[address-policy-wg] Next steps for new LIRs

Hello List,

Here is my trial balloon attempting to offer a policy which prevents gaming.
The concept is that it is simpler to attack the incentive than wade into the
quagmire of defining legitimate business operations.

I propose that new RIPE LIRs get their /22, but it only becomes fully vested
as an asset after 5 years.
Before that time, RIPE won't allow these 185/8 addresses to be transferred
without RIPE being paid the balance of the 5 years' worth of membership
fees.

So the new LIR gets the /22 and pays the annual membership fee to RIPE.
After 5 payments the addresses are fully transferable.
If the new LIR goes out of business and returns the addresses, they don't
owe anything further.
If the new LIR wants to sell the addresses, he first has to pay the balance
of 5 years membership dues to RIPE.

So if he sells the addresses after one year, he has to pay four years of
RIPE membership dues before they process the transfer.

This lets the new LIR accumulate asset value in the addresses over time and
gives him the option of selling or returning the addresses.
I chose 5 years because right now 5 years of RIPE fees is roughly the cost
for a /22.

This will not be overly burdensome to RIPE staff, as analysis is only
performed when and if a transfer of 185/8 addresses is submitted.

This will not require judgement calls on the part of RIPE staff.

If prices skyrocket, we can adjust the number of years.

(Not commenting on prior policy but providing commentary on Mr.Huberman's
post.)


Thoughts?

Regards,
Mike Burns
IPTrading.com


-----Original Message-----
From: address-policy-wg [mailto:address-policy-wg-bounces at ripe.net] On
Behalf Of David Huberman
Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2015 9:59 AM
To: address-policy-wg at ripe.net
Subject: [address-policy-wg] Next steps for new LIRs

Hello,

I think it is time to consider the next step for dealing with the problem of
a few individuals opening up dozens of LIRs for the exclusive purpose of
selling the /22s. Such activity is outright fraud, and something the NCC
should tackle with the assistance of the APWG.

Obvious point 1: 
It is very difficult to write policy text which stops such behavior, but
does not impact legitimate market behavior. 

Obvious point 2:
The NCC staff likely know when a request is a duplicate of previous
requests.  (Or at least, in many cases they do.)

We had discussed in Amsterdam that perhaps it was best to empower the staff
to stop the activity when it is clear to them that such activity is taking
place. So how about a policy sentence that reads something like:

"When RIPE NCC staff have reason to believe a LIR is being opened for the
purposes of selling the IPv4 block allocation, such a request may be
denied."

Just throwing out ideas,
David

David R Huberman
Principal, Global IP Addressing
Microsoft Corporation