[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 Review Phase (Resource Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)

On Thu, 5 Sep 2019, Jacob Slater wrote:

> All,

Hi Jacob, All,


> Given the number of people who may submit a report (anyone receiving a 
> full table from their upstream(s), assuming the accused hijack makes it 
> into the DFZ),

If that happens, then potentially everyone can be a victim, yes.
Then they should be able to place a report.
But that's a fundamental part of why some changes are needed: it's not 
only the legitimate address space owner who is the victim of an hijack. 
People/networks whose packets are diverted by an hijack are also victims 
of traffic interception.

Afaik, this is possible within LACNIC (i.e. through warp.lacnic.net). When 
the same proposal was discussed there, the yearly number of reports (if 
i'm not mistaken) was on the scale of dozens -- and they have a very high 
degree of helping stop/mitigate the incidents, almost close to 100%, which 
is fantastic!


> I'm still concerned that the proposed policy would cause more harm than
> good. A random AS that happens to receive the announcement isn't in an 
> authoritative position to know if a given announcement was unauthorized.

I can fully agree that a system based on (possibly forged) LOAs, and 
unauthenticated IRR created the huge mess we are submerged in today... 
:(((


> Putting them through a reporting process that might well require the 
> disclosure of internal information because of an unrelated 
> individual/group being suspicious is a problem.

I fail to identify exactly were the proposal describes such a need.
Even so, the experts should be binded to NDAs... :-)


Regards,
Carlos



> Combined with the issues detailed in the Impact Analysis, I'm opposed to the policy as written.
> 
> Jacob Slater
> 
> On Thu, Sep 5, 2019 at 9:24 AM Marco Schmidt <mschmidt at ripe.net> wrote:
>       Dear colleagues,
>
>       Policy proposal 2019-03, "Resource Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation"
>       is now in the Review Phase.
>
>       The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking is not
>       accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service region.
>
>       The proposal has been updated following the last round of discussion and
>       is now at version v2.0. Some of the changes made to version v1.0 include:
>       - Includes procedural steps for reporting and evaluation of potential
>       hijacks
>       - Provides guidelines for external experts
>       - Adjusted title
>
>       The RIPE NCC has prepared an impact analysis on this latest proposal
>       version to support the community?s discussion. You can find the full
>       proposal and impact analysis at:
>       https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03
>       https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03#impact-analysis
>
>       And the draft documents at:
>       https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03/draft
>
>       As per the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP), the purpose of this
>       four week Review Phase is to continue discussion of the proposal, taking
>       the impact analysis into consideration, and to review the full draft
>       RIPE Policy Document.
>
>       At the end of the Review Phase, the Working Group (WG) Chairs will
>       determine whether the WG has reached rough consensus. It is therefore
>       important to provide your opinion, even if it is simply a restatement of
>       your input from the previous phase.
>
>       We encourage you to read the proposal, impact analysis and draft
>       document and send any comments to <anti-abuse-wg at ripe.net> before 4
>       October 2019.
> 
>
>       Kind regards,
>
>       Marco Schmidt
>       Policy Officer
>       RIPE NCC
> 
> 
> 
>