:
https://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer
rsync://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0URYSGqUz2myBsOzeW1jQ6NsxNvlLMyhWknvnl8NiBCs/T/S2XuNKQNZ+wBZxIgPPV2pFBFeQAvoH/WK83HwA26V2siwm/MY2nKZ+Olw+wlpzlZ1p3Ipj2eNcKrmit8BwBC8xImzuCGaV0jkRB0GZ0hoH6Ml03umLprRsn6v0xOP0+l6Qc1ZHMFVFb385IQ7FQQTcVIxrdeMsoyJq9eMkE6DoclHhF/NlSllXubASQ9KUWqJ0+Ot3QCXr4LXECMfkpkVR2TZT+v5v658bHVs6ZxRD1b6Uk1uQKAyHUbn/tXvP8lrjAibGzVsXDT2L0x4Edx+QdixPgOji3gBMyL2VwIDAQAB
rsync://rpki.ripe.net/ta/ripe-ncc-ta.cer
MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEA0URYSGqU
z2myBsOzeW1jQ6NsxNvlLMyhWknvnl8NiBCs/T/S2XuNKQNZ+wBZ
xIgPPV2pFBFeQAvoH/WK83HwA26V2siwm/MY2nKZ+Olw+wlpzlZ1
p3Ipj2eNcKrmit8BwBC8xImzuCGaV0jkRB0GZ0hoH6Ml03umLprR
sn6v0xOP0+l6Qc1ZHMFVFb385IQ7FQQTcVIxrdeMsoyJq9eMkE6D
oclHhF/NlSllXubASQ9KUWqJ0+Ot3QCXr4LXECMfkpkVR2TZT+v5
v658bHVs6ZxRD1b6Uk1uQKAyHUbn/tXvP8lrjAibGzVsXDT2L0x4
Edx+QdixPgOji3gBMyL2VwIDAQAB
Online CA
The Online CA publishes subordinate certificates, CRLs and RPKI-signed objects under:
rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository/33/36711f-25e1-4b5c-9748-e6c58bef82a5/1/
Hosted member CAs
The hosted member CAs publish subordinate signed objects in the repository that is hosted by the RIPE NCC:
rsync://rpki.ripe.net/repository
The exact URI of the publication point is unique per hosted CA. This member CA and can be found in the hosted member CA certificate as described in [RFC 7318 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7318 ]. [res-certificate-profile] Link: #rescertificateprofile .
Note the repository structure is defined in
[RFC 6481 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6481 ].2.3. [RFC6481] Link: #RFC6481 .2. 3. Time or Frequency of Publication
A certificate will be published within
eight hours of being issued (or deleted).
The RIPE NCC will publish its CRL prior to the next “Update value” in the scheduled CRL previously issued by the CA.
2.4.Write access to the repositories is limited to the systems running the ACA, Production CA, and hosted Offline CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs.
3. Identification and Authentication3.1. Naming
3.1.1. And Authentication3. 1. Naming
3. 1. 1.
Types of names3.1. Naming
3.1.1.3. 1. Naming
The Subject of each certificate issued by the RIPE NCC is identified by an X.500 Distinguished Name (DN). The distinguished name will consist of a single Common Name (CN) attribute with a value generated by the RIPE NCC. Optionally, the Serial Number attribute may be indicated along with the common name (to form a terminal relative distinguished name set), to distinguish between successive instances of certificates associated with the same entity.
For the Offline CA, CA the self-signed CA certificate is published as a Trust Anchor, as described in Section 2.2. section 2. 2. The subject is “CN=ripe-ncc-ta”. ‘CN=ripe-ncc-ta'.
For all other certificates controlled by the ACA, Production CA, and hosted CAs, Offline CA, Online CA and hosted member CAs the subject has the format CN=<pub key hash>, where the public key hash is a Base64 encoded form of the public key SHA-1 hash, as described in section 2.1 of
[RFC 4387 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6487.pdf ].3.1.2. [RFC4387] Link: #RFC4387 .3. 1. 2. Need for names to be meaningful
The Subject name in each subscriber certificate will be unique to the public key found
in the certificates.The Subject name should on the certificates.Note: The name of the holder of an address block or AS Number is intended to
of INR holdings. They are not used to identify subjects.3.1.3. regarding INR holdings, not for identification.3. 1. 3. Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
Although Subject subject names in certificates issued by this registry should not be are not meaningful, and may appear "random,", anonymity is not a function of this PKI. No PKI, and thus no explicit support for this feature is provided.
3.1.4. 3. 1. 4. Rules for interpreting various name forms
None.
3.1.5. 3. 1. 5. Uniqueness of names
The RIPE NCC certifies Subject names that are unique among the certificates that it issues. Although it is desirable that Subject names be unique throughout the PKI (to facilitate certificate path discovery), uniqueness is not required and is not enforced through technical means. The RIPE NCC generates Subject names to minimise the chance that two entities in the RPKI will be assigned the same name. Specifically, the generated subject based on the public key hash (described in Section 3.1.1.) keeps hash, as described in 3.1.1, reduces the likelihood of accidental collisions to a negligible minimum.
3.1.6. 3. 1. 6. Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
Since Because the subject names are not intended to be meaningful, the RIPE NCC makes no provision either there is no provision to recognise or to authenticate trademarks, service marks, etc.
3.2. 3. 2. Initial Identity Validation
3.2.1. 3. 2. 1. Method to prove possession of private key
For the Offline CA, proof of possession of the private keys used for the self-signed certificate can be determined internally.
For the ACA, which acts as a Online CA that acts as subscriber to the Offline CA, and for the Production CA, which acts as a subscriber to the ACA, possession of the private keys is affected effected via the procedures used to generate and manage these keys. Specifically, the RIPE NCC uses a hardware security module (HSM) to generate the key pairs for each of these CAs. This CAs and thus assures that the private key is appropriately associated with the public key in the certificates issued by each of these CAs. CAs
For the hosted member CAs that act as subscribers to the Production Online CA, possession of the private keys is affected effected by the system. Note that the hosted member CAs are managed systems and operators do not access the keys directly. These CAs will contact the Production CA as needed, Online CA as needed via protocols internal to the RIPE NCC. These protocols also cover proof of possession of the private keys.
The Delegated CA, which acts as a subscriber to the Production CA, holds its own key pair. The issuing or renewal of Certificates is performed via the provisioning protocol. See [RFC 6492 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6492 ].
3.2.2.Certificates
The hosted Member CA is available only to RIPE NCC Members. The RIPE NCC has already established procedures to verify the identity of the RIPE NCC Members. These procedures are explained here:
organisational identity of subscribers. However, certificates are issued to subscribers in a fashion that preserves the accuracy of INR registrations as represented in the RIPE NCC’s records.
The RIPE NCC has already established procedures to verify the identity of Certificate Holders. See section 3.2.3. below.
For hosted CAs, 3.2.3. 3. 2. 3. Authentication of individual identity
Certificates issued under this PKI do not attest to the individual identity of a subscriber. However, the RIPE NCC maintains contact information for each subscriber to support certificate renewal, re-key, and revocation.
