FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database

Hi!

Come on, begin your education career from your FSB (ex-KGB if somebody
don't know) colleagues:

inetnum:      213.24.76.0 - 213.24.77.255
netname:      RT-CLNT-FSB-RF
descr:        Federal Security Service of Russian Federation
descr:        3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045
country:      RU
admin-c:      DIP2-RIPE
admin-c:      ANH8-RIPE
tech-c:       ANH8-RIPE
tech-c:       DIP2-RIPE
status:       ASSIGNED PA
mnt-by:       AS8342-MNT
source:       RIPE # Filtered

person:         Dmitry Pravikov
address:        FSB RF
address:        3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045
remarks:        phone:        +7 095 2248374
phone:          +7 495 2248374
remarks:        fax-no:       +7 095 2244441
fax-no:         +7 495 2244441
e-mail:         pravikov at fsb.ru
nic-hdl:        DIP2-RIPE
source:         RIPE # Filtered
remarks:        modified for Russian phone area changes

person:         Alexander Holushco
address:        FSB RF
address:        3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045
remarks:        phone:        +7 095 2244441
phone:          +7 495 2244441
remarks:        fax-no:       +7 095 2244441
fax-no:         +7 495 2244441
e-mail:         root at fsb.ru
nic-hdl:        ANH8-RIPE
source:         RIPE # Filtered
remarks:        modified for Russian phone area changes

% Information related to '213.24.0.0/16AS8342'

route:        213.24.0.0/16
descr:        RTCOMM-RU
origin:       AS8342
mnt-by:       AS8342-MNT
source:       RIPE # Filtered

As we can see - there is *NO* mntner at all at *-c: objects! ;-)

Potapov Vladislav wrote:
> Hi,
>
>   
>> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert at space.net]
>> Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any 
>> operational changes, and doesn't require key management and 
>> crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security.
>>     
> No "operational changes"? Let's look at the plan to get an image that
> it's not so "problemless". I don't speak about RIPE resources which
> should support this change. About security: there was several opponents
> of your view already. I'm adding myself to them.
>
>   
>> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert at space.net]
>> Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, 
>> use that to leverage a routing attack").
>>     
> Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE
> problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. As for security issues...
> I think the better way to do this things is to educate people, convince
> them to have better way of security. Up to now it is only "small group
> words" and 3500 usages...
>
> I'm against the proposal.
>
> Vladislav Potapov
> Ru.iiat
>
>   


-- 
WBR,
Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253 at FIDO)