[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)

In message <CAFV686d+rHrTrevDm8sL9h+Nu6TPi8x+jHBv2pL+w-
M9gyBgpg at mail.gmail.com>, Jacob Slater <jacob at rezero.org> writes

>> First, I'm not sure I either understand or am even aware of these alleged
>> "forms of permission for announcement {that} are not documented".  So
>> perhaps
>> Mr. Slater could elaborate upon that, for my benefit, and perhaps also for
>> that of others who may also be similarly in the dark about what he's
>> talking
>> about here.
>>
>
>Route objects are not always required. While route objects are generally
>preferred and should be used, letters of authorization are still in use
>today. You certainly wouldn't see them in a public database (though you
>might see objects which claim to be tied to them). Even if you do, they may
>well be stale and no longer accurate.

I doubt that all (perhaps any?) anti-DDoS arrangements (which often
involve apparent hijacks of blocks of address space) are documented with
route objects....

... although perhaps more so in Europe where I believe that some
providers build filtering systems from route objects ?

-- 
richard                                                   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755
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