This archive is retained to ensure existing URLs remain functional. It will not contain any emails sent to this mailing list after July 1, 2024. For all messages, including those sent before and after this date, please visit the new location of the archive at https://mailman.ripe.net/archives/list/ripe-atlas@ripe.net/
[atlas] integrity checks for the Atlas software?
- Previous message (by thread): [atlas] integrity checks for the Atlas software?
- Next message (by thread): [atlas] integrity checks for the Atlas software?
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Tanner Ryan
canadatechguy at gmail.com
Tue Jan 12 12:54:09 CET 2016
I think that is completely possible. The only issue is that it will take up far more resources validating the integrity of the code (which could be used for measurements). On Tuesday, 12 January 2016, Wilfried Woeber <woeber at cc.univie.ac.at> wrote: > > While thinking about options or mechanisms to make virtual probes > "tamper-proof" > I had this question coming up: > > Is the probe software capable to "verify" (check-sum or digital sig) the > bootstrap > kit and then, during run-time, verify that the code in memory is still > genuine? > > Thanks, > Wilfried > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: </ripe/mail/archives/ripe-atlas/attachments/20160112/43cd70a7/attachment.html>
- Previous message (by thread): [atlas] integrity checks for the Atlas software?
- Next message (by thread): [atlas] integrity checks for the Atlas software?
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]