Offline CA
Individuals
Hosted CAs
For hosted“Admin” and “Regular” users in the RIPE NCC’s LIR Portal. New users can be added by the current admin user and granted either “Admin” or “Regular” status. This user can then also maintain their CA.
For hosted End User CAs, individual identity is delegated to the LIR Portal account associated with the organisation object referenced in the PI assignment. For more information, please refer to the documentation on RPKI for End Users Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/resource-certification-rpki-for-provider-independent-end-users/ .
Production CA and ACA
For the Production CA and the ACA, the mechanism for hosted CA users is used. However, it should be notedThe admin user's identity can be (re-)established using the admin password reset procedure:
The reset procedure involves two halves of a code that are sent via two separate paths, email and fax, that need to be combined in order to reset the "admin" account's password.
Maintenance can also be performed through the internal admin interface.3.2.4. 3. 2. 4. Non-verified subscriber information
No non-verified subscriber data is included in certificates issued under this certificate
policy, except for Subject Information Access (SIA) extensions [RFC 6487 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487 ].3.2.5. policy.3. 2. 5. Validation of authority
The procedure to verify that an individual claiming to represent the subscriber is authorised to represent the subscriber for different CAs is as follows:
- Access to the Offline CA is restricted to a RIPE NCC engineer with
Developer that hasaccess to the UNIXUnixaccount on the server. In addition, the HSM key cards are protected by pass phrases known only totheindividual CA Operators (see Section 5.2.3.section 5. 2. 3for a description of the CA Operator role). - Access to the Production CA and ACA
Online CAis restricted to RIPE NCC CA Operators using - internal admin interface.For access
CA, see Section 3.2.3. above.3.2.6.
The RPKI is not intended or designed to interoperate with any other
PKI.3.3. PKI at this stage.
The function of the Online CA will be extended in the future to interoperate with the other four RIRs and RIPE NCC Members operating their own CAs.
Re-key Requests3.3.1. Re-Key Requests3. 3. 1.
Identification and authentication for routine re-key The procedure to ensure that a subscriber requesting routine re-key is the legitimate holder of the Certificate is as follows:
- For the Offline CA and ACA,
Online CAthe same identification and authentication mechanisms apply as described in - Section 3.2.3.For hosted CAs,
- Non-hosted CAs will have to handle re-keys on their own, as the private key is unknown to the RIPE NCC. 3.3.2.
[RFC 6489 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489 ].
The old key can be revoked as the final step in key rollover algorithm [RFC 6489 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489 ], once [RFC6489] Link: #RFC6489 , after a new key has been activated.
In the RIPE NCC’s our implementation, old keys are not automatically revoked after a routine re-key. Explicit revocation of old keys can be done by CA Operators of the Offline CA and the Online CA. CA Operators for the Online CA can also revoke old keys for hosted specific hosted member CAs. Identification and authentication for these roles
is described in Section 3.2.3.This may change after further has been described in section 3. 2. 3 Link: #Authenticationofindiv .The RIPE NCC implementation may change following
3.4. 3. 4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request
For hosted CAs, the holder of the INRs can contact the RIPE NCC Registry Services Department to request the certificate revocation. It should be also member CAs it should be noted that user actions in the interface may result in the revocation of EE certificates used for objects (such as ROAs) that should be invalidated.
For non-hosted CAs, the holder can request the revocation in the user interface.
4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
4.1. Certificate Application
4.1.1. Who is able to 4. 1. Certificate Application
4. 1. 1. Who can submit a certificate application
Any RIPE NCC
member or End User holding INRs distributed by the RIPE NCC may submit a certificate application to this CA.4.1.2. Member may request a certificate.4. 1. 2. Enrolment process and responsibilities
For the Offline CA, an Engineer CA a Developer can configure and initialise the CA on a server controlled by the RIPE NCC (see Section 5.2.1. section 5. 2. 1 for a description of the Engineer Developer role).
For the ACA and the Production CA, an Engineer Online CA a Developer can install and initialise the application. When this has been done, done a CA Operator can log in and initialise the ACA and the Production Online CA.
For hosted CAs, any RIPE NCC member or End User may choose to use a RIPE NCC-hosted Certification Authority or may choose to set up their own non-hosted CA.
In order to activate the hosted CA, an "Admin" or “Regular” member CA an "admin" user must log in to the LIR Portal. and grant the "certification" role to a normal user. This user must then log in and ensure that a client certificate has been generated for them (or generate one if this is missing).
The user that has the "certification" role will then be able to click through on a link labeled "RPKI Dashboard". This "Certification". This link will take the user to a page where they must explicitly opt in to the hosted CA service. The user does member CA service - they do this by clicking "Yes, I want to activate my hosted member CA". After activation, an automated hosted a mostly automated hosted member CA will be created. Authentication and authorisation for further automated processes should be considered transitive from the moment that user
opts-in and activates the hosted CA.4.2. opted-in and activated the hosted member CA, as described here.4. 2. Certificate Application Processing
For hosted CAs, member CAs an initial CA certificate
should be requested by an authorised representative through the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal.
The requester will be asked to choose the type of the CA as described in Section 4.1.2. and agree to the RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/legal/ripe-ncc-certification-service-terms-and-conditions/ .
In the case of a hosted CA, the system will automatically create the certificate in the LIR Portal. The subscriber will need to accept the RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions by clicking “I accept. Create my Certification Authority”. This way, the subscriber confirms that they have read, understood, and agree to be bound by these terms and conditions.
For non-hosted CA, the requester will need to upload the identity .xml file generated by their CA software.
4.2.1.See
Section 3.2.3. for identification and authentication practice of certificate applicants.4.2.2. Approval or rejection section 3. 2. 3.4. 2. 2. Approval of certificate applications
The online CA will issue certificates to hosted CAs that are valid until member CAs with a validity time to the end of the calendar year, plus a further six-month six months grace period to allow for renewal before the certificate expires.
All Provider Aggregatable (PA) resources registered to a RIPE NCC member the RIPE NCC Member at the time of issuance will be included in the certificate.
All Provider Independent (PI) resources registered to the End User at the time of issuance will be included in the certificate.
Certificates cannot be issued when:
- The RIPE NCC member does not hold any Internet number resources;
- Service level for a RIPE NCC member has been suspended (e.g. due to non-payment Link: /about-us/financial-information/current-billing-procedure/ ).
For hosted member CAs, the system will automatically request renewal of the CA certificate that lists all eligible resources when new resources are received by the RIPE NCC Member and/or a new validity time is applicable.
Certificates are generated automatically upon request by a RIPE NCC member or End User
and processed immediately.
In case the automated process is not functional, a RIPE NCC member or End User can request a certificate manually, via a request form Link: /about-us/support/contact/contact-us/ on the RIPE NCC website. These requests will be processed day.4.3. Certificate Issuance
4.3.1. day of approval of the certificate application.4. 3. Certificate Issuance 4. 3. 1.
The Offline CA will produce a response message that includes all publishable certificates and other objects after the certificate has been issued. This message can be physically transferred to the Production CA and the ACA, Online CA, where it is published.
