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[anti-abuse-wg] Yet another BGP hijacking towards AS16509
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Siyuan Miao
siyuan at misaka.io
Tue Aug 23 02:15:47 CEST 2022
Just noticed another thing: ➜ ~ whois -h whois.ripe.net -- "--list-versions AS1299" | tail -n10 2862 2022-07-11T14:44:49Z ADD/UPD 2863 2022-07-27T11:17:25Z ADD/UPD 2864 2022-08-02T08:43:02Z ADD/UPD 2865 2022-08-10T12:11:29Z ADD/UPD *2866 2022-08-17T10:47:43Z ADD/UPD2867 2022-08-18T12:53:37Z ADD/UPD* % This query was served by the RIPE Database Query Service version 1.103 (WAGYU) ➜ ~ whois -h whois.ripe.net -- "--show-version 2865 AS1299" | grep 209243 ➜ ~ whois -h whois.ripe.net -- "--show-version 2866 AS1299" | grep 209243 import: from AS209243 accept AS209243 mp-import: afi ipv6 from AS209243 accept AS209243 *➜ ~ whois -h whois.ripe.net <http://whois.ripe.net> -- "--show-version 2867 AS1299" | grep 209243import: from AS209243 accept AS-SET209243mp-import: afi ipv6 from AS209243 accept AS-SET209243* Looks like the first thing that AS209243 had done after they got AS1299 transit is ... hijacking an Amazon prefix ..? On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 1:51 AM Siyuan Miao <siyuan at misaka.io> wrote: > Hi folks, > > Recently I read a post regarding the recent incident of Celer Network and > noticed a very interesting and successful BGP hijacking towards AS16509. > > The attacker AS209243 added AS16509 to their AS-SET and a more specific > route object for the /24 where the victim's website is in ALTDB: > (Below is our IRRd4 server NRTM logging, UTC timezone) > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106270-ADD 96126 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106280- > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106281-as-set: AS-SET209243 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106306-descr: quickhost set > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106332-members: AS209243, AS16509 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106362:mnt-by: MAINT-QUICKHOSTUK > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106392-changed: crussell at quickhostuk.net > 20220816 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31106438-source: ALTDB > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147549-ADD 96127 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147559- > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147560-route: 44.235.216.0/24 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147588-descr: route > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147606-origin: AS16509 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147626:mnt-by: MAINT-QUICKHOSTUK > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147656-changed: crussell at quickhostuk.net > 20220816 > > irrd.log-20220817.gz:31147702-source: ALTDB > > > Then they started announcing the prefix ... under another AWS ASN (AS14618) > I guess AS1299 Arelion doesn't check if the origin AS of an announcement > is in the customer's AS-SET but it's pretty normal and understandable. > > > https://stat.ripe.net/widget/bgplay#w.resource=44.235.216.0/24&w.ignoreReannouncements=true&w.starttime=1660694458&w.endtime=1661032798&w.rrcs=0&w.instant=null&w.type=bgp > > > Type: A > announce Involving: 44.235.216.0/24 > Short description: The new route 34854 1299 209243 14618 has been > announced > Path: 34854, 1299, 209243, 14618, > Community: 1299:35000,34854:3001 > Date and time: 2022-08-17 19:39:50 Collected by: 00-2.56.11.1 > > Hjacking didn't last too long. AWS started announcing a more specific > announcement to prevent hijacking around 3 hours later. Kudos to Amazon's > security team :-) > > Type: A > announce Involving: 44.235.216.0/24 > Short description: The new route 58057 34549 5511 1299 16509 has been > announced > Path: 58057, 34549, 5511, 1299, 16509, > Community: 5511:521,5511:666,5511:710,5511:5511,34549:100,34549:5511 > Date and time: 2022-08-17 23:08:47 Collected by: 00-194.50.92.251 > > The attacker cleaned up the IRR objects on 17 Aug and surprisingly no one > seems to notice them ... > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517714-ADD 96196 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517724- > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517725:as-set: AS-SET209243 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517750-descr: quickhost set > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517776-members: AS209243, AS35437, AS37497 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517815-mnt-by: MAINT-QUICKHOSTUK > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517845-changed: crussell at quickhostuk.net > 20220817 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517891-source: ALTDB > > > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517910-DEL 96197 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517920- > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517921-route: 44.235.216.0/24 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517949-descr: route > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517967-origin: AS16509 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26517987-mnt-by: MAINT-QUICKHOSTUK > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26518017-changed: crussell at quickhostuk.net > 20220816 > > irrd.log-20220819.gz:26518063-source: ALTDB > > > > Nowadays hijacking a service by forging AS path is pretty easy and RPKI > won't be able to solve this (as it validates origin AS and prefixes only) > :-( > > Regards, > Siyuan > > > -------------- next part -------------- An HTML attachment was scrubbed... URL: </ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/attachments/20220823/941af22f/attachment-0001.html>
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