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[address-policy-wg] The implications of RPKI certificate revocation
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Florian Weimer
fweimer at bfk.de
Thu May 5 10:29:39 CEST 2011
* Mikael Abrahamsson: > On Thu, 5 May 2011, Florian Weimer wrote: > >> But why would this be a bad thing, as long as the required legal >> process is followed? > > The problem here is that all of a sudden dutch courts might have > direct operational influence in all of the RIPE region. Only indirect influence. Direct influence is when you inject prefixes into the global table, which many of us can do (including RIPE NCC). > In DNS, one can choose not to use a US based domain name or registrar > to avoid what's going on in DNS there, what would the similar action > be in case the dutch legal system starts doing things we don't agree > with, without turning off RPKI totally? Add additional trust anchors? -- Florian Weimer <fweimer at bfk.de> BFK edv-consulting GmbH http://www.bfk.de/ Kriegsstraße 100 tel: +49-721-96201-1 D-76133 Karlsruhe fax: +49-721-96201-99
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