The Production CA and the ACA, as well as hosted CAs, Online CA and hosted member CAs make all subordinate certificates and objects available for publication. While In practice, the system will make a best effort to publish these materials as soon as possible, but as described in section 2. 3 Link: #TimeoorFFrequencyofPub , publication should happen
no later than eight hours after issuance (as described in Section 2.3.)4.3.2. within no more than 24 hours of issuance.4. 3. 2. Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate
For RIPE NCC member and End User CAs, there is no active notification to a subscriber about certificate issuance. The approved and published certificate is visible in the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal and in the RIPE NCC-hosted repository.
4.3.3.Publication of a certificate in the repository operated by RIPE NCC is the means by which a subscriber is notified of certificate issuance. This procedure is employed by all CAs covered by this CPS.
Publication of a certificate in the repository operated by the RIPE NCC is the means by which other entities are notified of certificate issuance.
4.4. Certificate Acceptance
4.4.1. 4. 4. Certificate Acceptance
4. 4. 1. Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
When a certificate is issued, the RIPE NCC CA will publish it in the repository. After the Certificate is issued, the subscriber can see the updated number of issued certificates under “Certified Resources” in the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal.
Certificate acceptance by the subscriber is not part of the process.
4.4.2.A subscriber is presumed to have accepted a certificate issued by any of the Certificate Authorities covered by this CPS and published in the RIPE NCC repository unless the subscriber contacts the RIPE NCC.
Certificates will be published in the repository system within eight hours one business day of being issued by any of the CAs covered by this CPS.
4.4.3. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
There are no entities other than the subscriber who are notified when a certificate is issued.
4.5.A summary of the use model for the RPKI IP Address and AS Number PKI is provided below.
4.5.1. 4. 5. 1. Subscriber private key and certificate usage
The hosted member CAs receive CA certificates from the Online CA. This means that these certificates could in principal be used to issue subordinate CA certificates. However, the hosted system does not provide this functionality. The hosted member CA certificates will only be used (by the system) to issue EE certificates used for RPKI-signed objects (such as ROAs) and manifests.
The private key associated with each of these certificates is used to sign subordinate (CA or EE) certificates and CRLs.4.5.2. 4. 5. 2. Relying party public key and certificate usage
Reliance on a certificate must be reasonable under the circumstances. If the circumstances indicate a need for additional assurances, the relying party must obtain such assurances in order for such reliance to be deemed reasonable.
Before any act of reliance, relying parties MUST
- independently:Verify
independently (1) verifythat the certificate will be used for an appropriate purpose that is not prohibited or otherwise restricted by this CPS (see section - 1.4.)Assess
If a relying party determines that use of the certificate is appropriate, the relying party must utilise appropriate software and/or hardware to perform digital signature verification as a condition of relying on the certificate. Moreover, Moreover the relying party must MUST validate the certificate in a manner consistent with the RPKI certificate profile [RFC 6487 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487 ], [RFC6487] Link: #RFC6487 , which specifies the extended validation algorithm for RPKI certificates.
4.6. 4. 6. Certificate Renewal
Note that the hosted member CAs do not issue CA certificates to subordinate CAs and there is no need for certificate renewal for EE certificates used for signed objects. However, hosted member CAs are mentioned a few times in this section as children of the
Production CA and the ACA.4.6.1. Circumstances Online CA.4. 6. 1. Circumstance for certificate renewal
A For hosted member CAs: When new Internet number resources are associated with a RIPE NCC Member or a new validity time is applicable (see section 4. 2. 2 Link: #Approvalofcertificate ) a certificate will be
renewed for hosted CAs when new INRs are associated with a RIPE NCC member or End User, or a new validity period is applied (see Section 4.2.2).Note that if INRs renewed.Note that in case Internet number resources
Section 4.9.4.6.2. section 4. 9 Link: #CertificateRevocationaan .4. 6. 2. Who may request renewal
For hosted
CAs, the renewal process is fully automated, which means that the subscriber cannot initiate renewal.For the Production CA and the ACA, a RIPE NCC Engineer member CAs, requests for renewal are fully automated.For the Online CA, RIPE NCC staff with the Online CA Administrator role
For the Offline CA, Internet number resources may have to be added to the self-signed certificate. A RIPE NCC Engineer RIPE NCC staff with the appropriate role may perform this action.
4.6.3. 4. 6. 3. Processing certificate renewal requests
See 4.6.1.
For hosted CAs, the system will automatically request renewal of the CA certificate that lists all eligible INRs when new resources are received by a RIPE NCC member or End User, or a new validity period is applicable.
4.6.4.The same stipulations listed in section 4. 2. 2 Link: #Approvalofcertificate apply here.
See
Section 4.3.2. (Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate).4.6.5. section 4. 3. 2 Link: #Notificationtosubscri .4. 6. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
See
Section 4.4.1. (Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance).4.6.6. section 4. 4. 1 Link: #Conductconstitutingce .4. 6. 6. Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
The Offline CA, Production CA, and the ACA, will all Both the Offline CA and Online CA will publish renewed subordinate CA certificates within
eight hours of issuance.4.6.7. one business day of issuance.4. 6. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
See
Section 4.3.2. (Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate).
4.7. Certificate Re-Key
Hosted4. 7. Certificate Re-Key
4.7.1. 4. 7. 1. Circumstance for certificate re-key
Re-key As per the RPKI CP, re-key of a certificate should will be performed only when
- required, based on:Confirmed/suspected
requested, based on:Knowledge or suspicion ofcompromise or loss of the associated private keykey, or - Expiration of the cryptographic lifetime of the associated key pair
If a certificate is revoked to replace the resource extensions (see RFC 3779 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3779.pdf ), [res-certificate-profile] Link: #rescertificateprofile , the replacement certificate will incorporate the same public key (not a new key). key, not a new key, unless the subscriber requests a re-key at the same time. If the re-key is based on a suspected compromise, then the previous certificate will be revoked.
Section 5.6 of [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ] the Certificate Policy notes that when a CA signs a certificate, the signing key should have a validity period which exceeds that that exceeds the validity period of the certificate. This places additional constraints on when a CA should request a re-key.
4.7.2. 4. 7. 2. Who may request certification of a new public key
For the RIPE NCC Hosted CA, Production CA, and the ACA, there is no scheduled manual key rollover. This hosted member CAs, an automated key roll over is performed when the key has been in use for five years. Authentication and authorisation for this is considered transitive from opt in (see section 4. 1. 2 Link: #Enrolmentprocessandr ).For the RIPE NCC Online CA, a manual key rollover is planned to be performed every five years. This manual rollover can be initiated by
a RIPE NCC Engineer in the event of an outage.
The RIPE NCC may also initiate a re-key based on a verified compromise report.
4.7.3.The
procedure in Section 4.2.2 applies here.4.7.4. same stipulations listed in section 4. 2. 2 Link: #Approvalofcertificate apply here.4. 7. 4. Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
See section
4.3.2.4.7.5. 4. 3. 2 Link: #Notificationtosubscri .4. 7. 5. Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
See section
4.4.1.4.7.6. 4. 4. 1 Link: #Conductconstitutingce .4. 7. 6. Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
For all CAs Certificate Authorities covered by this CPS, a re-keyed certificate will be published in the repository system within eight hours one business day of being issued by this CA.
