[ncc-services-wg] UA IP transfers situation Askochenskaya Alexandra

Hi Alexander,

I disagree with you. The statement that we don't know whom belongs
resources isn't true, because RIPE NCC reflects changes of the
resources holder in the RIPE database. And do the best
to keep this database up to date. Also RIPE NCC checks if a resource
holder is legitimate or not before transfer. Could you please clarify,
did you mean by below that RIPE NCC doesn't do work properly?

>>But in order to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, it is necessary to recognize that these Ukrainian Internet resources are located on IP addresses that belong to someone.
>>And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms. And at that time >>>there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located.

The transfer frize might lead to  the situation that you described,
that soon we will not know whom actually belongs resources.

On Tue, Nov 1, 2022 at 10:32 AM Федієнко Олександр Павлович via
ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg at ripe.net> wrote:
>
> Thank you, Ms. Oleksandra, for mentioning me in your letter.
>
>
>
> Unfortunately, we don't know you personally, but I'm sure that if you want to get a transparent answer, I can treat you to coffee and give you answers.
>
>
>
> Now about that, about:
>
> 1) the question of how to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from
>
> theft, and to avoid coordination monopolization of the IP transfers by
>
> one state body, which is a direct path to corruption.
>
>
>
> I fully support your p1!
>
> But in order to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, it is necessary to recognize that these Ukrainian Internet resources are located on IP addresses that belong to someone.
>
> And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms. And at that time there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located.
>
>
>
> Another problem is state Ukrainian Internet resources. And it will be a very unfortunate situation when, for example, state Ukrainian Internet resources will be located on IP addresses of LIRs that are not under the jurisdiction of Ukraine.
>
>
>
> But taking into account cyberattacks, and believe me, they happen all the time on our information Ukrainian Internet resources, the state will make decisions on protection. It is also a battlefield.
>
> I hope that RIPE NCC will still create a group and develop new transfer policies.
>
>
>
> p2 Regarding the alleged spam from me :)
>
> If you carefully read the letters that I wrote, ONE letter, and not a typed text from Mr. Maksym, I hope you will draw conclusions.
>
> That immediately in my first letter, as well as in the letter of the Internet Association of Ukraine, I appealed to RIPE NCC to start making policies.
>
> But I did not expect that I would affect Maxim Tulyev's business interests, and he would start such an informational attack.
>
>
>
> I fully support you in the part that EVERY Ukrainian, REGARDLESS of where he lives, should make efforts for our victory against Russia.
>
>
>
> Glory to Ukraine.
>
> --
>
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