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[routing-wg] Post-mortem: Error in Contractual Status of Legacy Resources Impacted RPKI
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Marco Schmidt
mschmidt at ripe.net
Fri Dec 18 14:58:54 CET 2020
Dear colleagues, On Wednesday, 16 December 2020, we carried out work to implement Numbered Work Item 10 (NWI-10), which applies a consistent interpretation of the country code attribute in the RIPE Database and the Extended Delegated Statistics. At some point between 18:00-19:00 (UTC+1), 105 legacy resources mistakenly lost their contractual status in our internal systems. As a result, these resources were no longer able to be certified using RPKI. Details: Legacy resources can only be certified with RPKI when there is a contractual relationship in place with the RIPE NCC. These resources are registered differently from RIPE NCC-issued resources in our internal systems. A programming error in our NWI-10 implementation overlooked this aspect, which caused the contractual status for these legacy resources to be set to “none”. As a consequence, the resources were unable to be certified. Once RPKI detected this change: * The resource certificates for 36 Certificate Authorities (CAs) were updated to contain fewer certifiable resources. * The ROAs for legacy resources held by affected hosted CAs were revoked. 41 ROAs (with 202 Validated ROA Payloads) from 24 CAs were deleted. * The RPKI certificates issued for affected delegated CAs shrank, which caused their ROAs to disappear or be rejected due to overclaiming, depending on their CA software. We recovered the contractual status of the 105 affected resources at 17:10 (UTC+1) on Thursday, 17 December, re-established the correct resource list for the affected certificates, and recreated the 41 affected/deleted ROAs (with 202 VRPs) that are hosted by us. Recommendations: We have already recovered the ROAs belonging to the affected hosted CAs. We recommend that these CAs double-check this. Affected delegated CAs should check whether they need to recreate any ROAs. Our Customer Services team will be in contact to follow up. To prevent this from happening again in future, we will improve our Quality Assurance and Acceptance Testing. We will also improve our testing and prepare more detailed impact analyses when making changes to our registry software, applying a more risk-based testing approach to mitigate any concerns that are identified. Kind regards, Marco Schmidt Registry Services Assistant Manager
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