4.7.7. 4. 7. 7. Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities
See section
4.3.3.4.8. Certificate Modification
4.8.1. 4. 3. 3 Link: #Notificationofcertifi .4. 8. Certificate Modification
4. 8. 1. Circumstance for certificate modification
Certificate modification is not applicable to the CAs described here. Renewal is used when new resources are being to be certified, or a new validity period is applicable (Section 4.6). time is applicable, as described in section 4. 6 Link: #CertificaterRenewal . Re-issuance and revocation is used when resources are no longer held by an
entity (Section 4.9.).4.9. entity, as described in section 4. 9 Link: #CertificateRevocationaan .4. 9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension
4.9.1. 4. 9. 1. Circumstances for revocation
Certificates must can be revoked for several reasons:
A signed object needs to be invalidated- One or more listed INRs
Internet number resourcesare no longer associated with the RIPE NCC - member or End UserAs a last step
MemberAs the last stepswhen doing a planned re-key (clean up) - As a last step
the last stepswhen doing an unplanned re-key because a loss or compromise of the old key has come to light - The RIPE NCC member violates the RIPE NCC Certification Service Terms and Conditions
A certificate may be revoked if a signed object needs to be invalidated.
4.9.2.For Hosted and Delegated the hosted member CAs, revocation of their CA certificate can be performed automatically via the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal, by RIPE NCC staff on request or when RIPE NCC staff have reason to believe the keys have been compromised. In this latter case, this would are compromised. In the latter case this will always be performed as the final step of an emergency key rollover for the hosted CA.
For Delegated CAs, the revocation request can be done via the RPKI Dashboard in the LIR Portal.
The other circumstances for revocation, most notably when ROA objects need to be invalidated because a user of the hosted member CA changes the specification, are managed automatically by the system.
For the Production CA and the ACA, Online CA, the RIPE NCC may manually request revocation of the old CA certificate as soon as a key rollover has been performed. Related events, most notably the revocation of the EE certificates used for manifests, are managed by the system.
4.9.3. 4. 9. 3. Procedure for revocation request
When one or more of the INRs Internet number resources listed in a certificate are no longer associated with a RIPE NCC member or End User, Member, the Online CA will:
- Re-issue a new certificate that retains
certificate, minus the lost Internet number resources, but maintainingall other properties (minus the affected INRs) - Publish the new certificate using the same publication point as before, thus replacing the old certificate
- Revoke any non-expired certificates held by the hosted
memberCA that list the affected INRs,lost Internet number resources,thus invalidating any signed objects (such as ROAs) that refer to theseresources
For Delegated CAs, a new certificate not be issued automatically once the revocation request has been completed. This will have to be requested again via the LIR Portal.
4.9.4.Internet number resources.4. 9. 4.
Any party or operators who can identify a that is able to identify the need for revocation that is not already handled by the system are and operators is expected to notify the RIPE NCC
as soon as possible.4.9.5. within one business day.4. 9. 5. Time within which CA must process the revocation request
The RIPE NCC will process a revocation request within eight hours one business day of receipt and validation of the request.
4.9.6. 4. 9. 6. Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
As per [RFC 6484 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6484 ], whenever the CP, a relying party validates a certificate, it is responsible for acquiring and checking the most recent, scheduled CRL from the issuer of the
certificate4.9.7. certificate, whenever that relying party validates a certificate.4. 9. 7. CRL issuance frequency
Each CRL contains a “Next Update” value, will carry a nextScheduledUpdate value and a new CRL will be published at or before that time. The RIPE NCC will set the “Next Update” nextScheduledUpdate value when it issues a CRL to signal when the next scheduled CRL will be issued.
The CAs covered by this CPS use different values:
| Type of Certificate Authority | Next Update |
|---|---|
Offline CA: | 3 months from the moment of issuance |
CA: | 24 hours from the moment of issuance |
Hosted | 24 hours from the moment of issuance |
ACA | 24 hours from the moment of issuance |
As a matter of good operational practice, sense, all CAs covered by this CPS will aim strive to republish and re-issue a new CRL before the next scheduled update value, to allow value in time to deal with any operational problems.
It should be noted that the values listed here may be used by relying parties to determine the need to fetch an updated CRL.
4.9.8. In particular this means that a possible revocation by the Offline CA may go unnoticed for three months - this should not be a problem since the production keys are protected by an HSM. A revoked ROA for a hosted member CA may not be noticed for 24 hours. The values here should be regarded as a compromise between various aspects, including the operational burden of re-signing (for Offline CA), time needed to be able to do an emergency restore, efficiency of caching in the global RPKI, propagation time of revocation in the global RPKI.4. 9. 8. Maximum latency for CRLs
A CRL will be published posted to the repository system within
eight hours of their generation.4.10. one hour of issuance.4. 9. 9. On-line revocation/status checking availability [OMITTED]
4. 9. 10. On-line revocation checking requirements [OMITTED]
4. 9. 11. Other forms of revocation advertisements available [OMITTED]
4. 9. 12. Special requirements re key compromise [OMITTED]
4. 9. 13. Circumstances for suspension [OMITTED]
4. 9. 14. Who can request suspension [OMITTED]
4. 9. 15. Procedure for suspension request [OMITTED]
4. 9. 16. Limits on suspension period [OMITTED]
4. 10. Certificate Status Services
The RIPE NCC will only issue CRLs and does These CAs do not support Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) or the Server-Based Certificate Validation Protocol (SCVP).
4. 10. 1. Operational characteristics [OMITTED]
4. 10. 2. Service availability [OMITTED]
4. 10. 3. Optional features [OMITTED]
4. 11. End of Subscription [OMITTED]
4. 12. Key Escrow and Recovery [OMITTED]
4. 12. 1. Key escrow and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
4. 12. 2. Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices [OMITTED]
5. Facility, Management and Operational Controls
5.1. Physical Controls
5.1.1. 5. 1. Physical Controls
5. 1. 1. Site location and construction
For the Offline CA, operations are conducted
at the RIPE NCC office:RIPE NCC
Stationsplein 11
1012 AB within a physically protected area of an office building in which the RIPE NCC is a tenant. This building is located at:
Singel 258
The Netherlands
The RIPE NCC space within this facility includes offices and meeting spaces and two machine rooms.
For the Production CA and hosted member CAs, core cryptographic operations are performed by virtual machines and their respective HSMs two machines physically located in two different data centres centers in a load balanced (and fail-over) fail over) set up. The two data
centres are:Equinix AM3
Science Park 610
1098 XH centers are:
Nikhef:
Science Park 105
The Netherlands
Equinix AM5
Schepenbergweg 42
1105 AT
Telecity 2:
Kuiperbergweg 13
The Netherlands
5.1.2. Physical access
The offline CA is operated using a laptop and USB-based HSM that are kept in a sealed bag in a safe at the RIPE NCC office. The offline CA key can only be used when three out of ten operator card holders are present and approve operation. Operator cards are kept by the card holders and are not stored at the RIPE NCC office.
