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[address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region)
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Sander Steffann
sander at steffann.nl
Tue May 10 09:44:49 CEST 2011
Hi Martin, > Sander, I remain fully unconvinced that lowering the effort for > censoring the internet will make no or negative effect on the amount > of censorship done. If you really think different, perhaps we should > make a bet. :) I personally think that law enforcement will find a way to do whatever it needs/wants/etc to do. With or without RPKI. I don't think RPKI makes a big difference in that in the long run. What is more important I think is what can be done when things go terribly wrong in some way (intentionally leaving the meaning of 'wrong' and 'some way' undefined here). If the NCC revokes all certificates and destroys the private key we will have the same internet as we have now: no validated routes, all routes are equal. Sounds like a possible emergency exit strategy... - Sander
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