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Hi all<BR>
<BR>
Great thanx to ur cooperation and informative replies<BR>
<BR>
Thank you<BR><BR><FONT color=#800000 face="Lucida Handwriting, Cursive"><STRONG>Eng Amer Alghadhban</STRONG></FONT><BR><FONT color=#800000 face="Lucida Handwriting"><STRONG>COE</STRONG></FONT><BR><FONT color=#800000 face="Lucida Handwriting"><STRONG>SANS-GCFW</STRONG></FONT><BR><STRONG><FONT color=#800000><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting"><STRONG><FONT color=#800000><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting">CEH</FONT></FONT></STRONG>, </FONT><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting"><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting">SCNP</FONT>, </FONT><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting"><FONT face="Lucida Handwriting">CCNA</FONT></FONT></FONT></STRONG><BR><BR><BR><BR> <BR>
> From: president@ukraine.su<BR>> To: routing-wg@ripe.net<BR>> Subject: Re: [routing-wg] Prefix hijacking possibility<BR>> Date: Mon, 21 Feb 2011 00:34:47 +0200<BR>> <BR>> Alex,<BR>> <BR>> In the most cases of real hijacks I know, the origin was the real ASN of<BR>> the prefix. It is easy, like this (cisco style):<BR>> <BR>> router bgp $EVIL_AS<BR>> network $TARGET_SITE_IP/24 route-map INSERT_ASN<BR>> ...<BR>> route-map INSERT_ASN permit 1<BR>> set as-path prepend $TARGET_SITE_ASN<BR>> <BR>> If you need to fight with the hijacks, you SURE need to check and filter<BR>> the WHOLE chain of route.<BR>> <BR>> 20.02.11 12:45, Alex Band �������(��):<BR>> > Hi Amer,<BR>> > <BR>> > In order to help mitigate route hijacking issues, it is considered good practice to register your announcements as route objects in an Internet Routing Registry such as the RIPE Database. This allows other to base routing decisions on them, using filters.<BR>> > <BR>> > A new alternative is the RIPE NCC Resource Certification service, which was launched at the beginning of this year. This allows you to get a digital certificate for your IP address blocks and create Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) objects, which essentially state "From this Autonomous System, I shall announce these prefixes". This allows anyone on the Internet to *validate* if a certain route announcement has a valid ROA associated with it, created by the legitimate holder of the address space.<BR>> > <BR>> > You can find more information here: http://ripe.net/certification<BR>> > And here is a quick-tour: http://youtu.be/Q0C0kEYa1d8<BR>> > <BR>> > Kind regards,<BR>> > <BR>> > Alex Band<BR>> > Product Manager, RIPE NCC<BR>> > <BR>> > <BR>> > On 18 Feb 2011, at 16:10, Amer wrote:<BR>> > <BR>> >> Hi all<BR>> >> I would like to ask you about what is the possibility of prefix hijacking by ISP after implementing the last RIPE's prefix advertisement procedures<BR>> >> Is their an official documents regard that?<BR>> >><BR>> >> Best regards<BR>> >><BR>> > <BR>> <BR>> <BR>> -- <BR>> WBR,<BR>> Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO)<BR>> <BR> </body>
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