For both Equinix AM3 and AM5,5. 1. 2. Physical access
For the Offline CA, physical access is restricted to the RIPE NCC's IT staff and senior managers. The access system relies on personal smart cards. Access to areas is logged every moment of the day on our access system, this data is mirrored at the same moment to another server, located in another building. CCTV is in operation and recordings are kept for one week.
5.1.3. Only Telecity2 staff can open the suite for us and access is logged by the reception.5. 1. 3. Power and air conditioning
The
server rooms are located on the first floor of the building, which is above sea level. Power to the data centres comes from the public grid, supported by internal backup generator infrastructure. More information on the ISO standards applicable to Equinix AM3 and Equinix AM5 data centres Link: https://www.equinix.nl/data-centers/design/standards-compliance/ is available.
5.1.4. Water exposures
The server rooms located at Equinix AM3 and Equinix AM5 are both located on the first floor of their building or higher, which is above sea level.
5.1.5. Fire prevention and protection
The server room at Equinix AM3 has a two-stage fire detection system: Aspiration and VESDA, on a head-per-head basis. The server room at Equinix AM5 has VESDA and HI-FOG as water mist fire suppression and double knock fire activation.
5.1.6. Media storage
Whenever the Offline CA is operated, all data is backed up to a USB stick (and encrypted where needed).
For the Online CA and hosted Cas, all data is stored in a database cluster. This cluster relies on one primary node, running in one data centre, and a hot-standby replication node running in the other data centre. Full database backups are made daily, and incremental backups are made according to our business continuity plan, ensuring thatFor Nikhef, power consumption and air conditioning are monitored by the provider. Should power consumption exceed the maximum allowance, the RIPE NCC will receive an invoice, but power will not be cut. Nikhef has an uninterruptible power supply (UPS) to overcome immediate power failures, and a generator with enough fuel to cover for arrival of more fuel and/or fixing the power failure.
For Telecity2, power consumption and air conditioning are monitored by the provider. Should power consumption exceed the maximum allowance, the RIPE NCC will receive an invoice, but power will not be cut. Telecity2 has a UPS to overcome immediate power failures, and a generator with enough fuel to cover for arrival of more fuel and/or fixing the power failure.
5. 1. 4. Water exposures
The RIPE NCC server room used by the Offline CA is located on the second floor of the office building. This is above sea level.
The server room located at Nikhef is located on the first floor of their building. This is above sea level.
The server room located at Telecity2 is located on the first floor of their building.
5. 1. 5. Fire prevention and protection
a restore.
5.1.7. Waste disposal
Key cards that are found to be broken will be destroyed.5. 1. 6. Media storage
Whenever the Offline CA is operated, all data is backed up (encrypted where needed) to a network filesystem that is mirrored between the Nikhef and Telecity2 datacenters. In addition this data is backed up off-site nightly (see section 5. 1. 8 Link: #Offsitebackup ).
For the Online CA and hosted member CAs all data is stored (encrypted where needed) on a network filesystem that is mirrored between the Nikhef and Telecity2 datacenters. In addition this data is backed-up off-site nightly (see section 5. 1. 8 Link: #Offsitebackup ).
5. 1. 7. Waste disposal
When servers reach their end of life, the hard disks are physically destroyed by RIPE NCC staff.
Once the HSM is decommissioned, the private keys on the device will be wiped according to the process specified by the vendor. Broken modules for which this is not possible will be destroyed.
There is no other waste that may contain sensitive data.
5.1.8. 5. 1. 8. Off-site backup
The network filesystem, used to store the data from the CAs, is backed up every night to another fileserver. This second fileserver is also backed up every night to another backup
server.5.2. Procedural Controls
Below are the procedural security controls used for certificate management.
5.2.1.5. 2. Procedural Controls
For the Offline CA:
RIPE NCC Executive Team Has access to the safe containing the Offline CA laptop and (USB-based) HSM. | Ensures the System Operator | ||||
CA Operator | There are ten CA Operators. Each CA operator has | ||||
| Has Admin Card Holder
Engineer Has access to the source code used to run the Offline CA. Is responsible for developing, testing and deploying new releases. The Engineer also
|
For the Online System Operator Has access to the servers in the data centres. Engineer Has access to the source code used to run the Online CA. Is responsible for developing, testing and deploying new releases. In addition, the Engineer CA Operator Has access to the user interface. Can perform key re-key operations, revoke old keys, and has access to the system status page that allows switching on/off of the background services for the Online CA. Security Officers For the online CA, the Information Security staff ensure the Administrative Cards needed for a restore are stored in the safe in the RIPE NCC and retrieved following established procedures. The passphrases for these keys are kept by the RPKI Engineers. The Information Security staff have an observer role. For the hosted CAs: System Operator Same as for Offline CA. Engineer Same as for Online CA. CA Operator Has access to the user interface. This The CA Operator can perform the following actions only: RIPE NCC Operator This role is available to all CA Operators for the Online CA. It allows access to all actions that a member CA Operator could perform. In addition, For the Delegated CA: System Operator Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC member or End User. CA Operator Follows the procedure as defined internally by the RIPE NCC member or End User. CA and ACA: Roles Process CA:System Operator Same as for Offline CA. Developer addition the Developer can configure values used by the software, such as publication frequency.
Roles Process ACS Card holder The ACS Card Holder receives one of five cards making up the ACS for the HSMs used for the Online CA and hosted member CAs. Three of these five cards are needed to perform a restore. There are five ACS Card Holders. For the hosted member CAs: Developer The system automates all cryptographic operations, operations such as creating and revoking EE certificates, publication, publication etc.member CAaddition it allows re-key operations and revocation of old keys. The role also has access to the system status page that allows switching on/off of the background services for hosted CAs.
Roles Process member CAs.5. 2. 2. Number of persons required per task
For all roles and CAs listed in the above section, section only one person is required per task, except for CA operations for the Offline CA (here, CA; here three out of ten persons are
required).5.2.3. required.5. 2. 3. Identification and authentication for each role
For the Offline CA:
For the Production CA and ACA: Roles | Process | | Access System Operator
| ||||||||||||||||
| The Engineers Engineer
| ||||||||||||||||||
CA Operator | The CA operator uses the RIPE NCC single sign-on system to log in to the user interface. The login process requires a username and a password. The In case of End Users, the log in credentials for the LIR Portal must be associated with the maintainer of the respective organisation in the RIPE Database. For the Delegated CA:
|
For the hosted member CAs:
System Operator Same as for Online CA.
Developer Same as for Online CA.
CA Operator The CA operator uses the RIPE NCC single sign-on system to log in to the user interface. The login process requires that a username, password and client certificate are presented. In addition the CA Operator must be made a member of the "certification" group by the "admin" user for their LIR in the LIR Portal.
The CA Operator role for the Offline CA is performed by RIPE NCC staff from various departments. The people fulfilling these roles have no other roles in the CAs operated by the RIPE NCC.
