[cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related Analysis

Dear Athina,

The ICG report is dependent on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability, so
it seems clear to me that the oversight of the IANA functions also depends
on the recommendations of CWG-Accountability.

Since it seems that we have different interpretations, I suggest that we
agree to disagree.

Best,
Richard

> -----Original Message-----
> From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces at ripe.net] On Behalf
> Of Athina Fragkouli
> Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 17:54
> To: cooperation-wg at ripe.net
> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers Related
> Analysis
> 
> Dear Richard,
> 
> According to the ICG proposal the oversight of the IANA function, as a
> whole, will not be conducted by ICANN. In particular the IANA numbering
> function will be conducted by the numbers community represented by the
> five RIRs and the IANA protocol parameters function will be conducted
> by the IETF community represented by the IAB.
> 
> With regards to the NTIA requirements, these are addressed by the ICG
> proposal in pages 59-61 (https://www.ianacg.org/icg-
> files/documents/IANA-stewardship-transition-proposal-EN.pdf).
> 
> I hope this clarifies the situation.
> 
> Kind regards,
> Athina
> 
> 
> On 21/12/15 16:46, Richard Hill wrote:
> > Dear Atina,
> >
> > Thank you for this and please see embedded comment below.
> >
> > Best,
> > Richard
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces at ripe.net] On
> >> Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli
> >> Sent: lundi, 21. décembre 2015 16:36
> >> To: cooperation-wg at ripe.net
> >> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers
> >> Related Analysis
> >>
> >> Dear Richard,
> >>
> >> Thank you for your reply.
> >>
> >> Regarding your comment on the Sole Designator Model, I would like to
> >> highlight that the NTIA requirement you mention refers to the
> >> oversight of the IANA function. The replacement of the oversight of
> >> the IANA function is described in the ICG proposal.
> >>
> >> The CCWG draft report, however, refers to the oversight of ICANN.
> >> Therefore, the NTIA requirement would not be applicable in this
> case.
> >
> > I beg to differ. The oversight in question is the oversight for
> > ICANN's performance of the IANA function, so the NTIA requirement
> does apply.
> >
> > The issue of the general oversight of ICANN is being handled
> separately.
> >
> >>
> >> With regards to the topic of U.S. Headquarters as part of ICANN's
> >> fundamental bylaws, thank you for expressing your agreement to the
> >> ASO representatives' position.
> >>
> >> Kind regards,
> >>
> >> Athina Fragkouli
> >> ASO representative to the CCWG
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>> Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2015 10:40:37 +0100
> >>> From: "Richard Hill" <rhill at hill-a.ch>
> >>> To: "'Athina Fragkouli'" <athina.fragkouli at ripe.net>,
> >>> 	<cooperation-wg at ripe.net>
> >>> Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers
> >>> 	Related	Analysis
> >>>
> >>> Thank you for this.
> >>>
> >>> Please see embedded comments below.
> >>>
> >>> Best,
> >>> Richard
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: cooperation-wg [mailto:cooperation-wg-bounces at ripe.net] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Athina Fragkouli
> >>>> Sent: Wednesday, December 16, 2015 16:46
> >>>> To: cooperation-wg at ripe.net
> >>>> Subject: [cooperation-wg] CCWG Third Draft Report - Numbers
> Related
> >>>> Analysis
> >>>>
> >>>> Dear colleagues,
> >>>>
> >>>> I would like to remind you that the Cross Community Working Group
> >>>> on Enhancing ICANN Accountability (CCWG) has published a third
> >>>> Draft Report, available here:
> >>>> https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
> >> accountability
> >>>> - proposal-work-stream-1-recs-30nov15-en.pdf
> >>>>
> >>>> Comments can be sent via this webpage:
> >>>> https://www.icann.org/public-comments/draft-ccwg-accountability-
> >>>> proposal-2015-11-30-en
> >>>>
> >>>> The comment period closes on 21 December 2015 at 23:59 UTC.
> >>>
> >>> SNIP
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> 2. Sole Designator Model
> >>>>
> >>>> The second Draft Report suggested that these powers would be
> >>>> exercised by changing ICANN?s structure, and introduced a
> structure
> >>>> called the Sole Membership Model.
> >>>>
> >>>> During and following the public consultation, objections to this
> >>>> model were expressed. As a result of further discussions and
> >>>> consultations, the third Draft Report introduces a new structure
> >>>> called the Sole Designator Model.
> >>>>
> >>>> The details of the Sole Designator Model can be found in ANNEX 01
> >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
> >> accountabilit
> >>>> y-
> >>>> proposal-annex-1-30nov15-en.pdf).
> >>>>
> >>>> The following aspects of the model are important to highlight:
> >>>>
> >>>> - To implement the ?Sole Designator? model, ICANN?s Supporting
> >>>> Organizations and Advisory Committees would create a unified
> entity
> >>>> to enforce their Community Powers. This unified entity will be
> >>>> referred to as the ?Empowered Community?. SO/ACs are not required
