[db-wg] Disallowing MD5 passwords in e-mail updates, was MD5 Hashes in the database

That would mean RIPE NCC did not do anything while people has been aware of
this fact since 2 years ?

On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 1:42 PM, Micha Borrmann <ripe at syss.de> wrote:

> Am 08.11.2011 13:14, schrieb virtu virtualabs:
>
> > I agree the fact that grabbing all the existing maintainers hashes is
> > completely feasible since I did it during previous days  (in order to
> > assess their strength, not to disclose them). I made some tests with the
> > help of a friend of mine, and we recovered at least 4% of these
> > passwords only by testing a very popular wordlist (rockyou), and the
> > recovery process is still running.
> >
> > We were amazed to see how many maintainers use weak passwords to protect
> > their datas, sometimes using their alias as a password. Therefore, I
> > totally agree with David and would ask that some constraints should be
> > added while creating MD5(UNIX) hashes through RIPE's website dedicated
> > page (https://apps.db.ripe.net/crypt/). This webpage is also recommended
> > by ARIN and modifying the way passwords are hashed (and checked ?)
> > should be better for both RIPE NCC and ARIN.
> >
> > Telling people not to use twice a generated hash could also help a bit
> > more ;)
> >
> > My goal is not to recover every possible password from public hashes but
> > just demonstrate that it does not follow currently best-practices in
> > term of security.
>
> This is an old story for myself. It was reported by the german magazin
> "DER SPIEGEL" two years ago
> (http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65243798.html).
>
> > On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 12:58 PM, David Freedman
> > <david.freedman at uk.clara.net <mailto:david.freedman at uk.clara.net>>
> wrote:
> >
> >     I don't mind it continuing to be used over encrypted channels,
> >     as long as the hashes are not available to the general public (as
> >     per your
> >     previous mail)
> >
> >     I would support a warning phase
> >
> >     Dave.
> >
> >
> >
> >     On 08/11/2011 11:56, "Shane Kerr" <shane at time-travellers.org
> >     <mailto:shane at time-travellers.org>> wrote:
> >
> >     >David,
> >     >
> >     >On Tue, 2011-11-08 at 09:38 +0000, David Freedman wrote:
> >     >> I'd like to see auth: MD5-PW deprecated , even though it seems to
> be
> >     >> widely used (for various reasons)
> >     >> according to the report by DB presented to us.
> >     >
> >     >I propose that we deprecate  passwords over unencrypted channels.
> AFAIK
> >     >this just means e-mail today, although the web API stuff may also
> >     >provide an non-TLS option (I don't know).
> >     >
> >     >Unlike hiding MD5, this is a major change for users, and would need
> to
> >     >be done with the same caution and preparation as similar large
> changes
> >     >in the past. We could have a warning phase, where anyone using a
> >     >password in email would get a scary warning in the reply telling
> >     them to
> >     >use a more secure scheme (PGP, X.509, webupdates, or database web
> API).
> >     >The RIPE NCC could identify heavy users and help them convert their
> >     >tools. And eventually we could flip the switch and turn off plain
> text
> >     >passwords.
>
>
>
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