[ncc-services-wg] (No Subject)

Hi Petrik,

nice to meet such a definitely fake named person (for those who do not 
know, it is like "Jon Smith" in Ukrainian), with protonmail email! ;)

No, it will not ruin my IPv4 "business" in any way (if you mean me as 
Maksym Tulyuk, who is another person and works for AMS-IX). Even more, 
it makes world prices higher as the offer shrinks, and makes Ukrainian 
prices times lower, as the buyers can be only inside Ukraine.
Even more, drop ukrainian prices and "buy" nets for a cheap is the real 
target for benificiaries of the blockage.

Let me remind there is ZERO cases of the forced transfer. Same way you 
can ask for blockage to avoid reources being moved to the Moon because 
of possible interplanetary war. The probability is the same.

And, once again, extra checks for due diligence SHOULD be implemented 
FOR THE DISTRESSED REGION, but not all the country.

27.10.22 20:52, Petryk Pyatochkin via ncc-services-wg пише:
> Dear Matthias,
> 
>> On 27 Oct 2022, at 18:01, Matthias Merkel 
>> <matthias.merkel at staclar.com> wrote:
>>
>> Dear Viktoriia,
>> I don’t think anyone is suggesting to allow transfers and later revert 
>> them – there is no real procedure for this and it would likely cause a 
>> lot of issues down the line.
> 
> This is the "option number 1", as it was presented by Athina in 
> yesterday's Working Group session.
>> What most people seem to be advocating now – and what the RIPE NCC is 
>> currently doing – is that additional due diligence should be carried 
>> out, which means that special care should be taken that identities are 
>> verified and sanctions screening is carried out correctly.
> 
> The problem with that is requests for transfers made under threat of 
> life will look very legitimate. We have to remove the whole possibility 
> for such a threat.
> 
>> I understand that IP addresses being stolen could be a problem, 
>> however I have not heard of any cases where this has actually happened 
>> so far. But here’s an alternative consideration: If a Ukrainian ISP 
>> needs additional funding to rebuild and wants to sell IP addresses to 
>> enable this, your proposal would potentially cause the exact issues 
>> you’re trying to prevent.
> 
> This sounds pretty unrealistic. If you want to rebuild your network, you 
> would not sell IP addresses, because there is not enough of them and you 
> will need them.
> 
> But there are people who would will to just sell them for making profit, 
> but not to rebuild anything. Yes, they are also part of this community, 
> and we, as a community, have to decide who we want to support.
> 
> 
>> Your proposal would essentially freeze assets – similar to what 
>> sanctions might do – but of the people who you are trying to support. 
>> This can have severe financial consequences for the affected parties, 
>> and I really think that this would need to be an opt-in thing (but 
>> also that it would need to be defined in a separate and clear policy).
> 
> This proposal would just keeps things as they are now, will remove 
> potential threats for life, will simplify evaluation of transfers by 
> RIPE NCC, and maybe other things.
> 
> And yes, it will damage business of Max Tulyuk, but as I said, we could 
> choose who we support.
> 
> 
>> Matthias Merkel
> 
> Cheers,
> Petryk Pyatochkin
> 
> 
>> *From:*Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk at gmail.com>
>> *Date:*Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 17:50
>> *To:*Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel at staclar.com>
>> *Cc:*ncc-services-wg at ripe.net <ncc-services-wg at ripe.net>
>> *Subject:*Re: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine
>>
>> Dear Mattias,
>> responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be 
>> significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all 
>> internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are 
>> more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs.
>> The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw 
>> from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing 
>> machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, 
>> leaving people who live there without any information channels and 
>> means of communication. We have tore-buildtelecom and internet 
>> infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if 
>> the IP addresses of local Internet Providerswill betransferred to 
>> other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical 
>> infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses.
>> Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and 
>> somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem 
>> that we have.
>> Viktoriia Opanasiuk
>> чт, 27 окт. 2022 г. в 16:59, Matthias Merkel 
>> <matthias.merkel at staclar.com <mailto:matthias.merkel at staclar.com>>:
>>
>>     Hi Viktoriia,
>>     RIPE operates on consensus policies. A new policy cannot be
>>     adopted if there is a meaningful number of objections like clearly
>>     there is here.
>>     As has been explained in the in-person meetings, a freeze cannot
>>     be implemented until a corresponding policy is in place, as this
>>     may otherwise open up the RIPE NCC to civil liability. Of course,
>>     there is also a risk that a freeze could negatively impact
>>     Ukrainian LIRs (for example ones who may want to sell parts of
>>     their IP space to fund continued operations).
>>     For the reasons above, I personally don’t think that a blanket ban
>>     will be a good solution. Instead, the RIPE NCC should conduct
>>     increased due diligence on transfers from Ukraine and other
>>     high-risk regions. From what I understand, the NCC has already
>>     implemented these measures.
>>     Most of the recent emails have already identified themselves as
>>     Ukrainian, some including a reg-id or at least mentioning they
>>     were an LIR as well. As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will
>>     be significant participation by non-LIRs.
>>     Matthias Merkel
>>     Staclar, Inc.
>>
>>     *From:*ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg-bounces at ripe.net
>>     <mailto:ncc-services-wg-bounces at ripe.net>> on behalf of Viktoriia
>>     Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk at gmail.com
>>     <mailto:viktoriia.opanasiuk at gmail.com>>
>>     *Date:*Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 15:51
>>     *To:*ncc-services-wg at ripe.net
>>     <mailto:ncc-services-wg at ripe.net><ncc-services-wg at ripe.net
>>     <mailto:ncc-services-wg at ripe.net>>
>>     *Subject:*[ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine
>>
>>     Hi everyone!
>>     Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the
>>     decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a
>>     comment and a wish.
>>     First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are
>>     only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP
>>     addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit
>>     risky transfers is found and implemented.
>>
>>     And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary
>>     freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a
>>     few words about who exactly those who express their position
>>     represent.
>>     For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an
>>     ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it
>>     provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it
>>     continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether
>>     the position of the participant in the discussion is from a
>>     representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this
>>     community he represents.
>>
>>     Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems
>>     that exist in Ukraine today.
>>     --
>>     Viktoriia Opanasiuk
>>
>>
>> --
>> З повагою,
>> Вікторія Опанасюк
>> --
>>
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> 
>