[address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region)

Sascha,

On Jun 1, 2011, at 11:11 AM, Sascha Luck wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 01, 2011 at 12:02:25PM +0300, Randy Bush wrote:
>>> anybody can play with announcements, with potentially global impact.
>> 
>> s/can/does/.  happens daily.  though almost all are accidents.
> 
> So, a few accidents with rarely any noticeable impact (At least I don't notice any major connectivity issues every day)

This could either mean your prefix isn't getting hijacked (others are) or the hijacking is being done in such a way that you don't notice.  It doesn't mean that hijacking doesn't occur and isn't a significant problem. RPKI provides an infrastructure that would allow for tools to be built that could address this problem.

> Yet, also daily, I read about an attempt by $someone to censor, cut off or otherwise regulate somebody else's internet access.

Not sure about daily, but yes, this is a problem.  I have absolutely no doubt that if a tool exists that allows politicians to claim they're doing something to solve "a problem", they'll use it.

> You have to excuse me for not quite believing that this attempt to impose a centralised structure upon internet routing has anything to do with preventing someone from fat-fingering a prefix
> advertisement...

It really does have something to do with preventing fat-fingering (or perhaps more accurately, reduces the impact of that fat-fingering).  The main arguments I've heard (some cynical, some not) for RPKI have been:

- allow for SIDR deployment
- allow for the RIRs to enforce their policies
- allow for the RIRs to have a viable business model after IPv4 is exhausted
- allow the existing address hierarchy model to be enforced (disallow 'alternative address registries')

Other folks might have heard other arguments.

Regards,
-drc