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[db-wg] [ncc-services-wg] Blocking Access to Personal Data Objects in the RIPE Database
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João Damas
joao at bondis.org
Wed May 28 11:01:23 CEST 2014
On 27 May 2014, at 14:33, Wilfried Woeber <Woeber at CC.UniVie.ac.at> wrote: > Janos Zsako wrote: > >> Dear all, >> >> In short, yes, I support the proposal. > > Same here. I also, in principle, like the more general idea as outlined below. > Although I'd leave it to the NCC to think about and to apply DoS protection. :-) > I am in full agreement with Wilfried’s comment, supporting the modified limitation to personal data access, and let the operator deal with operational issues Joao > Wilfried. > >> My slightly modified suggestion is: >> >> When a given IP address, due to the large number of personal data queries >> reaches the limit where the NCC would now deny access to any objects, I >> think >> it would make sense to fully limit the access to personal data (i.e deny >> access to it), however, limit the access to other data as if they had been >> using the --no-personal flag so far. >> >> As long as there is no other kind of limitations than the one based on >> the number of personal data retrieved[*], this boils down to the >> suggestion below. >> If at some point other limitations are put in place, like number of queries >> within a time frame (to mitigate DoS attacks), then this would mean that >> they >> are still eligible for limitation if their query rate is too high (this >> time >> not due to the personal data involved). >> >> Best regards, >> Janos >> >> [*] See RIPE DB AUP >> (http://www.ripe.net/data-tools/support/documentation/aup). >> >>> At RIPE 68, we again raised the issue of how the blocking mechanism >>> works in the RIPE Database. Currently it is all or nothing — if a user >>> queries for too much personal data, we block their access to everything. >>> >>> We often find that this causes issues for legitimate users of the >>> database. This is a recent example of the requests our Customer >>> Services department receives: >>> >>> "This is the outgoing NAT IP for a vast shared hosting cluster. We >>> can't control the type of queries our customers run, there are over >>> 250,000 websites, a tiny fraction might use RIPE but those customers >>> are using RIPE database for a good reason and need to be able to query >>> it. This is why I'm asking for a blanket allow.” >>> >>> Clearly we cannot whitelist any IP address for unlimited access to >>> personal data. However, the option to only block access to personal >>> data objects when the limit is reached would be a great help in these >>> situations. >>> >>> No decision has been made on this issue. We are hoping that it can be >>> further discussed by the community to see if a consensus can be reached. >>> >>> Regards >>> >>> Denis Walker >>> Business Analyst >>> RIPE NCC Database Team >>> >>> >>> >> > > -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 203 bytes Desc: Message signed with OpenPGP using GPGMail URL: </ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/attachments/20140528/b6f9adfc/attachment.sig>
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