[routing-wg] RPKI Route Origin Validation and AS3333

Hello Nathalie,


On Thu, 18 Mar 2021 at 21:40, Job Snijders via routing-wg
<routing-wg at ripe.net> wrote:
> It is always laudable to try to stop children from running around with
> scissors, but RIPE NCC can't really stop operators from hurting their
> network presence. The best RIPE NCC can do is to try to design good User
> Interfaces, and provide accurate documentation.
>
> > If the community decides it is important that AS3333 performs ROV, our
> > legal team needs to update the RPKI Terms and Conditions to reflect
> > the potential impact.
>
> I challenge the above assertion as I do not believe the legal team has
> to update anything.

I second this, let's not unnecessarily involve lawyers. Let's not pull
an "ARIN" here.

People in misconfigured networks will be unable to access any AS3333
services, regardless of whether they previously accepted specific T&C
or not, and this is no different then today, the only difference is
that this would now also include ROV.


I immagine lawyers did not check other possible routing mistakes
people may make, like trying to access AS3333 services from
bogon/unallocated or hijacked IP space or wrong/spoofed/invalid AS
paths which intermediate networks or AS3333 may drop.



thanks,
lukas