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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">If the database is filled with nonsensical information that anyone can hand in and get themselves a large netblock there isn’t much point to the entire exercise.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Much as if a bank manager were to accept any random paperwork and hand over loans – which is what RIPE is doing with IP space that it is the custodian of.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Not much point in arguing this, once the conclusion is that no action is about to be taken and a “not in my backyard” attitude adopted, no amount of such discussion over decades
is going to change a thing. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">Regulatory action is entirely possible if something egregious enough turns up as it eventually will, and then none of us is going to like the end result.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US">--srs<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt;mso-fareast-language:EN-US"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal" style="margin-bottom:12.0pt"><b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif;color:black">From:
</span></b><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif;color:black">anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces@ripe.net> on behalf of Tomás Oliveira Valente Leite de Castro via anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net><br>
<b>Date: </b>Thursday, 18 January 2024 at 5:41</span><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Arial",sans-serif;color:black"> </span><span style="font-size:12.0pt;font-family:"Aptos",sans-serif;color:black">AM<br>
<b>To: </b>Anti-abuse Wg <anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net><br>
<b>Subject: </b>Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Bulletproof servers causing mischief on the internet<o:p></o:p></span></p>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">Hi,<br>
<br>
As far as "taking down" bulletproof hosting, that is very hard to do as <br>
they often operate on jurisdictions that are easier for them to run <br>
their business.<br>
RIPE NCC only allocates blocks of IP addresses to LIRs, which in turn <br>
LIRs allocate to end users. There have been cases where the LIR itself <br>
are cybercriminals that exploit this to get addresses for their <br>
activities.<br>
There are other entities that do flag these blocks in an attempt to make <br>
the internet safer by flagging these IP blocks and even entire ASNs.<br>
<br>
I think the most important thing to note, is that at the end of the day <br>
no one "controls" the internet. And RIPE's job is to coordinate these <br>
blocks of IPs assigned to LIRs/ISPs and maintain an up to date database <br>
of all these allocations. RIPE is not in any way an ISP, they don't have <br>
insights on the traffic of the internet including the IPs they assign <br>
(RIPE does operate RIS but it's out scope for this topic).<br>
<br>
One of the entities that specializes in flagging and trying to bring <br>
down these criminals is spamhaus (<a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/">https://www.spamhaus.org/</a>). There are
<br>
more, but I personally use the spamhaus blocklist so I'm randomly <br>
quoting this one.<br>
<br>
It is also important to understand that RIPE will only revoke addresses <br>
if the LIR is going against RIPE's policies. Since RIPE covers many <br>
regions and jurisdictions it makes the job much harder. As far as I <br>
know, sending SPAM email and other type or bulletproof hosting <br>
activities, is technically not a RIPE policy violation. Providing false <br>
contact information, and false documentation to obtain number resources <br>
is a policy violation.<br>
<br>
RIPE must always maintain a very neutral position in all of this, and as <br>
you mention a Netflix documentary (I'm assuming it was "Cyberbunker"?) <br>
where they were in fact a LIR, those addresses were not revoked, rather <br>
than sold to another company. The documentary reflects this.<br>
<br>
Also, RIPE provides registration services for these LIRs. Nothing else. <br>
Without RIPE's job you wouldn't know who was controlling these blocks, <br>
including abuse contacts.<br>
<br>
If you cannot get in contact with a LIR through an abuse contact, then <br>
you can contact the registrant's local authorities. If such entity does <br>
not exists, then this is a policy violation and the LIR account will be <br>
revoked including the IPs registered to it.<br>
<br>
I personally blame ISPs involved in providing connectivity as they <br>
probably are aware of weird traffic patterns (such as IP spoofing), and <br>
might be contacted every once in a while as to why they are providing <br>
connectivity to these other, smaller, ISPs.<br>
<br>
Also I believe that some of the activities you described happen on the <br>
"Tor" network, the .onion websites, which are a bit out of scope here.<br>
<br>
At the end of the day, there is very little RIPE can do about this. As I <br>
mentioned on my other email, IP leasing happens a lot nowadays with IPv4 <br>
shortage so revoking a LIR account or addresses that were used for these <br>
activities wouldn't even punish the scammers. You would be punishing an <br>
ISP that allocated addresses to scammers. And I think you can see where <br>
the legal fights begin, RIPE does not want to be sued by ISPs.<br>
<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
Tomás Leite de Castro<br>
<br>
<br>
On 2024-01-17 23:00, OSINTGuardian wrote:<br>
> hi tomás,<br>
> <br>
> thanks for answering me<br>
> <br>
> I understand that RIPE NCC's job is not to monitor the internet, but<br>
> unfortunately criminals see that they do not get consequences and<br>
> decide to join the bulletproof hosting business. People financed by<br>
> organized crime see this as a business opportunity.<br>
> <br>
> and hackers, pedophiles, scammers, drug dealers, arms dealers and<br>
> other people see an opportunity to be a customer of these bulletproof<br>
> hosting. criminals see that they get no consequences for doing this<br>
> and make a lot of money.<br>
> <br>
> If RIPE NCC creates an abuse team that monitors that no one uses RIPE<br>
> NCC as a form of business model to create bulletproof servers to sell<br>
