[db-wg] Proposal for restricting authentication concerning use of revoked and expired GPG ID's in key-cert objects

Hi Denis,

> On 11 Feb 2019, at 16:53, denis walker <ripedenis at yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> 
> Hi Ed
> 
> Thanks for following up on this. Just one question, have you taken into account time zones? If an update is signed now in Dubai it is 19:51. If the update is processed on Amsterdam time, it is 16:51. Will this update fail because it is 3 hours in the future?
> 
> cheers
> denis
> co-chair DB-WG
> 

Good question. We rely on the Bouncy Castle cryptography library to provide the signing time for the message, and it does appear to take the timezone into account.

I tested by signing a message inside a virtual machine set to a different timezone (EST), and the signature creation time was correctly mapped to the local timezone (within a minute rather than hours).

The signed updates in production appear to confirm this - only 24 messages were more than 1 hour old, out of 118,183 (from October to December 2018), and none of these appeared to be offset by a multiple of hours.

Regards
Ed

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