[anti-abuse-wg] addtess verification (was: personal data in the RIPE Database)

Creative forgery engaged in by fraudulent resource holders is good, it lets people use that forgery first as an indication of badness and second as a way to search for more of the same.

Hiding it would be counter productive to the extreme especially as we may not be able to trust the LIR in at least some cases (or registrars in certain cases, for domain whois).

--srs
________________________________
From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces at ripe.net> on behalf of denis walker <ripedenis at gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, June 8, 2022 3:46:37 AM
To: Ángel González Berdasco <angel.gonzalez at incibe.es>
Cc: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg at ripe.net>
Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] addtess verification (was: personal data in the RIPE Database)

Hi Angel

On Tue, 7 Jun 2022 at 03:09, Ángel González Berdasco
<angel.gonzalez at incibe.es> wrote:
>
> denis wrote:

> In a previous mail you mentioned:
> > When these people apply to be a member I am sure the RIPE NCC requires proof of identity and proof of address.
>
> but -being slightly more skeptic- I would like to know what kind of address verification is performed.
>
> Document ripe-770 do mention the first part:
> "Each agreement signed with either the RIPE NCC or with a sponsoring LIR must be accompanied by supporting documentation proving the existence (and validity) of the legal or natural person (see below)."
>
> but no mention is made of verifying the physical address.
> https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-770#111

I checked with the RIPE NCC. You are right. They do no verification at
all on the address. Those attributes are maintained by the LIR. They
can enter any data they like into the address fields and this can be
changed at any time and as frequently as they wish. So with regard to
this field Ronald is right, it can be completely false data. If this
is pointed out to the RIPE NCC they will follow up and presumably
ensure it is corrected.

This is significant in two respects. Firstly the value of doing
correlations on this unverified free text is questionable. Secondly it
still needs to be taken out of the general public domain for natural
persons. I am sure some will say it is not a problem as those who want
to hide their true address can put false data in there. But that is
the wrong approach. We should never put resource holders in a position
where a solution to a problem is to lie. Also if the police need to
access and use that address data they need it to be correct.

So this doesn't change anything. It actually reaffirms what needs to be done.

cheers
denis
proposal author

>
> Regards
>
>
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