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[dns-wg] NCC reverse delegation criteria

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Jim Reid jim at rfc1035.com
Tue Jun 11 19:20:44 CEST 2019


> On 11 Jun 2019, at 17:58, Jonas Frey <jf at probe-networks.de> wrote:
> 
>>> Run a open resolver and secure it propely
>> These two things are mutually exclusive. Sorry.
>> 
> 
> Well, then all of these (running open resolvers) must be wrong:
> - Google
> - Cloudflare
> - Quad9
> ...

They’ve taken business decisions that the risks of operating open resolvers are worth the rewards. And AFAICT, they don't intermingle recursive and authoritative DNS on the same server(s).

> Anyway, isnt this the wrong discussion? The topic is wether RIPE should
> block, warn or pass these resolvers.

Indeed.

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