[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 Review Phase (Resource Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)

All,

If it's *your* table, you should be able.
>
Again, I disagree. Just because you have a copy of the routing table
doesn't automatically put you in a position to know what is going on with
each entry present in that table.

But please keep in mind than one event or a handful of events shouldn't
> justify an investigation, or handing a case to "experts".
>
The current policy proposal doesn't have text to support this.

If the issue is fixed and the issue originator isn't always the same, then
> no real need for an investigation. Maybe the amount of text on the current
> version fades a bit the two main concepts of "persistent" and
> "intentional".
>
I am in agreement with you on this.

There should be enough "trail" to justify starting an investigation...
>
If the person submitting a report isn't in an authoritative position to say
whether or not an announcement was a hijack, there isn't a good enough
"trail" to justify starting an investigation.

 The "proposal". It's just a proposal...! :-)



I agree that there isn't a way to measure how many people around the

world would not resort to hijacking if this proposal was in place today

My apologies for misspeaking on that one.  Any references I may have made
to 2019-3 as a "policy" should read as "policy proposal".
Just because a policy proposal has the chance to discourage bad actors
doesn't mean we should ignore the potential consequences of implementing
the proposal.

Jacob Slater



On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 5:25 PM Carlos Friaças <cfriacas at fccn.pt> wrote:

>
>
> Hi,
>
>
> On Mon, 9 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:
>
> > All,
> >       If that happens, then potentially everyone can be a victim, yes.
> >       Then they should be able to place a report.
> >
> >
> > I disagree. Just because you see what you think is a hijack in the full
> table doesn't mean you have enough information to justify a full
> investigation that is likely to consume valuable time and resources.
>
> If it's *your* table, you should be able.
> But please keep in mind than one event or a handful of events shouldn't
> justify an investigation, or handing a case to "experts".
>
>
> >       Afaik, this is possible within LACNIC (i.e. through
> warp.lacnic.net). When
> >       the same proposal was discussed there, the yearly number of
> reports (if
> >       i'm not mistaken) was on the scale of dozens -- and they have a
> very high
> >       degree of helping stop/mitigate the incidents, almost close to
> 100%, which
> >       is fantastic!
> >
> >
> > Being asked to fix an issue is very different from getting investigated
> for an issue with the potential for termination of membership.
>
> If the issue is fixed and the issue originator isn't always the same, then
> no real need for an investigation. Maybe the amount of text on the current
> version fades a bit the two main concepts of "persistent" and
> "intentional".
>
>
> > While I haven't seen a proposal for establishing a system like LACNIC's
> WARP under RIPE, I'd be
> > open to the idea.
>
> Great. Does anyone think this is a bad idea?
>
> That would probably fall under the ncc-services-wg, so we'll have to see
> :-)
>
>
>
> >       I fail to identify exactly were the proposal describes such a need.
> >       Even so, the experts should be binded to NDAs... :-)
> >
> >
> > While having the experts under NDA is a step in the right direction, it
> still involves effectively being required to turn information over to
> external parties due to the suspicions of some random AS. My concern isn't
> so much that the
> > information will be leaked; my concern is that, fundamentally, being
> required to turn information over to a third party on someone's unsupported
> suspicions seems wrong.
>
> There should be enough "trail" to justify starting an investigation...
>
>
>
> > Right now, the policy seems to pull a large amount of resources and risk
> (per the impact analysis) without enough of a return.
>
> The "proposal". It's just a proposal...! :-)
>
> I agree that there isn't a way to measure how many people around the
> world would not resort to hijacking if this proposal was in place today
> :-)
>
>
> Regards,
> Carlos
>
>
>
>
> > Jacob Slater
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > On Mon, Sep 9, 2019 at 3:45 PM Carlos Friaças <cfriacas at fccn.pt> wrote:
> >
> >
> >       On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:
> >
> >       > All,
> >
> >       Hi Jacob, All,
> >
> >
> >       > Given the number of people who may submit a report (anyone
> receiving a
> >       > full table from their upstream(s), assuming the accused hijack
> makes it
> >       > into the DFZ),
> >
> >       If that happens, then potentially everyone can be a victim, yes.
> >       Then they should be able to place a report.
> >       But that's a fundamental part of why some changes are needed: it's
> not
> >       only the legitimate address space owner who is the victim of an
> hijack.
> >       People/networks whose packets are diverted by an hijack are also
> victims
> >       of traffic interception.
> >
> >       Afaik, this is possible within LACNIC (i.e. through
> warp.lacnic.net). When
> >       the same proposal was discussed there, the yearly number of
> reports (if
> >       i'm not mistaken) was on the scale of dozens -- and they have a
> very high
> >       degree of helping stop/mitigate the incidents, almost close to
> 100%, which
> >       is fantastic!
> >
> >
> >       > I'm still concerned that the proposed policy would cause more
> harm than
> >       > good. A random AS that happens to receive the announcement isn't
> in an
> >       > authoritative position to know if a given announcement was
> unauthorized.
> >
> >       I can fully agree that a system based on (possibly forged) LOAs,
> and
> >       unauthenticated IRR created the huge mess we are submerged in
> today...
> >       :(((
> >
> >
> >       > Putting them through a reporting process that might well require
> the
> >       > disclosure of internal information because of an unrelated
> >       > individual/group being suspicious is a problem.
> >
> >       I fail to identify exactly were the proposal describes such a need.
> >       Even so, the experts should be binded to NDAs... :-)
> >
> >
> >       Regards,
> >       Carlos
> >
> >
> >
> >       > Combined with the issues detailed in the Impact Analysis, I'm
> opposed to the policy as written.
> >       >
> >       > Jacob Slater
> >       >
> >       > On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 9:24 AM Marco Schmidt <mschmidt at ripe.net>
> wrote:
> >       >       Dear colleagues,
> >       >
> >       >       Policy proposal 2019-03, "Resource Hijacking is a RIPE
> Policy Violation"
> >       >       is now in the Review Phase.
> >       >
> >       >       The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking
> is not
> >       >       accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service
> region.
> >       >
> >       >       The proposal has been updated following the last round of
> discussion and
> >       >       is now at version v2.0. Some of the changes made to
> version v1.0 include:
> >       >       - Includes procedural steps for reporting and evaluation
> of potential
> >       >       hijacks
> >       >       - Provides guidelines for external experts
> >       >       - Adjusted title
> >       >
> >       >       The RIPE NCC has prepared an impact analysis on this
> latest proposal
> >       >       version to support the community?s discussion. You can
> find the full
> >       >       proposal and impact analysis at:
> >       >
> https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03
> >       >
> https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03#impact-analysis
> >       >
> >       >       And the draft documents at:
> >       >
> https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03/draft
> >       >
> >       >       As per the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP), the
> purpose of this
> >       >       four week Review Phase is to continue discussion of the
> proposal, taking
> >       >       the impact analysis into consideration, and to review the
> full draft
> >       >       RIPE Policy Document.
> >       >
> >       >       At the end of the Review Phase, the Working Group (WG)
> Chairs will
> >       >       determine whether the WG has reached rough consensus. It
> is therefore
> >       >       important to provide your opinion, even if it is simply a
> restatement of
> >       >       your input from the previous phase.
> >       >
> >       >       We encourage you to read the proposal, impact analysis and
> draft
> >       >       document and send any comments to <anti-abuse-wg at ripe.net>
> before 4
> >       >       October 2019.
> >       >
> >       >
> >       >       Kind regards,
> >       >
> >       >       Marco Schmidt
> >       >       Policy Officer
> >       >       RIPE NCC
> >       >
> >       >
> >       >
> >       >
> >
> >
> >
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