[ncc-services-wg] Enforce 2FA for RIPE NCC Access account

Hi Benedikt,
this must be solved simultaneously. It's better to have multiple 
authentication element for one account. Currently, you have only one 
method (TOTP) and only single authenticator linked to your account. And 
you have recovery code, which you must have noted somewhere in case the 
only authenticator fails - and such recovery code can be used to bypass 
MFA in current implementation. It's necessary to have the possibility of 
having multiple elements (primary, backup) and remove recovery codes 
completely.

Otherwise it won't be safe in terms of what MFA has to offer. If the 
organization has a shared account (which is also failure) and the 
recovery code leaks just like the password, you have similar problem 
again...

- Daniel




On 1/4/24 12:21, Benedikt Neuffer wrote:
> Hi Daniel,
> 
> I agree that in the long term, support for FIDO2/WebAuthn would be 
> beneficial. However, as long as a LIR is unable to mandate 2FA or audit 
> whether all accounts have enabled 2FA, methods other than TOTP do not 
> help preventing accounts from disabling 2FA again.
> 
> RIPE NCC should begin by addressing the basic requirements, and then 
> gradually introduce additional functionalities.
> 
> Regards,
> Benedikt
> 
> 
> On 04.01.24 12:10, Daniel Suchy via ncc-services-wg wrote:
>> Hello,
>> I agree with MFA requirement in general, but but also RIPE should 
>> implement more methods here and don't rely only on TOTP. It's 
>> necessary to admit that the development hasn't progressed here too 
>> much...
>>
>> There're modern MFA methods like FIDO2/WebAuthn already, unfortunately 
>> RIPE access doesn't implement them. There also should opportunity to 
>> have multiple methods actived concurrently (to have choice between 
>> multiple tokens, for example) - similary to implementations on 
>> Google/GitHube etc.
>>
>> - Daniel
>>
>>
>> On 1/4/24 11:04, Benedikt Neuffer wrote:
>>> Happy New Year, everyone!
>>>
>>> However, the year begins with some concerning news: RIPE NCC has 
>>> announced a Security Breach Investigation[0]. It likely relates to 
>>> the incident where Orange Spain lost credentials[1][2]. This topic 
>>> has been discussed in the unofficial RIPE Telegram chat[3] and the 
>>> German network community on Telegram[4], on the discussion mailing 
>>> list[5][6] and a lot of more places.
>>>
>>> The primary issue in this case was the lack of 2FA usage. We must not 
>>> allow ourselves to be distracted by the debate over weak passwords. 
>>> Even strong passwords can be compromised.
>>>
>>> A while ago, I raised a concern with RIPE NCC about the inability to 
>>> check if 2FA is activated for an account linked to a LIR. It’s also 
>>> not possible to enforce 2FA for accounts associated with a maintainer 
>>> object in RIPE DB. Unfortunately, there has been no progress or 
>>> action taken on this matter yet.
>>>
>>> After some thought, I've come to the conclusion that RIPE NCC's 
>>> services are so essential to the internet that enforcing 2FA for RIPE 
>>> NCC Access accounts globally should be considered.
>>>
>>> So, I propose a discussion urging RIPE NCC to either enforce 2FA on 
>>> RIPE NCC access accounts globally, allow a LIR to enforce 2FA for 
>>> linked RIPE NCC Access accounts, or at the very least, provide 
>>> visibility in the LIR portal to identify which linked accounts have 
>>> not activated 2FA.
>>>
>>> To be honest, I don't get the impression that RIPE NCC takes the 
>>> security of RIPE NCC Access accounts very seriously. How can we, as a 
>>> community, influence RIPE NCC in this regard? Would it be possible, 
>>> for example, to develop a policy in the RIPE NCC Services WG that 
>>> enforces 2FA for RIPE NCC Access accounts?
>>>
>>> Kind Regards,
>>> Benedikt
>>>
>>> [0] 
>>> https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/ripe-ncc-access-security-breach-investigation
>>> [1] https://twitter.com/Ms_Snow_OwO/status/1742357282917109928
>>> [2] 
>>> https://twitter.com/vxunderground/status/1742704099035160612?t=GkJ0_jiIGI3NEDGcV7021g
>>> [3] https://t.me/ripe_chat
>>> [4] https://t.me/bgpde
>>> [5] 
>>> https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ripe-list-unmoderated/2024-January/005920.html
>>> [6] 
>>> https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/ripe-list-unmoderated/2024-January/005923.html
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
> 
>