[address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region)

Hi Sander,

On Tue, May 10, 2011 at 3:44 AM, Sander Steffann <sander at steffann.nl> wrote:
> Hi Martin,
>
>> Sander, I remain fully unconvinced that lowering the effort for
>> censoring the internet will make no or negative effect on the amount
>> of censorship done.  If you really think different, perhaps we should
>> make a bet. :)
>
> I personally think that law enforcement will find a way to do whatever it needs/wants/etc to do. With or without RPKI. I don't think RPKI makes a big difference in that in the long run.

I still hold that availability of technology is an enabler for
policies, and free-will implementation removes the need to make laws,
which may or may not be subject to public scrutiny/affecting election
outcomes, etc.

> What is more important I think is what can be done when things go terribly wrong in some way (intentionally leaving the meaning of 'wrong' and 'some way' undefined here). If the NCC revokes all certificates and destroys the private key we will have the same internet as we have now: no validated routes, all routes are equal. Sounds like a possible emergency exit strategy...

It does, for RPKI, and it would be extremely useful if it was written
in ink and published in very public places under under what
circumstances it will be enacted.

But it still does leave unhandled possible recourses or exit
strategies for when things go terribly wrong in some way with the
registry itself.  What are our options in this case?

Kind Regards,
Martin