[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)

In message <alpine.LRH.2.21.1904180803120.19649 at gauntlet.corp.fccn.pt>,
Carlos Friaças <cfriacas at fccn.pt> writes
>
>On Thu, 18 Apr 2019, Richard Clayton wrote:
>

>> ... I am aware of peer pressure (literally), action by IXPs, action by
>> organisations providing reputation scores and even action by hosting
>> companies.
>
>Yes, i'm aware of that too. Sometimes it fixes specific hijacks, but does 
>it stop or in anyway cause a delay for hijackers to hop onto the next 
>hijack...???

All of examples I gave come from my experience in putting a stop to
various actors hijacking address space. Now it may be that the same
actors have come back and found another completely different hosting
company to carry their hijacks -- but getting them to start again from
scratch has always looked like a win to me.

In particular there is nothing like being thrown off an IXP for putting
a crimp in your operations. There's real money involved.

I advised you before to give up on getting RIPE to develop a completely
new approach to tackling abuse (especially since it really is not going
all that well) -- and instead to put your effort into getting IXPs to
develop robust policies in this space. After all IXPs and routing are a
far better fit that an RIR and routing.

>> hijacks are reported in numerous places, the NANOG mailing list springs
>> immediately to mind -- and posting there is certainly easy
>
>Yes i'm aware about it, but is that the (globally?) de-facto place for 
>raising anyone's attention to an hijack or an hijacker operation?

it's not ideal from a global perspective, but it is certainly the de-
facto place at the moment

-- 
richard                                                   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 185 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: </ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/attachments/20190418/838d4ce8/attachment.sig>