[address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region)

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Sascha Luck wrote on 5/9/11 22:06 :
> On Mon, May 09, 2011 at 10:01:14PM +0200, Sander Steffann wrote:
>> I fully agree. Mind you, they could just as well just make a law that
>> says
>> "You may not route any packets to/from addresses that appear on list
>> X" and we
>> would have exactly the situation everyone seems to be afraid of, and
>> it doesn't
>> need RPKI. As soon as laws don't allow 'your network, your rules'
>> anymore then
>> anything can happen... But that is something that we'll have to steer
>> through
>> voting, not address policy :) > >- Sander >
> 
> Right now, this does *not* work effectively because the internet routes
> around such censorship attempts and there is no LEA that can reach
> *everyone* in the world. This policy proposal changes that.
> 

I am a bit surprised that the whole discussion is around only this part
of the equation. What about the added benefit of the routing security
this policy and subsequently deployed and adopted system can add?

Today, your network can be taken down by a simple misconfiguration or
malicious attack without any court order.

Andrei
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