[anti-abuse-wg] AS24961 myLoc managed IT AG, uadns.com, ledl.net, and non-disclosing registries

ICANN has absolutely nothing to do with whois policies for ccTLDs like .de, .eu and .at.
If you want to cast wild aspersions at organisations without providing *any* actual proof of anything then please at least get some basic facts right.
The .eu registry does have policies around registration data and they do actively enforce them. 

I also fail to see what exactly you want this group to do, since you haven't provided any tangible information beyond the incredibly vague assertion that there's something wrong out there.

Regards

Michele


--
Mr Michele Neylon
Blacknight Solutions
Hosting, Colocation & Domains
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On 19/02/2020, 07:21, "anti-abuse-wg on behalf of Hans-Martin Mosner" <anti-abuse-wg-bounces at ripe.net on behalf of hmm at heeg.de> wrote:

    AS24961 (RIPE NCC member myLoc managed IT AG) continues to host one persistent spam sender years after years. I have
    complained to them a number of times, with no noticeable effect.
    
    The sender is recognizable by characteristics of their domain names and local parts, and most importantly by their DNS
    service, which is always uadns.com. Would be easy to deny them service if myLoc wanted to.
    
    Domain registrations are most often done via Ledl.net GmbH (RIPE NCC member).
    
    Registries DENIC eG (RIPE NCC member), EURid vzw (RIPE NCC member), nic.at GmbH (RIPE NCC member) willingly accept
    registrations that have most likely fake data (which I can't check because these data are conveniently not disclosed,
    although they very likely describe a commercial entity and not existing private persons and are therefore not subject to
    GDPR protections.)
    
    Excuse me while I vomit a little.
    
    I know that this working group is not responsible for handling individual cases of abuse, so my intention is not to get
    a solution (which I already did via nullrouting that AS) but to understand how persistent abuse-enabling entities can
    act unhindered without any clear escalation path. Effectively extracting the last rotten tooth "ICANN Whois Inaccuracy
    Complaint" by hiding all registration data so that an inaccuracy check is made impossible didn't help much...
    
    Cheers,
    Hans-Martin