[ncc-services-wg] 2013-04 New Policy Proposal (Resource Certification for non-RIPE NCC Members)

From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism

    Common definitions of terrorism refer only to those violent acts
    which are intended to create fear (terror); are perpetrated for a
    religious, political or, ideological goal; and deliberately target
    or disregard the safety of non-combatants (civilians).
    ...
    The concept of terrorism may be controversial as it is often used by
    state authorities (and individuals with access to state support) to
    delegitimize political or other opponents.

In this sense, the American (and other) press have become non-violent
terrorists, creating and maintaining public fear for profit.  It has
been said that the last decade++ of the US Government has done so to
further enrich the top 0.001.

Analogously, fear is being used to prevent me, as an operator, from
protecting my network in a manner that I choose and which only affects
my network.  Mis-origination occurs daily, and there have been no known
abuses of ROAs.  Yet there are those who would use unrealistic fear to
prevent you and me from using them to improve protection of our
networks.

Yes, the 'Dutch Court attack' could be used against me.  But it is far
more likely that some net black hat or idiot will mis-originate my
prefix.  And yes, like everything else on the Internet, some perp will
figure out how to abuse it.  But it should be *my* choice whether or
not to use a ROA to protect it.

When the people with guns and lawyers want to take you off the net, they
will, and they have.  Two weeks ago, the USG took 7,000 Syrian domains
out.  The other year 120,000!  Ask MegaDownload if they had problems
with ROAs.  Can we please try to be somewhat realistic about how
vulnerable we are to black helicopters?

And I am aware of the issues in issuing a ROA.  It was I who presented
the issues in http://archive.psg.com/110502.ripe-bgpsec-policy.pdf in
the RIPE meeting in May 2011, which started all this anti-RPKI noise.

The costs for me to issue and maintain a ROA are negligible, and the
costs for others to validate my announcements are impressively small.
The system was designed with incremental deployment, various levels of
reliance, many flavors of disabling in routers, etc.  If I wish to trust
it, that is *my* prerogative.  Please do not place a complicated
bureaucracy of fear in my way.

Please do not tell me how I must run my network.

randy