[anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List

>
> You can find the full proposal at:
> https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03


Hey WG,

out of curiosity, why neighboring ASNs are not carrying any responsibility
for not filtering out a malicious advertisement from a directly-peered
neighbor in the proposal? AFAIU most leaks happen because large parties are
letting their ACL loose, not because some state-backed player decides to
take a pick on someone's else traffic (though both variants exists). The
peer who allows any prefix announcement originating from its direct
neighbor is no less responsible for the hijack as the origin AS itself.

Could you please suggest a possibility to include that kind of relations
(determined by third parties, as currently stated for hijacker's AS in the
draft) and measures against a transit/upstream in same manner as they are
currently defined for a hijacker?

Thanks.
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