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[ipv6-wg] [routing-wg] MERIT Darknet Experiment and RPKI alerts

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Daniel Karrenberg daniel.karrenberg at ripe.net
Tue Nov 13 09:36:39 CET 2012

On 09.11.2012, at 12:05 , Wilfried Woeber wrote:

> Overall, I think this is very dangerous approach, and the wrong way to start with.
> 
> There might be very good reasons, why a full block of (IPv6) addresses, or a
> subset of, ist not (yet) globally visible. Announcing/Hijacking those addresses
> may seriously interfere with local tests or pilot deployment.
> 
> IMHO this should be strictly opt-in, instead of opt-out!
> 
> Wilfried.

Wilfried, you are right. The agreement I thought we made with Merit was to use unallocated address space.
Apparently a misunderstanding occurred somewhere along the way. We will talk to Merit and correct this.

Daniel

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