[atlas] "Spoofing" tests.

On Sep 14, 2013, at 9:16 PM, Randy Bush <randy at psg.com> wrote:

> hypothesis: atlas probes show a bias toward clueful locations.  unless
> there is a calibration set with a different, or better yet known, bias,
> what useful is actually being measured?  unless it's a name and shame
> game.  and then you will want to know if things 'improve' over time,
> which means it is not a one-shot.

I do not think RIPE probes are representative of the larger Internet, because they are generally run by more clueful individuals.

In that sense, they represent an "ideal situation".  People who know and more often than not care.  If the results from this ideal situation are that a majority of probes can spoof, we might as well give up on source address validation, and move on to some other techniques to mitigate the problem.  On the other side, if nearly zero probes can spoof addresses it is proof-by-example that if you care to implement BCP38, it can work and can help.  That data may help convince those who don't care today that caring can result in a good outcome.

-- 
       Leo Bicknell - bicknell at ufp.org - CCIE 3440
        PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/





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