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[anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
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Carlos Friaças
cfriacas at fccn.pt
Wed Mar 20 09:17:59 CET 2019
On Wed, 20 Mar 2019, Andrey Korolyov wrote: > > And when everything is made clear, if a report is filed against AS1, AS1's > holder might have a problem, so i see a strong reason for not even trying > :-) > > > Out of interest, take an AS1 with single malicious upstream AS2, what stops AS2 to pretend that AS1 has made bogus announcements > and make them for its own purposes? This situation looks pretty real without RPKI or other advertisement strengthening methods, > as I could see. How experts are supposed to behave in this situation? That's an extra incentive for AS1 to create its ROAs properly...? :-)) What you describe is a supplier/customer relation. If the supplier is malicious, the customer can also file a report about the supplier's actions, and of course, if they are in conflict, AS1 can declare through it's aut-num that it has no relation with AS2 anymore, and that should catch the expert's eye... Cheers, Carlos
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