[anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] An arrest in Russia

In message <SG2PR03MB4053A9AE3E9612CBD66D6EBFF5230 at SG2PR03MB4053.apcprd03.prod.
outlook.com>, Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists at gmail.com> wrote:

>It is in their own members’ interest that they’re able to detect when some
>malefactor approaches them with clumsily forged paperwork, newly created shell
>companies pretending to be companies that were dissolved two decades ago etc
>and tries  to hijack a netblock.

Although I'll always be in agreement with the general notion that RIRs
have a responsibility to perform sound and adequate due diligence with
respect to all transfers and allocations,  I think that Suresh's comments
here are a bit out of place with respect to this specific case.

Here, it seems, based on the public reports, all of the i's were dotted,
and all of the t's were crossed, and there was even a formal written
endorsement of the transfer from some big shot associated with the
original Russian registrant of the resources in question.  There's no
evidence on the table that there was any involvement in this instance of
any shell companies or anything like that, so I, for one, have trouble
finding fault with anything that NCC did in this case.

RIRs -are- going to flim-flammed from time to time.  Just ask ARIN about
the Micfo case.  Even banks get flim-flammed now and then.  If someone
is hell bent on running a con, and has sufficient time, resources,
creativity, and, as seems to be true in this case, also has some insider
participating in the whole scheme, then there's not a lot that can be done
other than to request law enforcement to get involved, after the fact,
which it appears has already taken place in this case.


Regards,
rfg