hierarchical route objects, part 1

In message <637.852810211 at dns.dante.org.uk>, Steven Bakker writes:
> ==> From: Gabor Kiss <kissg at sztaki.hu> 
> ==>       Thu, 9 Jan 1997 11:28:52 +0100 
> 
> CA> I disagree that this is a good idea. If I register the following route
> CA> object (which actually exists):
> CA> 
> CA> route:       128.0.0.0/1
> CA> descr:       HALF-DEFAULT-ONE
> CA> origin:      AS1800
> CA> advisory:    AS690 1:1800 2:1239
> CA> mnt-by:      MAINT-AS1800
> CA> mnt-lower:   MAINT-AS1800
> CA> 
> CA> nobody else can register any route objects.
> 
> GK> This can be prevented by this object
> GK> route:     0.0.0.0/0
> GK> descr:     for authorisation purposes
> GK> origin:    AS0
> GK> mnt-lower: MAINT-INTERNIC
> GK> etc.
> GK>
> GK> Internic (or whatever else) may delegate maintainer rights as well
> GK> as allocates address ranges.
> 
> That still doesn't help you if the 128.0.0.0/1 is already registered (which 
> it is); I imagine the proposed auth scheme would look for the most
> specific enclosing route object, which is 128.0.0.0/1 and not 0.0.0.0/0
> (for most routes nowadays anyway).
> 
> 			Steven


128.0.0.0/1 is obviously bogus so remove it.  It was placed there for
no reason other than to be disruptive and try to undermine the IRR.

If the registry that holds 128.0.0.0/1 won't remove it, then the
community that is using the IRR may have to exclude that registry.
[big hint sent in Merit's direction].

Curtis