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[db-wg] Disallowing MD5 passwords in e-mail updates, was MD5 Hashes in the database
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Daniel Stolpe
stolpe at resilans.se
Tue Nov 8 13:35:25 CET 2011
It would be intreresting for benchmarking anyway. :-) On Tue, 8 Nov 2011, virtu virtualabs wrote: > If you are interested, I can provide you with a list of maintainers which have weak passwords :) > As I said, there is a cracking job running on my side on the MD5(UNIX) hashes I grabbed earlier(by the way I apologize if this raised some errors or > security warnings ...). Once done I also could provide you with exact figures regarding number of cracked hashes. > > > On Tue, Nov 8, 2011 at 1:22 PM, Daniel Stolpe <stolpe at resilans.se> wrote: > > I agree. > > And maybe someone should set up john the ripper to crack some passwords and contact the holders of the weakest ones. > > On Tue, 8 Nov 2011, David Freedman wrote: > > I don't mind it continuing to be used over encrypted channels, > as long as the hashes are not available to the general public (as per your > previous mail) > > I would support a warning phase > > Dave. > > > > On 08/11/2011 11:56, "Shane Kerr" <shane at time-travellers.org> wrote: > > David, > > On Tue, 2011-11-08 at 09:38 +0000, David Freedman wrote: > I'd like to see auth: MD5-PW deprecated , even though it seems to be > widely used (for various reasons) > according to the report by DB presented to us. > > > I propose that we deprecate passwords over unencrypted channels. AFAIK > this just means e-mail today, although the web API stuff may also > provide an non-TLS option (I don't know). > > Unlike hiding MD5, this is a major change for users, and would need to > be done with the same caution and preparation as similar large changes > in the past. We could have a warning phase, where anyone using a > password in email would get a scary warning in the reply telling them to > use a more secure scheme (PGP, X.509, webupdates, or database web API). > The RIPE NCC could identify heavy users and help them convert their > tools. And eventually we could flip the switch and turn off plain text > passwords. > > -- > Shane Daniel _________________________________________________________________________________ Daniel Stolpe Tel: 08 - 688 11 81 stolpe at resilans.se Resilans AB Fax: 08 - 55 00 21 63 http://www.resilans.se/ Box 13 054 556741-1193 103 02 Stockholm
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