5.3. Personnel Controls
Below are the personnel security controls employed for individuals associated with certificate management.
5.3.1.5. 3. Personnel Controls
Staff members are assigned to the roles mentioned in section 5. 2. 1 Link: #Trustedroles only if supervisory personnel deem them to be sufficiently trustworthy and only after they have undergone in-house training for the role.
5.3.2. 5. 3. 2. Background check procedures
All RIPE NCC staff undergo normal employment reference checks.
5.3.3. 5. 3. 3. Training requirements
The RIPE NCC provides its CA staff with training upon assignment to a System Operator, CA operator or an Engineer role. It also arranges CA role as well as on-the-job training as needed to perform their job responsibilities competently.
5.3.4. 5. 3. 4. Retraining frequency and requirements
The RIPE NCC provides its CA staff with re-training as needed to continue performing their job responsibilities competently.
5.3.5. 5. 3. 5. Job rotation frequency and sequence
There are no requirements for enforced job rotation among staff in fulfilling trusted CA roles.
5.3.6. 5. 3. 6. Sanctions for unauthorised actions
It has been established that if a If RIPE NCC staff member performs are determined to have performed activities inconsistent with the organisation’s RIPE NCC RPKI policies and procedures, appropriate disciplinary action will be taken.
5.3.7. 5. 3. 7. Independent contractor requirements
Independent contractors and consultants may be part of the development team but cannot constitute more than 50% of the total team.
No independent contractor or consultant is used to perform any of the roles for the CAs covered by this document. Contractors who are required to perform any maintenance functions on CA severs or cryptographic modules must be accompanied escorted and directly supervised by RIPE NCC staff at all times when in sensitive areas.
5.3.8.
Independent contractors and consultants may be part of the development team, but never constituting more than 50% of the total team.
Training for staff assigned to a trusted CA role is primarily via mentoring. An internal wiki is maintained by RIPE NCC staff as a further training aid.
5.4. 5. 4. Audit Logging Procedures
Below is the description of how RIPE NCC implements audit logging.
5.4.1.For the Offline CA, CA no audit logging is implemented.
Audit records are generated for operations performed by the CA Operators for the Production CA, ACA and hosted CAs. These operators for the Online CA and hosted member CAs. Audit records include the date, time, responsible user and summary content data relating to the event. Records are stored in a database and are visible through the user interface.
The physical access control system maintains separate separately maintains logs for access to the areas housing sensitive CA equipment.
Auditable events include, but are not limited to, the following:
- Access to CA computing equipment (e.g. log-in, log-out)
- Messages received requesting CA actions (e.g. certificate requests, certificate revocation requests, compromise notifications)
- Certificate creation, modification, revocation, or renewal actions
- Posting of any material to a repository
- Any attempts to change or delete audit data
- Key generation
- Software and/or configuration updates to the CA
Logs will be reviewed analysed during general audits or after a suspected incident.
5.4.3. 5. 4. 3. Retention period for audit log
Audit records for the Production CA and the ACA, as well as hosted CAs, Online CA and hosted member CAs are included in the nightly database back-up and retained off-site for a minimum of two years.
5.4.4. 5. 4. 4. Protection of audit log
At the moment, no additional measures are taken to protect the audit logs, as compared to normal back-up procedures.
5.4.5. This process is currently under review, and may change in the near future.5. 4. 5. Audit log backup procedures
See
Section 5.4.3.5.4.6. section 5. 4. 3 Link: #Retentionperiodforau .5. 4. 6. Audit collection system (internal vs. external) [OMITTED]
5.4.7. 5. 4. 7. Notification to event-causing subject [OMITTED]
5.4.8. 5. 4. 8. Vulnerability assessments
The RIPE NCC uses a third party employs an outside firm to perform periodic vulnerability assessments of for computer and network systems and of software that is the software that was developed in house to operate the CAs covered by this CPS. These reports are provided to the RIPE NCC Chief Information Security Officer and the RIPE NCC Managing Director.
5.5. Records Archival [OMITTED]
5.6. 5. 5. Key Changeover
The Offline CA currently acts as a Trust Anchor. If necessary, the RIPE NCC can issue a new key pair for the Trust Anchor and issue a new Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) and make this publicly available. For the Production CA, the ACA, and the hosted CA, An emergency key rollover has been practiced for the current set-up.The Online CA key pair changes are not performed on a scheduled basis. If a key-roll is required, a procedure as described in [RFC6489 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6489 ] will be followed.
Initiating the re-key is a manual action initiated by a Production CA and the ACA Online CA Operator via the user interface.
5.7. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
In the event of a key-pair compromise, a key rollover can be performed on demand for Production CA, ACA and Hosted CA.
As part of disaster recovery, backups are used.
For the Trust Anchor, in case of key-pair compromise, a key-rollover will be performed, and a new Trust Anchor Locator (TAL) will be published.
If the offline CA laptop is broken or compromised, it can be replaced using commodity hardware. In case the offline HSM breaks, it can be replaced with a new unit that can be initialised using a quorum of the Administrative Card Set.
5.8.The hosted member CAs perform an automated re-key using the algorithm described in[RFC6489] Link: #RFC6489 .This happens whenever a key has been in use for five years.
The RIPE NCC has been granted sole authority by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) to manage the allocation of IP address space and AS Numbers in its Number resources in the RIPE NCC service region, which includes Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia. The RIPE NCC has established the RPKI for its region consistent with this authority. There are no provisions for the termination and transition of the CA function to another entity.
6. Technical Security Controls
This section describes the security controls used by the RIPE NCC.
6.1. 6. 1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
6.1.1. 6. 1. 1. Key pair generation
For the RIPE NCC RPKI and hosted member CAs operated by the RIPE NCC, key pairs are generated using a hardware cryptographic module. The module used for this purpose is certified as complying with FIPS 140-2 level 3. The hardware cryptographic module employed for this process is
nShield Connect 6000.6.1.2. the nCipher nShield9000e.6. 1. 2. Private key delivery to subscriber
Private keys cannot can not be extracted from the HSM in unencrypted form. The Offline CA, the ACA and the production CA and Online CA only require the public key from their subscribers. Hosted The hosted member CAs have no subscribers.
6.1.3. 6. 1. 3. Public key delivery to certificate issuer
For the Offline CA, transfer of a custom mechanism has been developed to transfer certificate sign requests and/or revocation requests that include the ACA public key hash are Online CA public key hash. Since the Offline CA server is not connected to a network, the transfer is done using XML files on a USB stick
because the Offline CA laptop is not connected to a network.The hosted CA, the ACA, and the production CA are all (a.k.a. sneaker net).The hosted member CAs and Online CA are
production CA public keys.The Production CA, in turn, has direct access to the hosted CA public keys. For this reason,
6.1.4. 6. 1. 4. CA public key delivery to relying parties
For the ACA, the production Online CA and hosted CA, member CAs, public keys are included in CA and EE certificates issued by these CAs. The keys are delivered to relying parties by publication of the CA certificates and signed objects that include EE certificates (ROAs and manifests) in to the repository.