> to criminal networks, the Internet would become a cleaner place.<br>
> It became a business model to ignore abuse reports sent by email to<br>
> hosting companies.<br>
> <br>
> There is a wiki on Wikipedia about bulletproof servers that describes<br>
> the same thing, documentaries on Netflix and series that explain how<br>
> criminals do illegal activities on the Internet using bulletproof<br>
> hosting. If there is no prompt action against this, the only one who<br>
> will benefit is organized crime.<br>
> <br>
> What can be done against a person who operates a bulletproof server?:<br>
> From what I've noticed, you said that restrictions apply to LIRs. How<br>
> do they punish people who operate bulletproof servers? And what to do<br>
> when someone has a lot of evidence that a person operates bulletproof<br>
> hosting and uses it to sell services to dark net criminals?<br>
> <br>
> I myself spoke to bulletproof hosting owners, and they feel totally<br>
> immune and untouchable. They feel that no one can do anything against<br>
> them, many of them are in countries with few laws regarding the<br>
> Internet and they abuse this, what resources are there to combat this?<br>
> <br>
> or is there nothing to do?<br>
> "><br>
> On ene. 17 2024, at 6:05 pm, Tomás Oliveira Valente Leite de Castro<br>
> via anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net> wrote:<br>
> <br>
>> Hi,<br>
>> <br>
>> I have been wondering for a while about this same issue. And I guess<br>
>> <br>
>> there are both pros and cons about RIPE providing registration<br>
>> services<br>
>> to such IP addresses.<br>
>> As you've stated, contacting them most of the time is useless. But<br>
>> most<br>
>> of the cases these IPs are blacklisted or on DROP-lists (spamhaus<br>
>> for<br>
>> example)<br>
>> <br>
>> I believe RIPE NCC's job is not to police the internet, but to<br>
>> provide<br>
>> registration services. However RIPE should guarantee that the<br>
>> registrant's data is correct and up to date. This includes a proper<br>
>> abuse contact.<br>
>> <br>
>> As for bulletproof hosting, it is at the best interest of the<br>
>> Internet<br>
>> that these IPs remain duly registered. There are many cases where<br>
>> the<br>
>> original registrant might not even be properly aware, or at fault<br>
>> when<br>
>> such activities happen with their addressing.<br>
>> The most effective action is to contact the upstream ISPs and cut<br>
>> their<br>
>> connectivity.<br>
>> <br>
>> If such a system would be implemented by RIPE, I think it should be<br>
>> oriented towards making sure the abuse contacts are up to date and<br>
>> reachable. Rather than to police about the use of the addresses. As<br>
>> ultimately the connectivity for such activities is provided by ISPs.<br>
>> <br>
>> I do see the analogy you made with ICANN but registering a domain on<br>
>> the<br>
>> internet is much more reachable to everyone when comparing to IP<br>
>> space,<br>
>> when most of that space is reassigned from upstream ISPs. Also<br>
>> addresses<br>
>> are assigned in blocks, when domains are assigned individually.<br>
>> <br>
>> Please understand that I don't condone at all bulletproof hosting or<br>
>> <br>
>> such activities in way. In fact it should be stopped. But the most<br>
>> effective action is likely not from RIPE to just deregister such<br>
>> resources when abuse happens or when an abuse contact is incorrect.<br>
>> It<br>
>> is worth noting that RIPE does apply restrictions to LIRs that<br>
>> repeatedly cause issues, and this includes falsifying contact<br>
>> information.<br>
>> <br>
>> I think this is worth discussing if more restrictive actions should<br>
>> be<br>
>> taken towards such LIRs where illegal activities such as<br>
>> bulletproofing<br>
>> are the main business. But I'm worried about RIPE NCC's ability to<br>
>> verify on abuse that happens on the internet.<br>
>> <br>
>> Best regards,<br>
>> <br>
>> Tomás Leite de Castro<br>
>> <br>
>> On 2024-01-17 19:52, OSINTGuardian wrote:<br>
>>> hi,<br>
>>> <br>
>>> There are more and more bulletproof hosting in the world every<br>
>> month<br>
>>> and they are causing more and more chaos, feeding the dark web by<br>
>>> providing servers to criminals of all kinds who use the servers on<br>
>>> .onion websites in Tor and flooding the clear web with illegal<br>
>>> content.<br>
>>> <br>
>>> There is a bulletproof hosting market that is even openly<br>
>> promoted, it<br>
>>> is as easy to find companies that provide bulletproof servers as<br>
>>> searching on Google, hacker forums or simple internet websites<br>
>> that<br>
>>> provide lists of bulletproof hosting companies.<br>
>>> <br>
>>> The business model of these companies is to ignore reports of<br>
>> abuse of<br>
>>> illegal content, to look the other way when someone uploads<br>
>> illegal<br>
>>> content. This is openly their business model, what does RIPE NCC<br>
>> do<br>
>>> about this?<br>
>>> <br>
>>> RIPE NCC provides IP addresses to many of these companies with<br>
>>> bulletproof servers that are then used by criminals on the<br>
>> Internet,<br>
>>> strengthening organized crime.<br>
>>> <br>
>>> ICANN publicly has an abuse reporting form, where users can report<br>
>> if<br>
>>> a company provides bulletproof domains or ignores abuse reports.<br>
>> If<br>
>>> RIPE NCC did this same thing, the internet would become a better<br>
>>> place.<br>
>>> <br>
>>> If RIPE NCC did this and also other IP address accreditors, they<br>
>> would<br>
>>> greatly affect criminals on the Internet and therefore the<br>
>> Internet<br>
>>> would become a slightly safer place than it is today. Bulletproof<br>
>>> server companies would be afraid of being caught by RIPE NCC<br>
>>> committing these violations. Unfortunately, these companies<br>
>> currently<br>
>>> feel enough freedom to do this, that they even show themselves<br>
>>> publicly.<br>
>>> <br>
>>> Is RIPE NCC planning to do anything against this?<br>
>>> <br>
>>> - Claudia Lopez<br>
>>> OSINTGuardian<br>
>> <br>
>> --<br>
>> <br>
>> To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or<br>
>> change your subscription options, please visit:<br>
>> <a href="https://mailman.ripe.net/">https://mailman.ripe.net/</a><br>
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