This archive is retained to ensure existing URLs remain functional. It will not contain any emails sent to this mailing list after July 1, 2024. For all messages, including those sent before and after this date, please visit the new location of the archive at https://mailman.ripe.net/archives/list/ncc-services-wg@ripe.net/
[ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
- Previous message (by thread): [ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
- Next message (by thread): [ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]
Sander Steffann
sander at steffann.nl
Mon May 20 21:52:06 CEST 2013
Hi Martin, > On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 20:55 +0200, Sander Steffann wrote: >> About the "Obviously, and not only due to RPKI, a classic deterring >> safe-guard is required": I don't find this obvious at all. > > Again, what you said (no sed): > On Mon, 2013-05-20 at 15:57 +0200, Sander Steffann wrote: >> If the Dutch legal system gets so bad that they require >> disproportional measures to be taken by the RIPE NCC then I think we >> have bigger issues and should move the RIPE NCC to a different >> country. > > I am really interested in hearing how you think the decision model > should work here: > - What are "disproportional" measures? I was thinking of i.e. taking a whole LIR/ISP offline because one of their customers misbehaves. I think the RIPE NCC have a decent relationship to the LEA's so I doubt if such disproportional measures would happen. > - What should be the triggering mechanism for actually moving the RIPE > NCC to another country (possibly outside of the EU) ? Silly things like I described above. I never seriously thought of moving the RIPE NCC to a different country though. The line you quote was meant as hypothetical case. > If you don't see the above "obvious" it appears you haven't follow the > thought behind your quote (and mis-quote) through... Please do so. I still don't see any of this as obvious though. It would only be obvious if you are certain these bad things will actually happen, which I very much doubt. > [...] > > RPKI in this respect is entirely a non-issue! It's equivalent to TLS to > whois.ripe.net, ie. merely the transport - not the data source. I agree. > Having backups of the central information systems and clear rules of > their abuseability, to guard against the [by me, _completely_] expected > coming slippery slope, however, is entirely the core issue and a quite > obvious thing to implement. Ok. This discussion now seems to have gone beyond rPKI policy and so this thread isn't the right place to discuss it. I suggest you take this to the RIPE NCC Board then. I think it is the board's responsibility to take care of these issues, and you seem to have genuine concerns about this. I don't (as I mentioned: I see this only as a hypothetical case, not a realistic one) so I'm stepping aside here and I'll leave the rest of the discussion to the board. Cheers, Sander
- Previous message (by thread): [ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
- Next message (by thread): [ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)
Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]