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Regular abuse-c Validation

This policy proposal has been accepted and has been implemented

The new RIPE Document is: ripe-705

You're looking at an older version: 1

The current (published) version is 2
2017-02
State:
Accepted
Publication date
Affects
Draft document
Draft
Authors
Proposal Version
2.0 - 27 Nov 2017
All Versions
Accepted
01 Jun 2018
Implemented
10 Oct 2019
Working Group
Anti-Abuse Working Group
Proposal type
  • Modify
Policy term
Indefinite
New RIPE Document

Summary of Proposal

In 2012, the RIPE community developed a policy (ripe-563) that introduced a mandatory "abuse-c:” contact attribute, which holds contact information intended for automatic and manual reports of abusive behaviour originating in resource holders’ networks. Since then, this “abuse-c:” information has become an essential part of the accountability of the RIPE community.

However, ripe-563 didn’t provide for the validation of “abuse-c:” contact information. This undermines the effectiveness of the policy, as “abuse-c:” information can often be of date or inaccurate (with no valid contact); the RIPE NCC receives several hundred reports of invalid contact information each year. Further problems with abuse contacts are discussed regularly on the Anti-Abuse WG mailing list.

This proposal aims to give the RIPE NCC a mandate to regularly validate “abuse-c:” information, and to follow up in cases where contact information is found to be invalid.

Policy Text

[The following text will update section 1.0 in the RIPE Policy Document “Abuse Contact Management in the RIPE Database” if the proposal reaches consensus.]

a. Current policy text

1.0 Abuse Contact Information

[…]

The role objects used for abuse contact information will be required to contain a single “abuse-mailbox:” attribute which is intended for receiving automatic and manual reports about abusive behavior originating in the resource holders’ networks.

The “abuse-mailbox:” attribute must be available in an unrestricted way via whois, APIs and future techniques.

b. New policy text

1.0 Abuse Contact Information

[…]

The role objects used for abuse contact information will be required to contain a single “abuse-mailbox:” attribute which is intended for receiving automatic and manual reports about abusive behaviour originating in the resource holders’ networks.

The “abuse-mailbox:” attribute must be available in an unrestricted way via whois, APIs and future techniques.

The RIPE NCC will validate the “abuse-mailbox:” attribute at least annually. If no valid reply is received by RIPE NCC within two weeks (including if the email bounces back), the “abuse-mailbox:” contact attribute will be marked as invalid.

In cases where the “abuse-mailbox:” contact attribute is invalid, the RIPE NCC will follow up with the resource holder and attempt to correct the issue.

Rationale

a. Arguments supporting the proposal

  • Accurate and validated information in the RIPE Database is essential to establish a trusted and transparent environment in which all network operators can operate safely. Accurate and validated information helps Internet troubleshooting at all levels, but it also helps to attribute malicious online activities that undermine this trusted environment.
  • The lack of reliable accurate and validated information in the database negatively impacts legitimate uses of the RIPE Database, including:
    • Assuring the security and reliability of the network by identifying points of contact for IP addresses for network operators, ISPs, and certified computer incident response teams;
    • Ensuring that IP address holders are accountable, so individuals, consumers and the public are empowered to resolve abusive practices that impact safety and security;
    • Assisting businesses, consumer groups, healthcare organisations and other organisations that are combating fraud (some of which have mandates to electronically save records) to comply with relevant legal and public safety safeguards;
    • Complying with national, civil and criminal due process laws in support of investigations and providing justice for victims.
  • Validating “abuse-c:” information is essential to ensure the efficiency of the abuse reporting system.

b. Arguments opposing the proposal

  • The proposal would result in increased workload for RIPE NCC, especially when following up on unresponsive abuse contact information.
  • If organisations are not cooperative, the RIPE NCC ultimately has the possibility to close their RIPE NCC membership and deregister their Internet number resources.