[db-wg] Proposal for restricting authentication concerning use of revoked and expired GPG ID's in key-cert objects

On 05/11/2018 17:56, Gert Doering wrote:
> On Mon, Nov 05, 2018 at 04:12:10PM +0100, Edward Shryane via db-wg wrote:
>> Is it enough to update or delete a revoked key? Should the RIPE database process key revocation certificates?
> 
> One of the problems here is that the RIPE DB cannot reliably know if
> a GPG key is revoked, unless it is *told*.
> 
> "Telling it" can be done nicely by removing the key-cert object - otherwiese
> it would need to poll key-servers and hope for a key revocation to appear
> there.

I suggest just removing the key-cert object. Instead of updating the
key-cert object with a revoked version.

> A catch-22 arises if the key-cert object needs a signed update with that
> very key to be deleted...

I would not use this approach of requiring a signed update to remove the
key.

If an authenticated SSO account is signed into the RIPE NCC website and
tries to remove a key-cert object the DB. This should be allowed.

-- 
Christoffer Hansen

-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: signature.asc
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 228 bytes
Desc: OpenPGP digital signature
URL: </ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/attachments/20181201/34e90939/attachment.sig>