[db-wg] MD5s of the RIPE database, Deprecation of MD5 and safe authentication methods

Dear Chris,

My email was intended to propose having a safer authentication method.

I was hoping that RIPE will either :
  - force users to change their passwords. After 4 years and the RIPE
recommendation, 27.000 hashes are still being used on a total of
36.000 without update. Only 25% of the hashes have been updated.
  - deprecate MD5 in profit of stronger authentication methods.

Having 75% of valid hashes in the nature is a concern, I think. Any
security researcher who downloaded all the hashes could misuse this
information.

Regards,

-- 
Pierre Kim
pierre.kim.sec at gmail.com
@PierreKimSec
https://pierrekim.github.io/

On 5/6/15, Christiaan Ottow <chris at 6core.net> wrote:
> Hi Pierre,
>
> On 04/05/15 22:12, Pierre Kim wrote:
>> Dear Database Working Group Members,
>>
>> By reading
>> https://labs.ripe.net/Members/kranjbar/password-management-in-ripe-database
>> , I see : "The MD5 hash is public, when running a single query (not
>> for bulk queries)."
>> I assume this was a known problem but the RIPE didn't alert that all
>> the hashs have been retrieved, although there were some urgency to
>> change the passwords or to use a safer authentication method.
>>
>> When I discussed it with RIPE NCC Security, I gave a 90 day disclosure
>> policy about this "public" information, starting from the 16 Apr 2015.
>
> What public information exactly do you mean?
>
>> The 90 day period can be adjusted by adding more days at the end if
>> RIPE shows a good progress of the migration. I wanted to do
>> responsible disclosure when I saw the RIPE Responsible Disclosure
>> Policy which is a Really Good Thing, I think.
>
> What migration? RIPE has changed the database scheme to hide passwords,
> recommended all MNTners to change their password, and offers stronger
> means of authentication. What more do they need to do right now?
>
>> According to the RIPE transparency, as recommended by RIPE NCC
>> Security, therefore I am now contacting this working group to work
>> together because deprecation of MD5 is an important change in the RIPE
>> database and it must be debated in a democratic manner.
>>
>> My analysis is simple: The MD5 authentication is broken for years and
>> it's time to change to a more secure method. I think people needs to
>> be encouraged to move to SSO authentication. Using MD5 now is unsafe
>> and dangerous, especially with unchanged 4 year-old passwords.
>>
>> Please share your thoughts about this situation. I will be happy to
>> debate with you.
>>
>
> At this point, I'm very curious as to:
> 1) What information do you plan to disclose in 90 days?
> 2) What do you expect of RIPE in that period?
>
> -- chris
>
>