[ncc-services-wg] Questions about the fax the RIPE NCC received from United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI).

On 19.09.2012 17:49, Wilfried Woeber wrote:
> Michael Markstaller wrote:
> [...]
>> Anyone who thinks it's useful to talk about (long-term!) Root-CA
>> services by (RIR)/RIPE?
> 
> Caveat: very personal and non-PC point of view!
> 
> I consider the whole concept of tree-structured CAs an architectural failure.
> With that in mind, I do not want to see the NCC drawn into that swamp. It
> just increases the NCC's attack surface.
>
Well, let me draw a little picture of what I'd think of:

Currently:
- most "trusted" root-CAs in browsers are out of any control, thats bad,
big failure (as we can see when they sell certificates to dictators for
"monitoring"-purposes)
- anyone can get a cert for gurgleme.com ;) I dont trust any of them..
And no user will ever verify fingerprints etc..

Future(?):
- After many years, only really trusted, community-controlled (in terms
of what they are allowed to do) are accepted anymore, at least in
sensitive environments.
- Certificates are only given out based on a (human!) decision based on
policies, so if he/she is within the net, on the provider (LIR) speaking
through etc..

Surely: this needs human resources but when looking at the prices of
Verisign etc - these could be easily paid..

>> Instead of commercial instances that just print money and sell them in
>> case without anything (just price) to dictators like *.google.com
> 
> Any attempt to manage trust as a commodity and to sell it in a competitive
> market, where the majority of customers and consumers (with a broad definition
> of both) do not understand the technology and the risks - is doomed to fail.

Isn't it somehow our job to think about how to protect the consumer from
being a lemming of the industry ? ;)


best regards

Michael