[routing-wg] AS201640

I think there are two qualities to the problem

1) what kind of authentication takes place to admit out-of-region data into
a system which demands self-referential integrity and can't be made to do
cross-system references

2) what time limits do we place on the data to require re-validation, so
that it doesn't last forever and go stale.

Designing this demands both sender and receiver agree. The prior art, RPSS
and RPS-Auth did not achieve agreement both sides: we didn't all agree to
run a single cohesive framework.

RPKI (noting Sanders concerns it  scares some people) has the huge benefit:
all the RIR are doing it, and all the RIR respect each others root/signing
trust chains.

And, as I said before, it has time limits built in: signed objects have a
lifetime by definition. Do nothing, and data ages out at some point.

Thats why I like it: its commonly implemented, and it behaves the ways we
need, for this function.

-G

On 9 November 2014 11:59, Gert Doering <gert at space.net> wrote:

> Hi,
>
> On Sun, Nov 09, 2014 at 11:48:36AM -0800, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote:
> > P.S.  I'm still a bit befuddled by what happened in this case.  Would it
> > be a fair characterization to say that what AS201640 has done in this
> > case is to exploit a kind of loophole which is uniquely present only
> > when the hijacker/squatter AS is registered in one RiR and the IP blocks
> > that are being hijacked/squatted are registered in a different RiR?
>
> Yes.
>
> > Also, could this scenario have been replicated if the origin AS had
> > been registered in/by ARIN, APNIC, LACNIC, or AFRINIC, rather than
> > RIPE?
>
> I'm not sure how the access control in other regions' IRR DBs work - but
> at least ARIN's database is based on RIPE code, so "it might be".
>
> > If so, then a proper sort of fix will necessarily involve all
> > five RiRs, no?
>
> Correct.  George Michaelson is from APNIC, so "they are aware", and I'm
> fairly sure the other RIRs are being informed.
>
> Gert Doering
>         -- NetMaster
> --
> have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?
>
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