[db-wg] Disallowing MD5 passwords in e-mail updates, was MD5 Hashes in the database

Dear unnamed person,

This is not the RIPE NCC's database... they maintain it, and they use
it, but it is the RIPE Database - for the entire RIPE community.

Still, preventative steps have been taken - if you download the data on
maintainers then the passwords are not present. Also, the database
limits the volume of queries that users can make, to prevent harvesting
that way. These were done with coordination of the RIPE community.

The RIPE Database has always been completely public. The idea is that
you do not have to trust the RIPE NCC to keep secrets. This protects the
RIPE NCC, and it also protects us, the users. It also prevents users
accidentally exposing secret information by confusing which parts are
public and which are private - it is all public. In my mind there are
valid reasons to be concerned with hiding *any* of the RIPE Database,
although at the end I think it is the right thing to do.

Also, this is mostly a registration database we're talking about here.
If records are altered nobody will have their credit card charged, and
nobody will lose their allocations; probably the worst case is that
someone will be unable to get routed properly for a time. The RIPE
Database keeps an entire history of all transactions, so that if
authentication was compromised then the invalid changes could be rolled
back easily once discovered. (At least this used to be how it works;
perhaps that has changed?) 

There are reasons why the Database is the way it is. It is not the RIPE
NCC avoiding responsibility.

--
Shane

On Wed, 2011-11-09 at 10:55 +0100, virtu virtualabs wrote:
> So it is up to the community to move from MD5 authentication to
> stronger authentication methods ? No preventive steps would be taken
> to avoid MD5 hashes disclosure on the RIPE website ?
> 
> On Wed, Nov 9, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Nigel Titley <nigel at titley.com>
> wrote:
>         On Tue, 2011-11-08 at 15:01 +0100, virtu virtualabs wrote:
>         > That would mean RIPE NCC did not do anything while people
>         has been
>         > aware of this fact since 2 years ?
>         
>         
>         This problem is well known, both by the RIPE DB working group
>         (which is
>         what makes the policy, not the RIPE NCC) and also the RIPE NCC
>         itself.
>         It's been discussed for many years (not just 2) and the use of
>         better
>         authentication methods has been recommended (and have also
>         been
>         available for many years).
>         
>         However, the community seems to wish to continue to use plain
>         text
>         passwords in emails, together with MD5 hashing.
>         
>         Nigel
>         
>