[dnssec-key-tf] Input for Requirements Requested

Also, I think it would be better if only TA whose owner has agreed to  
inclusion in the TAR are actually included.
That is, even if the TA could be verified from the data in the DNS and  
that made available elsewhere by the TAR owner, only if the owner  
agrees to its inclusion should it be included.

Joao

On Mar 3, 2008, at 6:10 PM, Jim Reid wrote:

> On 29 Feb 2008, at 13:56, Daniel Karrenberg wrote:
>
>> If you have any input on requirements, even if it is just in the form
>> of "this and that is very important to me", please let me have it  
>> quickly.
>
> Just to start the ball rolling....
>
> [1] The TAR should be technology neutral. It should not exclude or  
> prevent different flavours of trust anchors to be published.
>
> [2] The TAR should be OS/DNS implementation neutral. Tools and  
> documentation should be provided for the common platforms: "here's  
> how to transform this tarball of crypto gunk into stuff to plug into  
> your name server configuration".
>
> [3] The TAR should somehow verify the keying material it's given  
> before publishing or storing it. There should also be a secure  
> channel for authenticating the TAR and any data it's publishing.
>
> [4] A process is needed to revoke a trust anchor and notify those  
> who may be using the now withdrawn or invalid trust anchor.
>
> [5] Everybody should sign up to T&C's that hold everyone else  
> harmless.
>
> [6] The TAR should be clear what support, if any, is available.
>
> [7] The TAR must make it clear what they keying material is for and  
> its political significance: eg "we're not undermining IANA" (or  
> perhaps not) or "we make no claims about the appropriateness of the  
> stuff in our TAR" (national sovereignty & competition issues).
>
> [8] The TAR should treat all parties equally. Provided they  
> demonstrate suitable levels of DNSSEC clue.
>
> [9] There should be regular reviews of the TAR's usefulness: ie  
> clear goals for defining "success" or "failure" and some way of  
> establishing consensus around these goals.
>
> [10] The TAR must have exit and escrow strategies
>