That would mean RIPE NCC did not do anything while people has been aware of this fact since 2 years ? <div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 1:42 PM, Micha Borrmann <<a href="mailto:ripe@syss.de">ripe@syss.de</a>> wrote: <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex;">Am 08.11.2011 13:14, schrieb virtu virtualabs: <div class="im"> > I agree the fact that grabbing all the existing maintainers hashes is > completely feasible since I did it during previous days �(in order to > assess their strength, not to disclose them). I made some tests with the > help of a friend of mine, and we recovered at least 4% of these > passwords only by testing a very popular wordlist (rockyou), and the > recovery process is still running. > > We were amazed to see how many maintainers use weak passwords to protect > their datas, sometimes using their alias as a password. Therefore, I > totally agree with David and would ask that some constraints should be > added while creating MD5(UNIX) hashes through RIPE's website dedicated > page (<a href="https://apps.db.ripe.net/crypt/" target="_blank">https://apps.db.ripe.net/crypt/</a>). This webpage is also recommended > by ARIN and modifying the way passwords are hashed (and checked ?) > should be better for both RIPE NCC and ARIN. > > Telling people not to use twice a generated hash could also help a bit > more ;) > > My goal is not to recover every possible password from public hashes but > just demonstrate that it does not follow currently best-practices in > term of security. </div>This is an old story for myself. It was reported by the german magazin "DER SPIEGEL" two years ago (<a href="http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65243798.html" target="_blank">http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-65243798.html</a>). <div class="im HOEnZb"> > On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 12:58 PM, David Freedman </div><div class="im HOEnZb">> <<a href="mailto:david.freedman@uk.clara.net">david.freedman@uk.clara.net</a> <mailto:<a href="mailto:david.freedman@uk.clara.net">david.freedman@uk.clara.net</a>>> wrote: > > � � I don't mind it continuing to be used over encrypted channels, > � � as long as the hashes are not available to the general public (as > � � per your > � � previous mail) > > � � I would support a warning phase > > � � Dave. > > > > � � On 08/11/2011 11:56, "Shane Kerr" <<a href="mailto:shane@time-travellers.org">shane@time-travellers.org</a> </div><div class="HOEnZb"><div class="h5">> � � <mailto:<a href="mailto:shane@time-travellers.org">shane@time-travellers.org</a>>> wrote: > > � � >David, > � � > > � � >On Tue, 2011-11-08 at 09:38 +0000, David Freedman wrote: > � � >> I'd like to see auth: MD5-PW deprecated , even though it seems to be > � � >> widely used (for various reasons) > � � >> according to the report by DB presented to us. > � � > > � � >I propose that we deprecate �passwords over unencrypted channels. AFAIK > � � >this just means e-mail today, although the web API stuff may also > � � >provide an non-TLS option (I don't know). > � � > > � � >Unlike hiding MD5, this is a major change for users, and would need to > � � >be done with the same caution and preparation as similar large changes > � � >in the past. We could have a warning phase, where anyone using a > � � >password in email would get a scary warning in the reply telling > � � them to > � � >use a more secure scheme (PGP, X.509, webupdates, or database web API). > � � >The RIPE NCC could identify heavy users and help them convert their > � � >tools. And eventually we could flip the switch and turn off plain text > � � >passwords. </div></div></blockquote></div>