Marco> My take is that DNSSEC is not a MINIMUM requirements for
Marco> trial interoperability so it should not be recommended in
Marco> the ETSI document (I would say it's the same for IPv6). The
Marco> support of DNSSEC or other mechanisms to prevent spoofing
Marco> is a national matter for each trial. The decision of
Marco> supporting DNSSEC in the trial has also to take into
Marco> account some practical aspects (e.g. costs, timeframe,
Marco> extra complexity, etc...) that are likely to be different
Marco> from country to country. It would be interesting to have
Marco> some trials (or portion of the same trial) with DNSSEC and
Marco> others without and then compare the results/feedbacks
Indeed. But this means some minimal standards/requirements for those
trials that do involve DNSSEC so they can interoperate. And there
needs to be some convention for handling the interactions between
DNSSEC-aware and non-DNSSEC-aware entities. [ie If an application
expects a signed answer from the DNS and doesn't get that, what should
it do?] These are reasonable things for this ETSI document to cover:
not that I have any say on that of course since my employer is not an
ETSI member. Another topic the ETSI document could/should look at is
IPv6 interoperability: what if a name server or registry/registrar for
ENUM was IPv6 only?