> >>>> to have a legal personhood.
> >>>> - Under California law, the Sole Designator has the right to
> >>>> appoint and remove ICANN Board directors, whether individually or
> >>>> the entire Board.
> >>>> Please note that Directors appointed by an SO may only be removed
> >>>> by a decision of that specific SO. The Sole Designator would
> merely
> >>>> implement their decisions.
> >>>> - If the ICANN Board refused to comply with a decision by the
> >>>> Empowered Community to use the statutory rights, the refusal could
> >> be
> >>>> petitioned in a court that has jurisdiction to force the ICANN
> >>>> Board to comply with that decision.
> >>>> - Details of the Community Process defined (including thresholds
> to
> >>>> start the process and to exercise community power) are described
> in
> >>>> ANNEX 04
> >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
> >> accountabilit
> >>>> y-
> >>>> proposal-annex-4-30nov15-en.pdf)
> >>>>
> >>>> Do you have any comments with regard to this model?
> >>>
> >>> Paragraph 58 of that proposal shows that the "empowered community"
> >> would consist of 5 organizations: ALAC, ASO, GNSO, ccNSO, and GAC.
> >> Each of these organizations is an organic component of ICANN, and
> the
> >> majority of them represent the domain name and addressing
> industries.
> >>>
> >>> Thus, the proposal does not provide for any external accountability
> >> or supervision of ICANN: ICANN would be accountable only to entities
> >> that are part of ICANN.
> >>>
> >>> In March 2014, NTIA announced that it intended "to transition key
> >> Internet domain name functions to the global multistakeholder
> >> community", see:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> https://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-
> >> tran
> >>> sition-key-internet-domain-name-functions
> >>>
> >>> An entity (the "empowered community") that consists of
> organizations
> >> that are organic components of ICANN is obviously not "the global
> >> multistakeholdercommunity", nor can it be construed to be
> >> representative of that community when 3 out of 5 of the cited
> >> organizations represent the domain name and addressing industries.
> >>>
> >>> Consequently, the proposal manifestly fails to meet the main
> >> objective enunciated by NTIA, namely that ICANNshould be accountable
> >> to a the broad global multistakeholder  community. Therefore, I do
> >> not agree with recommendations contained in the proposal.
> >>>
> >>> It still seems to me that it would be better to turn ICANN into a
> >> proper membership organization, see:
> >>>
> >>>   http://forum.icann.org/lists/icg-forum/pdfXXrCnTxCwW.pdf
> >>>
> >>> SNIP
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>>
> >>>> 4. U.S. Headquarters as part of the Fundamental Bylaws
> >>>>
> >>>> In the third Draft Report (as in the first and second Draft
> Report)
> >>>> the CCWG proposes the incorporation of some ICANN
> >>>> accountability-related provisions from the Affirmation of
> >> Commitments
> >>>> into the Bylaws (in particular regarding ICANN?s Mission and Core
> >>>> Values). The CCWG suggested defining these provisions as
> >> "Fundamental
> >>>> Bylaws". The concept of Fundamental Bylaws is described in ANNEX
> 03
> >>>> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/draft-ccwg-
> >> accountabilit
> >>>> y-
> >>>> proposal-annex-3-30nov15-en.pdf)
> >>>> of the third Draft Report.
> >>>>
> >>>> The main difference with the common Bylaws provisions is that
> while
> >>>> the Board could propose a change to this Bylaws provision,
> >> Supporting
> >>>> Organizations and Advisory Committees (SO/ACs) with voting rights
> >>>> could block the proposed change (by a 66% vote). On the other hand
> >>>> any change to Fundamental Bylaws would require approval by SO/ACs
> >>>> with voting rights (75% vote).
> >>>>
> >>>> One of the provisions of the AFfirmation of Commitments requires
> >> that
> >>>> ICANN ?remains headquartered in the United States of America?. The
> >>>> CCWG noted that this provision exists already in current ICANN
> >>>> Bylaws, at Article XVIII Section 1:
> >>>>
> >>>> ?OFFICES.
> >>>> The principal office for the transaction of the business of ICANN
> >>>> shall be in the County of Los Angeles, State of California, United
> >>>> States of America. ICANN may also have an additional office or
> >>>> offices within or outside the United States of America as it may
> >> from
> >>>> time to time establish.?
> >>>>
> >>>> The CCWG considered whether this provision should also be listed
> as
> >> a
> >>>> Fundamental Bylaw, since it has been suggested that the rest of
> >>>> Affirmation of Commitments provisions be incorporated in the
> >>>> Fundamental Bylaws.
> >>>>
> >>>> The ASO representatives communicated to the CCWG the following
> >> comment:
> >>>>
> >>>> ?There is general support the introduction of Fundamental Bylaws.
> >>>> Regarding, the list of Bylaws that should become Fundamental
> >>>> Bylaws, most of them indeed contain fundamental principles.
> >>>> However, the RIR community does not believe that the requirement
> >>>> for ICANN to remain in the United States of America is
> fundamental,
> >>>> but rather is an administrative issue.?
> >>>
> >>> I agree. It is not appropriate to case into stone that ICANN must
> >> reside in the USA.
> >>>
> >>> SNIP
> >>>
> >
> >