The Offline CA is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties. The Its Trust Anchor Locator [RFC 6490 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6490 ] [RFC6490] Link: #RFC6490 is described in Section 2.2.
The RIPE NCC will publish this Trust Anchor Locator on its website Link: /manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/rpki/ripe-ncc-rpki-trust-anchor-structure/ . at:
http://www.ripe.net/certification/validation Link: http://www.ripe.net/certification/validation
It may also publish this via other mechanisms, such as printed material, RIPE Meeting presentations or
training courses.6.1.5. Key sizes
The key sizes used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC 7935 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7935 ].
6.1.6.6. 1. 5. Key sizes
As per [RFC6485], the CAs covered by this CPS use a 2048-bit RSA key for all keys, including the keys used for EE certificates.
The public key algorithms and parameters used in this PKI are as specified in [RFC 7935 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7935 ].
The nCipher HSMs used by the CAs covered by this CPS were certified as complying with FIPS 140-2 level 3. Though the details of the key generation implementation used by these modules are not known by the RIPE NCC, the RIPE NCC trusts that this certification implies that key generation and quality checking by the modules is sufficiently safe.
6.1.7. 6. 1. 7. Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
The key usage extension bit values
employed in RPKI certificates are specified in [RFC 6487 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6487 ].The key usage extension bit values
are consistent with [RFC 6818 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818 ]. 6.2. 6. 2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
6.2.1. 6. 2. 1. Cryptographic module standards and controls
The Offline CA is operated under FIPS 140-2 level 3, requiring three out of ten operator keys to be presented for key pair generation and signing operations.
The ACA, the production CA, and hosted Online CA and hosted member CAs employ a cryptographic module evaluated under FIPS 140-2 level 3 [FIPS Link: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf ]. [FIPS]. However, because these systems need to be running 24/7 and need to be able to perform key generation and signing operations without human intervention, they are operated under FIPS 140-2 level 2 to allow unattended operation.
6.2.2. 6. 2. 2. Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
As described in Section 6.2.1, section 6. 2. 1 Link: #Cryptographicmodulest , three out of ten CA Operators are required to operate the Offline CA. For the ACA, Production Online CA and hosted CA, member CAs no multi-person control is used during normal operation.
6.2.3. 6. 2. 3. Private key escrow
No private key escrow procedures are required for this PKI.
6.2.4. 6. 2. 4. Private key backup
For all CAs covered by this CPS, the private keys are stored in the database that feeds on disk by the HSM using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) encryption with a key that is protected by a three-out-of-five 3-out-of-5 Administrative Card Set.
For the Offline CA, the files containing the encrypted private key
is stored in the local file system by the HSM, using Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).6.2.5. and other necessary information are copied to fileshare that is duplicated between the Nikhef and Telecity2 data centres after every operation. These files are backed up off-site on a nightly basis to a remote site located in Ede, the Netherlands, 70 km from Amsterdam.
For the Online CA and hosted member CAs, all encrypted private keys and other necessary information are stored on a fileshare that is duplicated between the Nikhef and Telecity2 data centers after every operation. These files are backed up off-site on a nightly basis to a remote site located in Ede, the Netherlands, 70 km from Amsterdam.
See sections 6.2.3. and 6.2.4.
6.2.6.There will be no archive of private keys by this CA.
The encrypted private keys and other information described in Section 6.2.4 section 6. 2. 4 may be restored to another HSM. In order to do this, a system administrator must have access to a quorum of the Administrative Card Set (ACS); in this case, case three out of the five cards are needed.
Also, Also note that this mechanism allows multiple HSMs to share the same internal key and encrypted managed keys stored on a network file system. This allows for the load balancing and fail-over set-up that is used for the
ACA, the production CA, and hosted CAs.6.2.7. Online CA and member CAs.6. 2. 7. Private key storage on cryptographic module
The private keys for all CAs covered by this CPS may be temporarily stored in inside the cryptographic module and will be protected from unauthorised use in accordance with the [FIPS 140-2 Link: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf ] FIPS 140-2 requirements applicable to the module.
Long-term Long term storage is done by storing the keys on a disk in an to disk in encrypted form, as described above.
6.2.8. 6. 2. 8. Method of activating private key
For the Offline CA, activating the keys requires that three out of ten five Operator cards are presented by individual senior staff, as described in
Section 6.2.1.For the ACA, Production CA, and hosted section 6. 2. 1 Link: #Cryptographicmodulest .For the Online CA and hosted member
with access to the HSM.6.2.9. that run on the physical servers that host the nCipher nShield9000e PCI cards.6. 2. 9. Method of deactivating private key
The Offline CA keys are de-activated as soon as processing is finished. Subsequent operation will require re-activation as described above. In addition, addition the server is physically turned off when not in use. As soon as processing is done, the server is backed up and is shut down again.
The cryptographic modules for the RIPE NCC ACA, Production CA, and hosted RPKI CA and hosted member CAs will operate in an unattended mode, on a 24/7 basis.
6.2.10. 6. 2. 10. Method of destroying private key
Keys are not stored long-term inside the hardware security modules used by the CAs covered by this CPS. The HSMs store the keys on disk in encrypted form. Keys are deleted when they When keys are no longer in use. use they are deleted from disk. Since they were encrypted in the first place, no additional action is taken to zero the bytes or purge them from long-term backup.
6.2.11. Cryptographic module rating
6. 2. 11. Cryptographic Module Rating
The cryptographic module(s) used by all CAs covered by this CPS are certified under FIPS 140-2, at level 3
[FIPS Link: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.140-2.pdf ].For the ACA, the production CA, and hosted [FIPS] Link: #FIPS .For the Online CA and hosted member
6.3. 6. 3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management
6.3.1. 6. 3. 1. Public key archival
Because this PKI does not support non-repudiation, there is no need to archive public
keys6.3.2. keys.6. 3. 2. Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
For the Offline CA that is intended to be used as a Trust Anchor by relying parties, the RIPE NCC is committed to support the same key pair for at least five
years. This may change if a new RFC is implemented that affects this process, or if the keys are compromised, which makes the CA unable to support the same key pair.
For the ACA, production CA, and hosted CAs, there is no intended validity period.
6.4. Activation Data
6.4.1.For the Online CA and hosted member CAs, key pairs have an intended validity interval of five years.
6. 4. Activation Data
For the Offline CAs, the three-out-of-five 3/5 Administrative Card Set (ACS) and the three-out-of-ten 3/10 Operator Card Set (OCS) were generated following the procedures described in the HSM manual. The cards were distributed among five of the ten Offline CA Operators described in
Section 5.1.2.For the ACA, production CA, section 5. 1. 2 Link: #Physicalaccess .For the Online CA
Section 5.1.2.6.4.2. section 5. 1. 2 Link: #Physicalaccess .6. 4. 2. Activation data protection
See section
6.2.8.6.4.3. 6. 2. 8 Link: #Methodofactivatingpr .6. 4. 3. Other aspects of activation data
None.
