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[address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call
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Mikael Abrahamsson
swmike at swm.pp.se
Thu May 5 10:21:26 CEST 2011
On Thu, 5 May 2011, Florian Weimer wrote: > But why would this be a bad thing, as long as the required legal process > is followed? The problem here is that all of a sudden dutch courts might have direct operational influence in all of the RIPE region. So basically it might make sense to bake a safety-valve into the system so that it's fairly easy to replace RIPE with something else in case meddling starts to happen. In DNS, one can choose not to use a US based domain name or registrar to avoid what's going on in DNS there, what would the similar action be in case the dutch legal system starts doing things we don't agree with, without turning off RPKI totally? -- Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike at swm.pp.se
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