This archive is retained to ensure existing URLs remain functional. It will not contain any emails sent to this mailing list after July 1, 2024. For all messages, including those sent before and after this date, please visit the new location of the archive at https://mailman.ripe.net/archives/list/[email protected]/

[dns-wg] What about the last mile, was: getting DNSSEC deployed

• Previous message (by thread): [dns-wg] What about the last mile, was: getting DNSSEC deployed
• Next message (by thread): [dns-wg] What about the last mile, was: getting DNSSEC deployed

Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

David Conrad david.conrad at icann.org
Fri Feb 16 17:51:13 CET 2007

>     NEW ATTACK TECHNIQUE THREATENS BROADBAND USERS
...
> As noted, dnssec can protect against spoofed dns info.

Except DNSSEC wouldn't really be applicable.

The attack (as I understand it) provides a new IP address (that of an  
attacker-owned caching resolver) to clients on a LAN attached to the  
broadband router, with the attacker-owned caching resolver returning  
answers to stub resolver queries.  Since validation is done at the  
caching resolver, DNSSEC wouldn't apply.

Rgds,
-drc

• Previous message (by thread): [dns-wg] What about the last mile, was: getting DNSSEC deployed
• Next message (by thread): [dns-wg] What about the last mile, was: getting DNSSEC deployed

Messages sorted by: [ date ] [ thread ] [ subject ] [ author ]

[ dns-wg Archives ]