6.5. 6. 5. Computer Security Controls
6. 5. 1. Specific computer security technical requirement
The Offline CA is kept offline when not in use. It is only switched on when in use and is never connected to any network. All data (requests, responses, backups) are transferred using otherwise empty USB sticks.
The ACA, Production CA, and hosted Online CA and hosted member CAs are operated on machines in the RIPE NCC internal service VLAN. The user interface is made available through a firewall that load balances requests to two different back-end proxy servers.
6.6. These will delegate requests for the "certification" section only to the back-end machines.6. 5. 2. Computer security rating [OMITTED]
6. 6. Life Cycle Technical Controls
6.6.1. 6. 6. 1. System development controls
The software for all CAs covered by this CPS was developed in-house by the RIPE NCC, working together with external consultants. Unit test The RIPE NCC software development follows an "agile" methodology that includes test-driven development. Unit test coverage of at least 75% and succeeding functional tests were required for all components. All software is developed and maintained under a revision control system (git) (subversion) and releases are tagged. Continuous integration is triggered for each commit and release, which each release and ensures that any possible broken tests come to light before a release is made final.
Code is subject to a code review during development. The RIPE NCC Software Development department software development uses bug and issue-tracking issue tracking software for all software development. Prior to deployment to the production service, the code is versioned and deployed to a standalone platform for integration tests. The same packages used for these integration tests are then deployed to the production service, provided that no problems
are found.6.6.2. were found.6. 6. 2. Security management controls
The RIPE NCC uses the same access policy for the servers used to run the Offline CA, the ACA, the Production CA, and hosted CAs; CA and the Online and member CAs: only staff from the responsible departments have SSH access. SSH access is limited to the RIPE NCC office and VPN networks. Access to the systems is logged.
In addition, it It should be noted that in addition, the Offline CA laptop server is physically switched off when not in use.
6.6.3. 6. 6. 3. Life cycle security controls
Section 6.6.1 contains See section 6. 6. 1 Link: #Systemdevelopmentcont for a description of the software life cycle, including testing prior to release. Deployment of new software releases is on demand, with planned roll-back scheduled, with planned back-out, and post-deployment testing of service.
Host operating systems are maintained to current patch levels, and CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team) and other security advisories are tracked for relevant vulnerabilities.
Hosts and network infrastructure are physically maintained and replaced in a duty cycle averaging four years. Onsite maintenance contracts cover normal business hours support for this hardware.
6.7. 6. 7. Network Security Controls
The vLAN used for the servers that host the CAs covered by this CPS is protected by router Access Control Lists (ACLs) and/or by firewall rules. This applies both to incoming and outgoing traffic from/to other vLANs, and the same applies to for the Internet at large. We do not currently have a dedicated vLAN for these servers, though we plan to look into this in the near future.
Sensitive data is protected by at least one of TLS or SSL with client and server certificates certificates, and with SSH version 2 with 1024-bit keys, or better.
6.8. Time-stamping
The RPKI6. 8. Time-Stamping
- Certificate and CRL Profiles See [RFC 6487 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6487.pdf ].
- Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
Please refer to the Certificate and CRL Profile [RFC6487] Link: #RFC6487 .
The RIPE NCC employs third parties an outside firm to perform periodic vulnerability and compliance assessments for computer and network systems, including those that are part of the RPKI CA.
7. Certificate and CRL Profiles
See [RFC 6487 Link: https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6487.pdf ].
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments
The RIPE NCC employs third parties to perform periodic vulnerability and compliance assessments for computer and network systems, including those that are part of the RPKI CA.
8.1.Assessments are initiated upon request of the Chief at the behest of the Information Security Officer,
Chief Technology Officer, Principal Engineer RPKI or the RIPE NCC Executive Team.
Regular re-assessments are planned in accordance with RIPE NCC Information Security policies.
If the RPKI implementation changes as a result of an assessment, then the CPS will be updated as described in section 1.5.1.
8.2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessors
All third parties8. 2. Identity/Qualifications of Assessor
8.3. Assessors’ 8. 3. Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Entity
All third parties The outside firm engaged to perform assessments are paid contractors, preferably the assessment is a paid contractor with no other relationships with to the RIPE NCC.
8.4. 8. 4. Topics Covered by Assessment
The external vulnerability assessment performed on RIPE NCC IT systems covers a variety of topics including (but not limited to): to) network port scanning, testing of web application interfaces, review of user authentication and authorisation
mechanisms.The internal vulnerability assessment similarly covers a variety of topics, including (but not limited to)
8.5. 8. 5. Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency
The RIPE NCC Chief Information Security Officer, Chief Technology Officer and Principal Engineer RPKI will review Security Officer reviews all recommendations made by the external assessors and assessor and will advise on remedial actions as appropriate.
8.6. 8. 6. Communication of Results
External The external vulnerability reports are provided to all relevant stakeholders within the RIPE NCC, including (but not limited to): the Chief Technology Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, Principal Engineer RPKI and the RIPE NCC Executive Team. When deemed necessary, this information may also be shared with external stakeholders. NCC including, but not limited to the Business Owner, Information Security Officer and Senior Management.
9. References
[RFC5280] D. Cooper, S. Santesson, S. Farrell, S. Boeyen, R. Housley, W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", May 2008.
[RFC6818] P. Yee, “Updates to the internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile, January 2013
[RFC6484] Seo, K., Watro, R., Kong, D., and Kent, S. , "Certificate Policy (CP) for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), February 2012 for the Internet IP Address and AS Number PKI", work in progress, July 2007.
[RFC6487] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", February 2012
[RFC7318] Newton, A, Huston, G, “Policy Qualifiers in Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Certificates” July 2014
[RFC6481] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure", February 2012 work in progress, May 2010.
[RFC6482] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., Kong, D., "A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", February 2012 work in progress, November 2010.
[RFC6488] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., Kent, S., "Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 Infrastructure", work in progress, October, 2010
[RFC6486] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., Lipinski, M., "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 Infrastructure", work in progress, November 2010
[RFC6489] Huston, G., Michealson, G., Kent, S., "Certification Authority (CA) "CA Key Rollover in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)” , February 2012 RPKI", December 2010
[RFC6490] Huston, G., Weiler, S., Michealson, G., Kent, S., "Resource Public Key Infrastructure Certificate PKI (RPKI) Trust Anchor Locator", February 2012 work in progress, November 2010
[RFC6485] Huston, G., “The "A Profile for Algorithms and Key Sizes for Use use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)”, February 2012 Infrastructure", work in progress, November 2010
[RFC4387] P. Gutmann, Ed., "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure - Operational Protocols: Certificate Store Access via HTTP",
February 2006.[RFC6492] Feb 2006.
[res-certificate-profile] Huston, G., Loomans, R., Michaelson, G., "A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates".
[BGP4] Y. Rekhter, T. Li (editors), A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4). IETF RFC 1771, March 1995.
[FIPS] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 140-2 (FIPS PUB 140-2), "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, May 25, 2001.
[RSA] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adelman, L. M. 1978. A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM 21, 2 (Feb.), 120-126.
RIPE NCC RPKI Certification Practice Statement, December 2010 21