[db-wg] Temporary origins

> this does conflict with some other Internet documents, like BCP-6.
> That can only be confusing and may inhibit global consensus.  If IETF
> BCP documents are inaccurate then the RIPE community has some
> responsibility to point it out.

the routing folk at ietf have been well aware of this for many years.

> The dual authorisation that RIPE requires on a ROUTE object seems an 
> unnecessary hurdle

and semantically incorrect

> The consensus from RPKI seems to be that the inetnum maintainer has
> the authority to grant ROA.

[ sorry to be pedantic about terminology.  but this is a complex area
  and rigor is needed to keep out of the weeds. ]

the rpki is a database, it has no ability to consent.  it also has no
idea what an inetnum: is.

i think you mean that the design of the rpki is that an address resource
holder is the sole authority over what ASs may announce that resource.
that any CA covering the address resource may authorize ROAs for that
resource.

> I do not know the history of why RIPE asks for AS maintainer also.  Is
> there still some good reason?  (If so, I am puzzled that it does not
> apply to RPKI, but that is a separate discussion).

the discussion when the rpki was designed was that the AS asserts its
consent through bgp.

> 1/ ask IETF to update BCP-6.

i am sure you have better ways to spend your time.

randy